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ABSTRACT
This dissertation is divided into two major topics. The first two chapters belong to the
field of environmental economics and the third chapter belongs to development and behavioral
economics. The work on environmental economics is divided into two parts: Chapter 1 studies
the design of environmental markets when pollutants are complements and Chapter 2 studies
the effectiveness of a subsidy program that promotes cover crops, a new pollution abatement
technology in agriculture, in Iowa. Lastly, the work on development economics in Chapter 3
studies intra-household dynamics using a lab-in-the-field risk experiment in rural Cameroon.
As environmental concerns are gaining more attention, the need for more research on envi-
ronmental markets seem pertinent. Among the topics that require more attention is the usage
or prohibition of double-dipping or stacking, which occurs when a firm is allowed to obtain
payments for two environmental services that come from the same action. Given the various
implementations of payments for ecosystem/environmental services (PES), understanding the
usage of payments for several environmental services becomes very relevant for policy makers.
Motivated by the relevance of this subject, Chapter 1 includes a theoretical framework on the
design of environmental programs for pollutants that are complements and Chapter 2 includes
an empirical assessment of a payment program to increase the adoption of a new pollution
abatement technology.
The interest in the design of environmental programs for pollutants that are complements is
motivated by the current state of the literature. In particular, the literature lacks a consensus on
whether program participants should be compensated for reductions of both pollutants, which
is commonly referred to as double-dipping or stacking (Woodward 2011, Murray et al. 2012,
Cooley & Olander 2012, Greenhalgh 2008, Moslener & Requate 2005). Several authors have
attempted to understand the implications of double-dipping, but there are unresolved questions
in need of additional study. Chapter 1’s contribution to the literature is to further expand
xii
the understanding of different environmental program designs (e.g. prices versus quantities
(Ambec & Coria 2011, Weitzman 1974)). Chapter 1 includes a theoretical framework that
expands Woodward’s model to consider more policy designs. Chapter 1 compares quantities
with prices. Under prices, a regulator can allow or prohibit double-dipping. Hence, three policy
choices are essentially compared. The chapter starts with a regulator who has full information.
Then, it moves to a second-best setting modeling two scenarios in which full information is
absent for the regulator. The first scenario is based on two uncoordinated regulators who
set either prices or quantities without taking into account the other regulator’s environmental
program. The second scenario is based on a regulator who designs two environmental programs
ignoring complementarity. A contribution of Chapter 1 is to explicitly model the regulators’
behavior. Under each scenario, there are market characteristics that favor one policy over
the other. In particular, the curvature of the marginal benefit curves favors the usage of prices
versus quantities, not ruling out prices with stacking. By understanding different environmental
program designs, policy makers can design better programs that attain pollution abatement
more efficiently.
The motivation for Chapter 2 is based on water quality problems that remain severe across
much of the United States. Improvements are particularly challenging in agricultural regions
where upwards of 90 percent of the pollution load comes from sources that fall outside regulatory
control under the Clean Water Act. These nutrient sources are responsible for a large dead
zone in the Gulf of Mexico, the closure of Toledo’s drinking water facility, and ubiquitous
damage to recreational amenities. In Iowa, several state and federal programs encourage the
adoption a new agricultural pollution abatement technology, cover crops, through cost-share
funding opportunities, in which farmers receive matching funds or incentive payments to cover a
proportion of the conservation costs. The promotion of cover crops through cost-share funding
combined with a longitudinal data set with large Iowa farm operators including information on
farmers both before and after introduction of the subsidy program provides an identification
strategy to evaluate the effectiveness of funding for this promising new abatement technology.
Using propensity score matching and a Tobit estimator that takes into account non-adoption,
Chapter 2 finds that cost-share funding significantly increases the proportion of cover crops
xiii
planted and cover crops acres among both recipients of funds and among adopters. These results
have critical implications for finding solutions to address persistent water quality problems with
limited conservation budgets.
Lastly, Chapter 3 is motivated by the importance of intra-household dynamics and spouses’
relative influence on household expenditure decisions for the success of development strategies.
The study is based on the results from a lab-in-the-field risk experiment in rural Camerooon,
in which husband and wife individually participated in isolation and then participated together
as a couple. Using the experimental results, Chapter 3 focuses on risk preference differences
between spouses, spouses’ individual influence over the couple’s joint decision, and the relation
between this relative influence and different expenditure decisions. Chapter 3 answers the
following research questions: (i) Are there differences in risk preference between husbands and
wives within households?; (ii) are there differences in the relative influence of each spouse
over joint decisions involving risk?; and (iii) how does this relative influence affect household
educational and medical expenditure decisions?
Chapter 3 finds evidence of risk aversion among husbands, wives, and couples (i.e. husband
and wife together) on average, in which husbands are more risk averse than wives and couples.
The study identifies some factors influencing the heterogeneity in risk preferences between
spouses including whether the wife chose her husband for marriage and whether the wife worked
during the past year. For the relative influence of spouses over couple’s decisions under risk,
Chapter 3 finds variables that increase the likelihood that one spouse is closer to the couple.
Moreover, using a proxy for female bargaining power based on the difference in choices between
each spouse and the couple, the study finds that monogamous wives are more likely to be
more empowered than polygamous wives. At the same time, monogamous wives married to
Muslim husbands are more likely to be less empowered than monogamous wives married to non-
Muslim husbands. Lastly, the proxy for female bargaining power is positively correlated with
educational and medical expenditures. Chapter 3’s results provide a deeper insight into intra-
household dynamics in the studied area, but more research is required to continue informing
policy and supporting the generation of more effective development strategies in the region.
1CHAPTER 1. DOUBLE-DIPPING IN ENVIRONMENTAL MARKETS
UNDER TWO SECOND BEST SCENARIOS
1.1 Abstract
As policy makers explore the creation or modification of environmental markets for pollu-
tants that have complementarities, they must take into account the way these complementarities
affect the design and results of their policies. Given the attainment of several environmental
outcomes from a single conservation practice, landowners could potentially be compensated in
multiple markets that pay for environmental improvements. This concept of allowing payments
stemming from a single action that has several benefits is known as double-dipping or stacking
in the literature.
The major contribution of this paper is to explicitly model the setup of prices and quantities
under a second best setting and to subsequently compare a price policy allowing double-dipping
to two policies: a quantities policy and a price policy prohibiting double-dipping. We aim at
understanding when each of these policy designs is more efficient under two second-best sce-
narios. The first scenario we study is the case of two uncoordinated policy makers who do
not take into account the other’s environmental program. The second scenario we study is
when complementarity is ignored in the policy design. The paper points to specific market
characteristics that favor one policy over the others, which further expands our understanding
about the implications of allowing double-dipping in environmental markets.
21.2 Introduction and Literature Review
As policy makers explore the creation or modification of environmental markets for pollu-
tants that have complementarities, they must take into account the way these complementari-
ties affect their policy design and subsequent results. This is especially true for environmental
markets that are designed for farmers who do not face any mandatory regulation and whose
single conservation practice can bring a variety of environmental benefits. For example, the
adoption of cover crops on a farm land improves water quality and increases carbon sequestra-
tion. Given the attainment of several environmental benefits from a single action (e.g. cover
crops), landowners could potentially be compensated in multiple markets (e.g. carbon and
water quality markets) that pay for environmental improvements. This concept of allowing
multiple credits or payments stemming from a single action that has several benefits is known
as double-dipping or stacking in the literature. A major objective of this paper is to understand
the implications of allowing or prohibiting double-dipping in environmental markets under two
second best scenarios in which the regulator does not possess full information.
Regarding pollutants’ complementarities, several papers point to the importance of taking
production relations into account. For instance, Moslener and Requate (2005) solve a dynamic
multi-pollutant problem focusing on pollutants that are either complements or substitutes.
They conclude that environmental policy based on one pollutant can be inaccurate if there is
any complementarity or substitutability between pollutants. Feng and Kling (2005) study the
consequences of co-benefits from carbon sequestration programs. They view these co-benefits as
externalities that arise from emission reduction credits that are traded in the carbon market.
They emphasize the importance of taking these co-benefits into account as the free market
allocation is not likely to attain the social optimum. Ambec and Coria (2011) perform a prices
versus quantities analysis following Weitzman (1960) with multiple pollutants, which considers
whether pollutants are substitutes or complements in the cost function. Their analysis does
not address double-dipping and imposes some symmetry assumptions that are not used in
this paper. In particular, they assume that all firms are identical and optimize using the
same functional forms. Lastly, Woodward (2011) emphasizes the importance of pollutants’
3production relations and explicitly models double-dipping focusing on the complementarity of
pollutants in the abatement cost function in a static model.
In the current literature, several papers point to the potential benefits and concerns that
arise from allowing double-dipping. Focusing on the former, Cooley and Olander (2011) ar-
gue that multiple payments provide several sources of revenue that could spark landowners
to manage their land focusing on more than one environmental service. Similarly, Moslener
and Raquete (2005) state that by focusing on more environmental services, we can achieve a
larger provision of ecosystem services. Greendhalg (2008) argues that the inclusion of several
ecosystem services can stimulate the interest of potential participants in the program. On the
other hand, most papers list additionality as a major concern that might prevent policy makers
from allowing double-dipping in environmental markets (Woodward 2011, Cooley and Olander
2012, Moslener & Requate 2005, Murray et al. 2012). To prevent concerns about additionality,
program participants should only be paid for abatement that is truly additional, discarding
any practices that would have been adopted without the policy.
Double-dipping in environmental programs is modeled in a variety of ways. Horan et al.
(2004) explore two policy designs: a coordinated policy in which both payments and trading
programs are designed assuming farmers participate in both programs and an uncoordinated
policy in which the trading program is designed taking the existing payment program as given.
They conclude that efficiency gains emerge with coordination since both programs are able
to jointly influence farmers’ marginal decisions. Without coordination, double-dipping can in-
crease or decrease efficiency depending on the way the agri-environmental policy is targeted
(Horan et al. 2004). Their paper differs from this one as it does not focus on pollutants’ com-
plementarities, but focuses on the coordination of two environmental policies. From a different
study, Montero (2001) states that pollution markets should be integrated using optimal pol-
lutant exchange rates when the marginal abatement cost curves in the various environmental
markets are steeper than the marginal-benefit curves. If those conditions are reversed, then
environmental markets should be separated. Cooley and Olander (2012) argue that stacking
credits is not a major concern when there are incentive payments and when credits are given
for practices that are located in spatially distinct parts of the land. When credits are verti-
4cally stacked and when they come from a single management practice, they must be handled
correctly to avoid any net loss of environmental services. They are primarily concerned about
stacking offset or mitigation credits as they can become problematic due to double-counting and
additionality. Their paper focuses on the difference between payments for ecosystem services
(PES) and offsets, which is not a focus of this paper.
Lastly, Woodward (2011) explores double-dipping with a model motivated by firms that face
caps on pollution imposed by a regulator(s) and who seek to satisfy these caps by purchasing
offsets from uncapped sources. He concludes that whenever abatement caps are set optimally,
double-dipping is the preferred policy choice. However, when abatement caps are set incorrectly,
a policy eliminating double-dipping may provide larger net benefits for society. Given that caps
are set incorrectly, he concludes that when there is significant pollutants’ complementarity,
relatively flat marginal benefit curves, and greater cost heterogeneity in abating firms, a policy
prohibiting double-dipping is likely to increase net benefits for society. He states that double-
dipping is preferred when the above conditions are reversed and when the marginal benefits
curves per unit of abatement for pollutants are very different.
Rather than considering the specific market scenario of an uncapped firm that might par-
ticipate in two PES systems stemming from a command and control policy given to capped
firms, we consider the more general case where two PES systems are designed by a regulator(s),
consisting of possible payments to a firm providing two different environmental goods without
being tied to any capped sectors. We do this in order to differentiate the usage of quantities
versus prices. Nonetheless, since quantities are also important, we also contrast these PES1
with a command and control2 policy. This provides a more broad based assessment of the
conditions under which efficiency improves when double-dipping is allowed and abstracts from
specific market contexts.
Following Woodward (2011), cases of first and second best solutions are considered. The
policy choices we analyze are a command and control policy, a price scheme allowing double-
dipping and a price scheme prohibiting double-dipping. The main focus of this paper is to find
1We refer to PES, prices and subsidies interchangeably
2We refer to command and control, quantities and standards interchangeably
5out which policy is preferred given that the regulator sets quantities or prices in a second-best
way due to the lack of full information. Knowing that this is more plausible in the real world,
we want to know which is the best policy for the regulator. Woodward (2011) also studies the
case in which caps are set incorrectly. However, he does not model the way these caps are
set incorrectly. For instance, in his theoretical model, he assumes the regulator imposes the
same cap for both pollutants and he does not model the ways these caps are set in a second
best fashion. In reality, having the same caps for two different pollutants does not seem very
realistic because the pollutants may have different units and there is no fundamental scientific
or economic reason for setting them equal to each other. This paper explicitly models the
set up of quantities or prices in two second best setting. However, we note that Woodward’s
(2011) model incorporates heterogeneity of firms and he performs some numerical analysis,
which could potentially explain the assumptions behind his set up of the caps. In this paper,
we do not incorporate heterogeneity of firms because we want to focus on the implications
behind the set up of the caps in second best scenarios. We attempt to expand on Woodward’s
work to further understand the implications of allowing or prohibiting double-dipping.
Suppose a policy maker is interested in maximizing net benefits for society from the abate-
ment of two pollutants. For concreteness, think about these pollutants as Carbon and Phospho-
rus. An abatement action such as no-till can reduce the amount of Carbon in the atmosphere
and can also reduce the amount of Phosphorus in the water streams. Should policy makers pay
farmers for abating both pollutants that come from the same abatement practice? or should
they make the farmer choose one environmental market knowing that he or she can only get
paid for one environmental output, even if the action taken results in positive abatement levels
for both pollutants? or should the policy maker impose quantities instead of prices to achieve
his environmental goals? In order to answer these questions, this paper begins with the full
information case in which a single social planner knows the cost and benefit functions of both
environmental outputs as well as the complementarity between pollutants in Section 1.3. For
every scenario, we model prices versus quantities and under prices, we model whether double-
dipping is allowed or prohibited, which is referred to as the single-market following Woodward
(2011). We begin with the well known result that given the availability of full information for
6the regulator, there is no difference between quantities and prices as long as double-dipping is
allowed. Furthermore, we show that double-dipping is preferred over a single-market even if
the regulator takes the single market structure into account when designing the environmental
program as long as there is full information.
Since it is unlikely that the regulator will posses full information, we secondly explore the
case in which there are two uncoordinated policy makers each independently designing an
environmental program without taking into account the other (Section 1.4). If each regulator
knows the existence of complementarity but is not aware of the other program being designed,
then the quantities and prices derived independently will be second best solutions. In order to
understand which policy is better or what factors favor one policy over the others, we compare
deadweight losses among each of the three policy designs we study and look at some comparative
statics. First, the policy that performs better is the one that gets closer to the optimum. We
focus on two cases in which the slopes of marginal benefit curves across two markets are very
different. In one case, quantities dominates a price policy prohibiting double-dipping and we
compare the performance of double-dipping versus quantities. In the other case, disallowing
double-dipping is preferred over quantities and we compare both price policies. Furthermore,
we find that making the steeper marginal benefit curve even steeper tends to favor a single
market or quantities over double-dipping.
Alternatively, it could be the case a policy maker is not aware of the complementarity
between pollutants (Section 1.5). Complementarity could be ignored either due to lack of
knowledge or understanding about the production relationships, which results in a regulator
choosing prices or quantities in a second best setting. We again compare deadweight losses
under the different policies to assess the best policy choice for the regulator and look at some
comparative statics. We focus on two cases that are determined by the slope of the marginal
benefit curve in the market in which the firm is not compensated under the prohibition of
double-dipping, which we denote the unchosen market. We focus on this market because its
results are substantially affected by the lack of knowledge about the complementarity. The first
case we study is one in which the marginal benefit curve is steeper in the unchosen market. In
this case, we compare quantities with a single market because the latter outperforms double-
7dipping. Making the marginal benefit curve even steeper favors the usage of quantities over a
single market. The second case we study is characterized by a relatively flatter marginal benefit
curve in the unchosen market and a very low complementarity between pollutants. Having
very low complementarity brings very similar results among the different policies in the chosen
market. However, in the unchosen market, making the slope of the marginal benefit curve
even flatter benefits double-dipping over quantities, but there are not substantial differences
when the complementarity is very low. Furthermore, this flatness in the marginal benefit curve
substantially affects the performance of the single market. Both double-dipping and quantities
outperform the single market when the marginal benefit is relatively flatter in the unchosen
market or when there is very low complementarity, making the single market very unlikely
to be favored under these characteristics. This paper illustrates that allowing or prohibiting
double-dipping depends on market characteristics under these two second best scenarios.
1.3 Full Information Case
Given that the policy maker knows the cost and benefit functions as well as the complemen-
tarity between pollutants, this section includes the social planner problem, the firm’s problem
under a quantities policy, the firm’s problem under a price policy allowing for double-dipping,
the firm’s problem under a price policy prohibiting double-dipping, and the welfare analysis
between the policy choices. Assume there is only one firm and there are two pollutants that are
complements in the cost function. In particular, abating one pollutant decreases the marginal
cost of abating the other pollutant. Following Woodward (2011), the cost function is given by:
g(a1, a2) =
α1
2
a21 +
α2
2
a22 − γa1a2 (1.1)
where a1 and a2 are the abatement levels for pollutant 1 and pollutant 2 respectively, α1 and
α2 are positive parameters, and γ is the interaction term between pollutants. Pollutants are
complements as long as γ ≥ 0 since ∂∂aj
∂g()
∂ai
≤ 0.This cost function is strictly convex as long
as ∂
2g()
∂a2i
= αi > 0 for i = 1, 2 and αiαj − γ2 > 0. Following Woodward (2011), the benefit
functions used in this model are:
B1(a1) = Ω1a1 − θ1
2
a21 (1.2)
8B2(a2) = Ω2a2 − θ2
2
a22 (1.3)
where Ω1, Ω2, θ1, and θ2 are positive parameters. Each benefit function is strictly concave as
long as ∂Bi()∂ai = Ωi − θiai > 0 for i = 1, 2 and
∂2Bi()
∂a2i
= −θi < 0 for i = 1, 2.3
1.3.1 Social Planner Problem
Quantities
The social planner maximizes net benefits for society by solving
max
a1,a2
W (a1, a2) = max
a1,a2
B1(a1) +B2(a2)− g(a1, a2) (1.4)
The first order conditions are:
a1 :
∂B1(a1)
∂a1
=
∂g(a1, a2)
∂a1
a2 :
∂B2(a2)
∂a2
=
∂g(a1, a2)
∂a2
The solutions derived from these first order conditions are denoted by a∗1 and a∗2. With the
functional forms (1.1),(1.2), and (1.3), the problem becomes:
max
a1,a2
Ω1a1 − θ1
2
a21 + Ω2a2 −
θ2
2
a22 −
α1
2
a21 −
α2
2
a22 + γa1a2
Solving for a∗1 and a∗2, we obtain the first best solutions:
a∗1 =
(α2 + θ2) Ω1 + γΩ2
(α1 + θ1) (α2 + θ2)− γ2 (1.5)
a∗2 =
(α1 + θ1) Ω2 + γΩ1
(α1 + θ1) (α2 + θ2)− γ2 (1.6)
Prices
If the social planner opts for the usage of prices instead, he solves for the optimal prices.
Denote τ1 and τ2 as prices received by the firm for abating pollutant 1 and 2 respectively. The
social planner knows that the firm maximizes profits equating the price for each pollutant to
3There is no complementarity in the benefits function. While this assumption can be relaxed, this could make
the analysis more complicated and less clear
9its marginal cost of abatement:
τ1 =
∂g(a1, a2)
∂a1
= α1a1 − γa2
τ2 =
∂g(a1, a2)
∂a2
= α2a2 − γa1
Using these equations, the social planner obtains the firm’s reaction functions:
aR1 (τ1, τ2) =
α2τ1 + γτ2
α1α2 − γ2
aR2 (τ1, τ2) =
α1τ2 + γτ1
α1α2 − γ2
The social planner then maximizes net benefits with respect to prices:
max
τ1,τ2
B1(a
R
1 (τ1, τ2)) +B2(a
R
2 (τ1, τ2))− g(aR1 (τ1, τ2), aR2 (τ1, τ2))
The first order conditions are
τ1 :
∂B1
∂aR1
∂aR1
∂τ1
+
∂B2
∂aR2
∂aR2
∂τ1
− ∂g
∂aR1
∂aR1
∂τ1
− ∂g
∂aR2
∂aR2
∂τ1
= 0
τ2 :
∂B1
∂aR1
∂aR1
∂τ2
+
∂B2
∂aR2
∂aR2
∂τ2
− ∂g
∂aR1
∂aR1
∂τ2
− ∂g
∂aR2
∂aR2
∂τ2
= 0
We can solve for the optimal price levels, which will be denoted by τ∗1 and τ∗2 . Notice that these
price levels can also be derived by equating the price to the marginal benefit of abating the
optimal quantity for each pollutant: τ∗i = Ωi − θia∗i for i = 1, 2. In Section 1.7, Figures (1.1)
and (1.2) contain graphical depictions of the social planner’s solution under each market.
1.3.2 Firm’s Problem
Quantities
Under a quantities policy, the regulator imposes a minimum level of reduction for each
pollutant. The firm then has to abate at least the level of the imposed quantity. The firm’s
problem:
max
a1,a2
−g(a1, a2) s.t. a1 ≥ a∗1and a2 ≥ a∗2 (1.7)
The Lagrangian for this problem:
£ = −g(a1, a2) + λ1(a1 − a∗1) + λ2(a2 − a∗2) (1.8)
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The first order conditions:
a1 : −∂g(a1,a2)∂a1 + λ1 ≤ 0 ac1
[
∂£
a1
]
= 0 ac1 ≥ 0
a2 : −∂g(a1,a2)∂a2 + λ2 ≤ 0 ac2
[
∂£
a2
]
= 0 ac2 ≥ 0
λ1 : a1 − a∗1 ≥ 0 λc1
[
∂£
λ1
]
= 0 λc1 ≥ 0
λ2 : a2 − a∗2 ≥ 0 λc2
[
∂£
λ2
]
= 0 λc2 ≥ 0
where the quantities solutions are denoted by ac1 and a
c
2 where c stands for command and
control. Facing this problem, the firm chooses to reduce pollution at a level equal to each given
quantity:
ac1 = a
∗
1 =
(α2 + θ2) Ω1 + γΩ2
(α1 + θ1) (α2 + θ2)− γ2 (1.9)
ac2 = a
∗
2 =
(α1 + θ1) Ω2 + γΩ1
(α1 + θ1) (α2 + θ2)− γ2 (1.10)
As long as λ1 =
∂B1(a1)
∂a1
and λ2 =
∂B2(a2)
∂a2
, then a∗1 = ac1 and a∗2 = ac2. In other words, as long
as the shadow price of pollution reductions equals their respective marginal benefits, then the
policy achieves the optimum and the firm chooses pollution reductions equal to the quantities
set by the regulator.
Prices - Double-dipping - Multiple Markets
Alternatively, suppose the regulator uses prices instead of quantities. The firm’s problem
becomes:
max
a1,a2
τ∗1 a1 + τ
∗
2 a2 − g(a1, a2) (1.11)
Without the cost functional form, the first order conditions are
a1 : τ
∗
1 =
∂g(a1, a2)
∂a1
a2 : τ
∗
2 =
∂g(a1, a2)
∂a2
The solution to this multiple markets problem is denoted by ammp1 and a
mmp
2 where mm stands
for multiple markets and p stands for prices. Again, as long as τ∗1 =
∂B1(a1)
∂a1
and τ∗2 =
∂B2(a2)
∂a2
,
then a∗1 = a
mmp
1 and a
∗
2 = a
mmp
2 . With the specific cost functional form, we obtain
ammp1 =
α2τ
∗
1 + γτ
∗
2
(α1α2 − γ2) (1.12)
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ammp2 =
α1τ
∗
2 + γτ
∗
1
(α1α2 − γ2) (1.13)
Since, τ∗1 =
∂B1(a∗1)
a1
and τ∗2 =
∂B2(a∗2)
a2
, we can conclude that there is no difference between using
quantities or prices under a multiple markets structure as long as the regulator possesses full
information (i.e. a∗i = aci = a
mmp
i for i = 1, 2). The optimal levels are the same regardless of
whether the regulator sets prices or quantities, since the regulator has full information. See
Figures (1.3) and (1.4) in Section 1.7 for a graphical illustration. This result also appears in
Woodward (2011) but recall that we are explicitly modeling the regulator’s behavior in two
second best settings.
Prices - Disallowing Double-dipping - Single Market
The prohibition of double-dipping is applicable under a payment framework. Suppose the
firm is only allowed to receive payment from abating one pollutant. Even if the firm reduces
the other pollutant, it would only be able to receive payment for one. Hence, the firm has to
choose to participate in an environmental market that is most optimal. Under a quantities
framework, there is not an analogous single market. If the regulator establishes standards,
then the firm is bounded by those levels. It is unrealistic to think that the firm would only
have to follow one standard level or that it would have a choice between following either one.
Hence, we do not consider a single market structure for a quantities policy. Nevertheless, we
compare the differences between setting prices while allowing double-dipping, setting prices
while prohibiting double-dipping, and setting quantities for both pollutants. We are primarily
concerned with the regulator’s policy choice. The firm’s problem under a price scenario in
which double-dipping is prohibited is the following:
max
{
max
a1,a2
τ∗1 a1 − g(a1, a2); maxa1,a2 τ
∗
2 a2 − g(a1, a2)
}
This problem can be viewed as a two stage process. First, the firm maximizes as if it was par-
ticipating in each market separately. For instance, the first order conditions of the optimization
problem given that the firm is being compensated for the reductions of pollutant i instead of j
are:
ai : τ
∗
i =
∂g(a1, a2)
∂ai
= αiai − γaj
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aj : 0 =
∂g(a1, a2)
∂aj
= αjaj − γai
Given the maximization results, the firm chooses the market that achieves the highest profit.
Unless
∂B(aj)
∂aj
= 0, the single market solution will not equal the first best solution (See Figures
1.3 and 1.4). Only when
∂B(aj)
∂aj
= 0, the first best is achieved as illustrated by Figure (1.5).
However, one cannot assume this special case holds. Hence, in general, the solution does not
equal the first best. If it is more profitable for the firm to be compensated for the reductions
of pollutant 1 instead of pollutant 2, the solutions for this problem are denoted by asm1p1 and
asm1p2 , where sm stands for single market, 1 refers to the fact that the firm chooses market for
pollutant 1, and p signifies that the regulator sets prices instead of quantities 4:
asm1p1 =
α2τ
∗
1
α1α2 − γ2 (1.14)
asm1p2 =
γτ∗1
α1α2 − γ2 (1.15)
1.3.3 Welfare Analysis
Since both prices and quantities are set using full information, they both achieve the first
best under a multiple market structure for prices. In order to compare the difference in welfare
levels between setting prices imposing a single market as opposed to allowing for double-dipping,
we first look at the difference between abatement levels under each policy:
a∗1 = a
c
1 = a
mmp
1 =
α2τ
∗
1 + γτ
∗
2
α1α2 − γ2 ≥
α2τ
∗
1
α1α2 − γ2 = a
sm1p
1
a∗2 = a
c
2 = a
mmp
2 =
α1τ
∗
2 + γτ
∗
1
α1α2 − γ2 ≥
γτ∗1
α1α2 − γ2 = a
sm1p
2
See Figures (1.3) and (1.4) in Section 1.7 for a graphical illustration of these rankings. Notice
that the equality only holds for the special case in which
∂B(aj)
∂a2
= 0 as depicted by (1.5).
Without this special case, we conclude that price policy allowing for double-dipping reduces
pollutants by a larger amount than a price policy imposing a single market restriction. Further-
more, we show the difference in deadweight losses between double-dipping and a single market
keeping in mind amm1 = a
∗
1. Define DWL
sm1p
i and DWL
mmp
i as the deadweight losses in the
4Throughout the paper, we assume that the firm chooses to participate in the market for pollutant 1 without
any loss of generality. We refer to the market for pollutant 1 as the ”chosen market” and the market for pollutant
2 as the ”unchosen market” throughout the paper.
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market for pollutant i for a single and multiple markets policy respectively. Further define the
difference in deadweight losses as:
WF1 = DWL
sm1p
1 −DWLmmp1
=
1
2
(α1 + θ1)
(
ammp1 − asm1p1
) [
2a∗1 − ammp1 − asm1p1
]
=
1
2
(α1 + θ1)
(
ammp1 − asm1p1
) [(
a∗1 − asm1p1
)
− (ammp1 − a∗1)
]
=
1
2
(α1 + θ1)
(
ammp1 − asm1p1
) [(
a∗1 − asm1p1
)]
=
1
2
(α1 + θ1)
(
ammp1 − asm1p1
)2 ≥ 0
Since this difference is generally positive, except for the special case in which
∂B(aj)
∂a2
= 0,
double-dipping is generally preferred over a single market policy given the availability of full
information for the regulator. Even under the special case, double-dipping performs the same
as the single market. Hence, double-dipping should always be preferred over the single market
given full information. For a graphical illustration of these findings, refer to Section 1.7 (Figures
1.3 and 1.5). The graphs show the magnitude of the deadweight losses. When the regulator
sets quantities using full information, he attains the first best. Similarly, when the regulator
sets prices using full information and allowing for double-dipping, he also achieves the first.
Moreover, the single market is not able to outperform double-dipping under full information
when the regulator sets up prices. Under a price policy, for the market for pollutant 1, there
is no deadweight loss if double-dipping is allowed. The deadweight loss under a price policy
prohibiting double-dipping is depicted by the blue triangle from Figure (1.3) for the market for
pollutant 1. Similarly, the deadweight loss is depicted by the green triangle from Figure (1.4)
for the market for pollutant 2 in Section 1.7. We confirm that as long as the regulator sets
standards or prices correctly using full information, double-dipping is preferred over a single
market. Consequently, if a policy maker has to choose between quantities or a prices having
full information, there is no difference in the results as long as double-dipping is permitted.
If, however, the policy maker is to disallowed double-dipping under a price policy, then it is
preferable to use quantities instead of prices.
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1.3.4 Full Information - Alternative Market Design
Some might argue that the regulator could incorporate the prohibition of double-dipping
when setting up prices. This section looks at this scenario and shows that even if the regulator
takes into account the prohibition of double-dipping in his design, the best policy is still to
allow double-dipping due to the availability of full information to the regulator. For this section,
we only concentrate on the single market outcome for the firm facing prices that are designed
taking into account the prohibition of double-dipping.
Regulator’s Problem - Prices
Imagine a regulator who has full information but who decides to prohibit double-dipping
possibly for political reasons or additionality concerns. In this case, the regulator takes into
account different reaction functions knowing that the firm has to choose between receiving
compensation from a single environmental program. If the regulator assumes that the firm will
participate in the market for pollutant 1, its reaction functions are:
aR1 (τ1) =
α2τ1
α1α2 − γ2
aR2 (τ2) =
γτ1
α1α2 − γ2
The regulator maximizes net benefits with respect to τ1 taking into account the reaction func-
tions functions:
max
τ1
B1(a
R
1 (τ1)) +B2(a
R
2 (τ1))− g(aR1 (τ1), aR2 (τ1))
Solving for τ1, we obtain the following optimal price:
τ sm1∗1 =
(
α1α2 − γ2
)
(α2Ω1 + γΩ2)
α22(α1 + θ1)− γ2(α2 − θ2)
6= τ∗1 (1.16)
For the market for pollutant 2, the process is analogous but the regulator maximizes with
respect to τ2 instead of τ1. The optimal price under this policy is:
τ sm2∗2 =
(
α1α2 − γ2
)
(α1Ω2 + γΩ1)
α21(α2 + θ2)− γ2(α1 − θ1)
6= τ∗2 (1.17)
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Firm’s Problem - Single Market
The firm’s problem: arg max
{
maxa1,a2 τ
sm1∗
1 a1 − g(a1, a2); maxa1,a2 τ sm2∗2 a2 − g(a1, a2)
}
.
Suppose the firm chooses to participate in the market for pollutant 1, then firm’s optimal
abatement levels become:
asm1∗1 =
α2 (α2Ω1 + γΩ2)
α22(α1 + θ1)− γ2(α2 − θ2)
6= a∗1 (1.18)
asm1∗2 =
γ (α2Ω1 + γΩ2)
α22(α1 + θ1)− γ2(α2 − θ2)
6= a∗2 (1.19)
If the firm chooses to participate in the market for pollutant 2, the optimal abatement levels
are:
asm2∗1 =
γ (α1Ω2 + γΩ1)
α21(α2 + θ2)− γ2(α1 − θ1)
6= a∗1 (1.20)
asm2∗2 =
α1 (α1Ω2 + γΩ1)
α21(α2 + θ2)− γ2(α1 − θ1)
6= a∗2 (1.21)
Even if the regulator takes into account the single market structure when designing the
environmental policy, the solutions are different than the first best because the regulator does
not consider that the marginal abatement benefits are positive for both pollutants if there is
any complementarity between them. In other words, since the price for abating one of the
pollutants is imposed to be zero, then the solution is never going to reach the first best unless
the marginal benefit for one of the pollutants is indeed zero (Figure 1.5). Not surprisingly,
given full information, the regulator should always opt for double-dipping over prohibiting it.
1.4 Uncoordinated Regulators
1.4.1 Uncoordinated Regulators’ Problem:
A major contribution of this paper is to model policy choices when the regulator does
not have full information. Instead of assuming that the regulator sets prices or quantities
incorrectly, we model the way these latter are set up. The first scenario we study is the
possibility of having uncoordinated regulators. Suppose there are two government agencies.
Each one has the task of designing an environmental program targeting a specific pollutant.
We first analyze quantities and then prices. We study these uncoordinated regulators because
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it could be the case in which a government agency knows about the complementarity between
pollutants but it is not aware of the existence of the other program targeting the other pollutant.
Also, there is no guarantee that both government programs are designed at the same time taking
into account one another.
Quantities
For regulator focusing on pollutant i, the problem becomes
max
a1,a2
Bi(ai)− g(a1, a2) (1.22)
The first order conditions are:
ai :
∂Bi
∂ai
=
∂g(a1, a2)
∂ai
aj : 0 =
∂g(a1, a2)
∂aj
For the regulator focusing on Pollutant i, his quantity is denoted by aui , where the u stands for
uncoordinated regulators and the i for the pollutant. For the regulator focusing on pollutant
1, his quantity is:
au1 =
α2Ω1
α1α2 − γ2 + α2θ1 6= a
∗
1 (1.23)
For the regulator focusing on pollutant 2, his standard is:
au2 =
α1Ω2
α1α2 − γ2 + α1θ2 6= a
∗
2 (1.24)
Prices
Let τu1 and τ
u
2 be the prices imposed by each agency independently from the other. Again,
we use the idea of reaction functions. The regulator for pollutant i knows the firm will optimize
according to the following first order conditions:
τui =
∂g(a1, a2)
∂ai
= αiai − γaj
0 =
∂g(a1, a2)
∂a2
= αjaj − γai
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The regulator for pollutant i has in mind the following reaction functions:
aRi (τ
u
i ) =
αjτ
u
i
α1α2 − γ2
aRj (τ
u
i ) =
γτui
α1α2 − γ2
The regulator focusing on pollutant i maximizes net benefits taking into account these reaction
functions:
max
τui
Bi(a
R
i (τ
u
i ))− g(aR1 (τui ), aR2 (τui ))
The first order conditions are
τui :
∂Bi
∂aRi
∂aRi
∂τui
− ∂g
∂aR1
∂aR1
∂τui
− ∂g
∂aR2
∂aR2
∂τui
= 0
The regulator for pollutant 1 sets the following price:
τu1 =
(α1α2 − γ2)Ω1
α1α2 − γ2 + α2θ1 (1.25)
The regulator for pollutant 2 sets the following price:
τu2 =
(α1α2 − γ2)Ω2
α1α2 − γ2 + α1θ2 (1.26)
1.4.2 Firm’s Problem
Quantities
Denote acui as the optimal abatement level for pollutant i chosen by the firm when facing
standards set by the two uncoordinated regulators. The firm solves:
max
a1,a2
−g(a1, a2) s.t. au1 ≤ a1 and au2 ≤ a2
Once again, the firm chooses abatement levels equal to the quantities imposed by the regulators:
au1 = a
cu
1 (1.27)
au2 = a
cu
2 (1.28)
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Prices - Double-dipping - Multiple Markets
A multiple markets policy in this context assumes neither regulator states any participation
restriction in other environmental programs under his program specifications. The solutions for
the firm’s problem are denoted as ammpu1 and a
mmpu
2 where mm stands for multiple markets, p
stands for prices, and u stands for uncoordinated regulators. The firm’s problem and solutions
are:
max
a1,a2
τu1 a1 + τ
u
2 a2 − g(a1, a2)
ammpu1 =
α2τ
u
1 + γτ
u
2
α1α2 − γ2 6= a
∗
1 (1.29)
ammpu2 =
α1τ
u
2 + γτ
u
1
α1α2 − γ2 6= a
∗
2 (1.30)
Prices - Disallowing Double-dipping - Single Market
The single market policy assumes the program specifically prohibits the participation in any
other environmental program for the other pollutant due to additionality concerns. Recall that
each regulator is aware of the complementarity between both pollutants, but the regulators do
not coordinate between each other. Essentially, each designs a program ignoring the existence
of the other program. The firm’s problem is:
arg max
{
max
a1,a2
τu1 a1 − g(a1, a2),maxa1,a2 τ
u
2 a2 − g(a1, a2)
}
If the firm chooses to be compensated for the pollutant i, the optimal abatement levels are
denoted by asmipui and a
smipu
j where sm stands for single market, i stands for the chosen
market, p stands for prices, and u stands for uncoordinated. Given that the firm decides to
participate in the market for pollutant 1, the chosen market, the solutions are:
asm1pu1 =
α2τ
u
1
α1α2 − γ2 6= a
∗
1 (1.31)
asm1pu2 =
γτu1
α1α2 − γ2 6= a
∗
2 (1.32)
1.4.3 Welfare Analysis
For the welfare analysis, we will assume strict complementarity (i.e. γ > 0). We first draw
attention to a general graphical analysis to obtain some intuition. Refer to Figures (1.6) and
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(1.8) for the market focusing on pollutant 1 and Figures (1.7) and(1.9) the market focusing on
pollutant 2. While the deadweight loss under double-dipping appears larger than the single
market (blue versus purple areas in Figure 1.8), we also observe that this is reversed in the
market for pollutant 2 (grey versus orange areas in Figure 1.9). In fact, since the firm chooses
to participate in the market for a1, the difference in deadweight losses becomes larger in the
market for a2 in which the single market policy yields the largest deadweight loss. Since the
firm faces zero compensation for abating pollutant 2, the firm abates at a point that is further
away from the optimum relative to the distance between the double-dipping solution and the
first best.
To understand the differences in efficiency among the three policies being studied, we rank
each pollutant’s abatement levels under each policy. As stated before, we assume that the firm
chooses to participate in the market for pollutant 1 when facing a single market policy, which
we refer to as the chosen market. For pollutant 1, we have the following ranking:
ammpu1 > a
∗
1 > a
sm1pu
1 = a
u
1 (1.33)
For pollutant 2, we have two possible rankings:
ammpu2 > a
∗
2 > a
sm1pu
2 > a
u
2
ammpu2 > a
∗
2 > a
u
2 > a
sm1pu
2
These rankings are explained in Section 1.8. To develop a graphical understanding of these
rankings, we further define new terms. Let au
′
j be defined as a function of a
u
i .
au
′
2 (a
u
1) =
γ
α2
au1 =
γ
α2
α2Ω1
α1α2 − γ2 + α2θ1 =
γΩ1
α1α2 − γ2 + α2θ1 = a
sm1pu
2
au
′
1 (a
u
2) =
γ
α1
au2 =
γ
α1
α1Ω2
α1α2 − γ2 + α1θ2 =
γΩ2
α1α2 − γ2 + α1θ2
Recall that each regulator sets quantities separately. They are aware of the complementarity
among pollutants and they use this information to set a single standard. Notice that au2 >
asm1pu2 implies a
u′
1 > a
u
1 since a
u′
1 (a
u
2) =
γ
α2
au2 and a
u
1(a
u′
2 = a
sm1pu
2 ) =
γ
α2
asm1pu2 . We consider
two possible cases from the combinations of these rankings.
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Case A
Case A is characterized by these rankings:
ammpu1 > a
∗
1 > a
sm1pu
1 = a
u
1 > a
u′
1
ammpu2 > a
∗
2 > a
sm1pu
2 = a
u′
2 > a
u
2
We discard a quantities policy as the single market solution for pollutant 2 is closer to the
optimum and the solution for pollutant 1 is equal to the quantities solution. Hence, the single
market outperforms the quantities policy in the market for a2 and equally performs in the
market for a1. We focus on the differences in deadweight losses between a multiple markets and
a single market policy. Define WAui = DWL
sm1pu
i −DWLmmpui as the difference in deadweight
losses between a single market and multiple market policy in the market for pollutant i.
Pollutant 1
WAu1 = DWL
sm1pu
1 −DWLmmpu1
=
1
2
(a∗1 − asm1tu1 )
(
∂B1(a
sm1pu
1 )
∂a1
− ∂(a
sm1pu
1 , a
∗
2)
∂a1
)
− 1
2
(ammpu1 − a∗1)
(
∂(ammpu1 , a
∗
2)
∂a1
− ∂B1(a
mmpu
1 )
∂a1
)
=
1
2
(
ammpu1 − asm1pu1
) [
Ω1 + γa
∗
2 − (α1 + θ1)
(
ammpu1 + a
sm1pu
1 − a∗1
)]
=
1
2
(α1 + θ1)
(
ammpu1 − asm1pu1
) [
(a∗1 − asm1pu1 )− (ammpu1 − a∗1)
]
Pollutant 2
WAu2 = DWL
sm1pu
2 −DWLmmpu2
=
1
2
(a∗2 − asm1pu2 )
(
∂B2(a
sm1pu
2 )
∂a2
− ∂(a
∗
1, a
sm1pu
1 )
∂a2
)
− 1
2
(ammpu2 − a∗2)
(
∂(a∗1, a
mmpu
2 )
∂a2
− ∂B2(a
mmpu
2 )
∂a2
)
=
1
2
(
ammpu2 − asm1pu2
) [
Ω2 + γa
∗
1 − (α2 + θ2)
(
ammpu2 + a
sm1pu
2 − a∗2
)]
=
1
2
(α2 + θ2)
(
ammpu2 − asm1pu2
) [
(a∗2 − asm1pu2 )− (ammpu2 − a∗2)
]
Refer to Section 1.8 for more details. The complementarity term plays a key role in our
results. For pollutant 1, notice that a∗1 − asm1pu1 → 0 as γ → 0. Similarly, ammpu1 − a∗1 → 0
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as γ → 0. Hence, as γ → 0, there is no difference between either policy in the market for
pollutant 1. Conversely, for pollutant 2, as γ → 0, ammpu2 → a∗2, but asm1pu2 → 0. Hence,
WAu2 → 12 (α2 + θ2) (a∗2)2 > 0. Consequently, given γ → 0, double-dipping is preferred over
a single market policy. This is intuitively as a regulator should not prevent double-dipping if
there is no complementarity. The existence of the complementarity is what gives rise to the
debate of whether or not to allow or prohibit double-dipping.
Notice that the first two terms of WAui are positive and its sign depends on the third
term. As long as the distance between the first best and the single market is smaller than the
distance between double-dipping and the first best, WAui < 0 and the regulator should opt
for the single market over double-dipping. Intuitively, prohibiting double-dipping makes sense
when the solution for the multiple markets is further from the first best compared to the single
market solution. The regulator should choose the policy that yields a solution closest to the
optimum. How far are these solutions from the first best depends on the parameters of the
functions. Furthermore, due to the interconnection between both markets, we must add WAu1
and WAu2 .
Case B
Case B is characterized by the following rankings:
ammpu1 > a
∗
1 > a
u′
1 > a
sm1pu
1 = a
u
1
ammpu2 > a
∗
2 > a
u
2 > a
sm1pu
2 = a
u′
2
In this case, since the quantities solution gets closer to the first best for pollutant 2 than the
single market, we discard the single market policy and focus on a comparison between prices
allowing double-dipping and quantities. We define the difference in deadweight losses for each
market:
Pollutant 1
WBu1 = W
Au
1
Pollutant 2
WBu2 = DWL
cu
2 −DWLmmpu2
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=
1
2
(a∗2 − au2)
(
∂B2(a
u
2)
∂a2
− ∂(a
∗
1, a
u
2)
∂a2
)
− 1
2
(ammpu2 − a∗2)
(
∂(a∗1, a
mmpu
2 )
∂a2
− ∂B2(a
mmpu
2 )
∂a2
)
=
1
2
(α2 + θ2) (a
mmpu
2 − au2) [(a∗2 − au2)− (ammpu2 − a∗2)]
When γ → 0, ammpu2 → a∗2 → au2 , implying that WBu2 → 0. From Case A, we know WAu1 → 0
as γ → 0. Hence, there is no difference between a quantities and prices allowing for double-
dipping. Moreover, the analogous interpretation of WBu2 refers again to the distance between
the optimum and the solutions for the respective policy. Whichever policy minimizes this dis-
tance becomes the second best policy given the context of these two uncoordinated regulators.
Again, to truly know which policy is better, we need to assess whether WBu1 +W
Bu
2 is positive
or negative. If it is negative, the regulator should choose quantities.
Analysis and Comparative Statics
In order to evaluate these three policy choices for these uncoordinated regulators, we first
need to identify situations that make one case more likely to occur than the other. We first
look at the complementarity term which is a crucial component of our model. In particular,
notice that as γ → 0, asm1pu2 → 0 and au2 > asm1pu2 , and we focus on Case B. Recall that there
is no difference in the market for pollutant 1 when γ → 0. However, there is a difference in the
market for pollutant 2 that favors Case B.
Whether we face Case A or B solely depend on whether asm1pu2 is greater or less than a
u
2 .
Most of the parameters enter both abatement levels and it is not straight forward to understand
the comparative statics. Nonetheless, we already observe the way γ affects this inequality and
the way the lack of complementarity favors Case B. However, we are interested in cases where
γ > 0 and will concentrate on the way the slopes of the marginal benefit curves favor each case,
since they appear once in either of the abatement levels and we already notice their effects on
our graphical analyses in both cases. We concentrate on the way the above abatement levels
change with θ1 and θ2:
∂asm1pu2
∂θ1
=
−α2γΩ1
(α1α2 − γ2 + α2θ1)2
< 0
∂au2
∂θ1
= 0
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∂asm1pu2
∂θ2
= 0
∂au2
∂θ2
=
−α21Ω2
α1α2 − γ2 + α1θ2 < 0
Suppose we start assuming that the difference between asm1pu2 and a
u
2 is very small. If we focus
on the slope of the marginal benefit curve for the market for pollutant 1, we know that an
increase in θ1 decreases a
sm1pu
2 while a
u
2 remains the same. Hence, a high (low) θ1 favors Case
B (Case A). Focusing on the slope of the marginal benefit curve for pollutant 2, we know that
a steeper slope decreases au2 while keeping a
sm1pu
2 the same. Hence a high (low) θ2 favor Case
A (Case B). Combining both, we know that Case A is favored by a low θ1 and a high θ2 while
Case B is characterized by a high θ1 and a low θ2.
We first start with some graphical analysis to obtain some intuition. For Case A, refer
to Figures (1.6) and(1.7) and for Case B, refer to Figures (1.8) and (1.9) that are drawn
based on the slope relations noted above. Focusing on the chosen market first, Figure (1.6)
depicts a flatter marginal benefit curve that corresponds to Case A. This flatness favors double-
dipping in the chosen market (blue versus purple areas). For Case B, when the slope of the
marginal benefit curve is steeper (Figure (1.8)), then either quantities or the single market
are favored over double-dipping in the chosen market (purple versus blue areas). Switching
to the unchosen market, we see that relatively steeper marginal benefit curve could favor a
single market over double-dipping (See Figure (1.7) and compare gray versus orange areas).
Conversely, a flatter curve clearly favors double-dipping over both quantities and the single
market (See Figure (1.9) and compare orange versus yellow and gray areas). In order to choose
the best second-best policy, we need to take into account both chosen and unchosen markets.
Focusing on Case B (Figures (1.8) and (1.9)), it is clear that a single market is not preferred.
Double-dipping is preferred over the single market. However, quantities outperformed both
price policies. Switching to Case A, the single market seems to be preferred. While double-
dipping outperforms a single market (blue versus purple area) in the chosen market, the single
market dominates in the unchosen market (gray versus orange areas).
Beyond a graphical analysis, we can perform some comparative statics based on these slopes.
Focusing on Case A and taking into account the parameter relations just noted, we know that
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the term that determines WAui ’s sign is 2a
∗
i − ammpui − asm1pui . If 2a∗i − ammpui − asm1pui > 0,
then WAui > 0 and if this happens for both i = 1, 2, then the regulator should use double-
dipping over a single market. Given the parameters that favor Case A and assuming that
either a∗1 − asm1pu1 is similar to ammpu1 − a∗1 or that 2a∗1 − ammpu1 − asm1pu1 > 0, we know that
∂WAu1
∂θ2
< 0 (Refer to Section 1.8 for details)5. Hence, for the market focusing on pollutant 1,
having even steeper marginal benefit curve for the unchosen market makes WAu1 more likely
to be negative, favoring the single market over double-dipping. This results exemplifies the
interconnection between markets. The slope of the marginal benefit curve in the unchosen
market affects the results in the chosen market.
Turning to the market for pollutant 2, we follow the same thought process. Taking into
account the characteristics of Case A and as long as a∗2 − asm1pu2 is similar to ammpu2 − a∗2 or as
long as 2a∗2− ammpu2 − asm1pu2 > 0, then ∂W
Au
2
∂θ2
< 0 (See Section 1.8). Increasing θ2 makes W
Au
2
more likely to be negative favoring a single market over double-dipping. If the marginal benefit
curve in the unchosen market becomes flatter, this could favor double-dipping. Nonetheless,
this case requires a steeper curve. To sum up, when markets are characterized by a flatter and
steeper marginal benefits curves for the chosen and unchosen markets respectively, making the
steeper marginal benefit curves even steeper favors a single market over double-dipping.
Switching to Case B, we know this case is favored by a steeper and flatter marginal benefit
curves in the chosen and unchosen markets respectively (i.e. high θ1 and low θ2). For this
case, the comparison is between prices allowing double-dipping and quantities, since quantities
outperformed the single market. Hence, a single-market policy is not favored under this case.
In other words, the question we answer for Case B is whether the regulator should employ
prices or quantities. Again, WBui ’s sign is determined by the sign of 2a
∗
i − ammpui − aui . If
2a∗i − ammpui − aui > 0, then WBui > 0 and if this happens for both i = 1, 2, then double-
dipping is preferred. We focus on comparative statics with respect to θ1 (the steeper slope) for
Case B. Taking into account the relative sizes of the slopes of the marginal benefit curves, we
conclude that
∂WBu1
∂θ1
< 0 (See Section 1.8). Increasing θ1 even more, makes W
Bu
1 more likely
5The signs of the comparative statics with respect to θ1 are not as straightforward and require more assump-
tions about the parameters.
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to be negative favoring quantities over double-dipping. In other words, quantities are likely to
dominate when the marginal benefit curve in the chosen market is even steeper.
Focusing on the unchosen market, we keep the same parameter assumptions. Furthermore,
assuming that either a∗2−au2 is similar to ammpu2 −a∗2 or as long as 2a∗2−ammpu2 −asmu2 > 0, then
∂WBu2
∂θ1
< 0 (See Section 1.8). As the slope of the marginal benefit curve for the market focusing
on pollutant 1 increases, then WBu2 decreases and could eventually make the deadweight loss
for the quantities policy smaller than the one under double-dipping. Hence, this change favors
the usage of quantities.
To sum up, double-dipping performs better in markets characterized by flatter marginal
benefit curves. However, we study two cases in which the marginal benefit curves differ sub-
stantially across markets. Hence, the performance of double-dipping is always affected by the
steeper marginal benefit curve. In fact, we find that in these two cases, double-dipping is not
likely be favored by making the steeper curve even steeper. When the latter occurs, either a
single market or a quantities policy tends to be preferred.
1.5 Complementarity Ignored by the Regulator
After studying the policy choices for uncoordinated regulators, the next scenario we study
is one in which the regulator does not know about the complementarity between pollutants.
Having a regulator with full information about the cost function is very unlikely in reality. A
more plausible case is one in which the regulator sets either prices or quantities in a second-best
sense due to this lack of information about complementarity.
1.5.1 Regulator’s Problem
Quantities
If the regulator decides to use quantities, he chooses them by solving the following problem:
max
a1,a2
W (a1, a2) = max
a1,a2
B1(a1) +B2(a2)− g(a1, a2|γ = 0) (1.34)
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Without using the functional forms described above, the first order conditions are:
a1 :
∂B1(a1)
∂a1
=
∂g(a1, a2|γ = 0)
∂a1
a2 :
∂B2(a2)
∂a2
=
∂g(a1, a2|γ = 0)
∂a2
The solution derived from these first order conditions are denoted a01 and a
0
2. The zero is meant
to signify that the policy maker thinks γ = 0. With functional forms, the problem and solution
become:
max
a1,a2
Ω1a1 − θ1
2
a21 + Ω2a2 −
θ2
2
a22 −
α1
2
a21 −
α2
2
a22 (1.35)
a01 =
Ω1
α1 + θ1
6= a∗1 (1.36)
a02 =
Ω2
α2 + θ2
6= a∗2 (1.37)
Prices
If the regulator chooses prices instead of quantities, he takes into account the reaction
function of the firm to set prices. Similarly to the full information case, the regulator knows
that the firm maximizes profits equating the price for each pollutant to its marginal cost of
abatement. However, different than the full information case, the regulator thinks that γ = 0.
(i.e. there is no complementarity):
τ1 =
∂g(a1, a2|γ = 0)
∂a1
= α1a1 ⇒ aR1 (τ1) =
τ1
α1
τ2 =
∂g(a1, a2|γ = 0)
∂a2
= α2a2 ⇒ aR2 (τ2) =
τ2
α2
Taking these reactions functions, the regulator’s problem becomes:
max
τ1,τ2
Ω1
(
τ1
α1
)
− θ1
2
(
τ1
α1
)2
+ Ω2
(
τ2
α2
)
− θ2
2
(
τ2
α2
)2
− α1
2
(
τ1
α1
)2
− α2
2
(
τ2
α2
)2
The optimal prices are denoted by τ01 and τ
0
2 , where 0 symbolizes that the regulator is ignoring
complementarities:
τ01 =
α1Ω1
α1 + θ1
6= τ∗1 (1.38)
τ02 =
α2Ω2
α2 + θ2
6= τ∗2 (1.39)
Once again, these prices can also be found by equating τ0i =
∂Bi
∂ai
= Ωi − θia0i for i = 1, 2.
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1.5.2 Firm’s Problem
This section illustrates the case in which the firm possesses more information than the
regulator as it understands the cost complementarities between pollutants
Quantities
Given that the regulator policy choice is to set quantities for each pollutant, the firm’s
problem becomes:
max
a1,a2
−g(a1, a2) s.t.a1 ≥ a01 and a2 ≥ a02
The firm has to decrease pollutants at least to the level equal to the given quantities. The
corresponding Lagrangian for this problem:
£ = −g(a1, a2) + λ01(a1 − a01) + λ02(a2 − a02)
The first order conditions for this optimization problem are:
a1 : −∂g(a1,a2)∂a1 + λ01 ≤ 0 ac01
[
∂£
a1
]
= 0 ac01 ≥ 0
a2 : −∂g(a1,a2)∂a2 + λ02 ≤ 0 ac02
[
∂£
a2
]
= 0 ac02 ≥ 0
λ1 : a1 − a01 ≥ 0 λc01
[
∂£
λ01
]
= 0 λc01 ≥ 0
λ2 : a2 − a02 ≥ 0 λc02
[
∂£
λ02
]
= 0 λc02 ≥ 0
The firm chooses to reduce pollution by an amount equal to the given quantity:
ac01 = a
0
1 =
Ω1
α1 + θ1
6= a∗1 (1.40)
ac02 = a
0
2 =
Ω2
α2 + θ2
6= a∗2 (1.41)
Prices - Double-dipping - Multiple Markets
If double-dipping is allowed, then the firm’s problem becomes:
max
a1,a2
τ01 a1 + τ
0
2 a2 − g(a1, a2)
The first order conditions are:
a1 : τ
0
1 =
∂g(a1, a2)
∂a1
a2 : τ
0
2 =
∂g(a1, a2)
∂a2
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Since τ0i =
∂Bi(a
0
i )
∂ai
6= ∂Bi(a∗i )∂ai for i = 1, 2, we know we are not able to attain the first best. Using
the specific cost functional form, the solution for the firm becomes:
ammp01 =
α2τ
0
1 + γτ
0
2
α1α2 − γ2 =
α2 ((α1 + θ1) γΩ2 + α1 (α2 + θ2) Ω1)
(α1 + θ1) (α2 + θ2) (α1α2 − γ2) 6= a
∗
1 (1.42)
ammp02 =
α1τ
0
2 + γτ
0
1
α1α2 − γ2 =
α1 (α2 (α1 + θ1) Ω2 + (α2 + θ2) γΩ1)
(α1 + θ1) (α2 + θ2) (α1α2 − γ2) 6= a
∗
2 (1.43)
Prices - Disallowing Double-dipping - Single Market
Suppose that due to additionality concerns or political reasons, the regulator decides to
prohibit the firm from getting compensated for the reductions of both pollutants. The firm’s
problem becomes:
max
{
max
a1,a2
τ01 a1 − g(a1, a2); maxa1,a2 τ
0
2 a2 − g(a1, a2)
}
Since this is a two stage optimization problem, the first order conditions for the first stage in
which the firm is getting compensated for the reductions of pollutant i instead of j are:
ai : τ
0
i =
∂g(a1, a2)
∂ai
= αiai − γaj
aj : 0 =
∂g(a1, a2)
∂aj
= αjaj − γai
If it is more optimal for the firm to participate in the policy for pollutant 1, the firm’s optimal
abatement levels are:
asm1p01 =
α2τ
0
1
α1α2 − γ2 =
α1α2Ω1
(α1 + θ1) (α1α2 − γ2) 6= a
∗
1 (1.44)
asm1p02 =
γτ01
α1α2 − γ2 =
α1γΩ1
(α1 + θ1) (α1α2 − γ2) 6= a
∗
2 (1.45)
1.5.3 Welfare Analysis
We follow the same thought process as with uncoordinated regulators6. For simplicity, we
assume again that the firm chooses to participate in the market for a1 when facing a single
market policy. The ranking of the abatement levels in each market is useful to identify the
6As in Section 1.4, we assume, without loss of generality, the firm decides to participate in the market for
pollutant 1, the ”chosen market” and that γ > 0
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cases to consider for this welfare analysis. For pollutant 1, we have two possible rankings:
Case I : ammp01 > a
∗
1 > a
sm1p0
1 > a
0
1 = a
c0
1
Case II : ammp01 > a
sm1p0
1 > a
∗
1 > a
0
1 = a
c0
1
For pollutant 2, there are three possible rankings:
Case 1 : ammp02 > a
∗
2 > a
sm1p0
2 > a
0
2 = a
c0
2
Case 2 : ammp02 > a
sm1p0
2 > a
∗
2 > a
0
2 = a
c0
2
Case 3 : ammp02 > a
∗
2 > a
0
2 = a
c0
2 > a
sm1p0
2
The conditions that determine which cases are more likely to occur rely on the relation between
a∗1 and a
sm1p0
1 , the relation between a
sm1p0
2 and a
0
2, and the relation between a
sm1p0
2 and a
∗
2.
For the first relation, we know that Case I is characterized by a∗1 ≥ asm1p01 which implies that
(α2+θ2)Ω1+γΩ2
(α1+θ1)(α2+θ2)−γ2 >
α1α2Ω1
(α1+θ1)(α1α2−γ2) . Notice that θ2 only affects a
∗
1:
∂a∗1
∂θ2
= −γ γΩ1 + (α1 + θ1) Ω2
((α1 + θ1) (α2 + θ2)− γ2)2
< 0 (1.46)
∂asm1p01
∂θ2
= 0 (1.47)
Suppose a∗1 are close to each other a
sm1p0
1 . If we increase θ2, a
∗
1 decreases while a
sm1p0
1 stays the
same, favoring Case II. Similarly, a decrease in θ2 favors Case I.
For the second market, we focus on the difference between asm1p02 and a
0
2 first. Since we get a
clear distinction between the Case I and II for a1 from changes in θ2, we continue our analysis
based on this parameter only:
∂asm1p02
∂θ2
= 0 (1.48)
∂a02
∂θ2
= − Ω2
(α2 + θ2)
2 < 0 (1.49)
An increase in θ2, decreases a
0
2 while a
sm1p0
2 stays the same. Hence, an increase in θ2 makes
Cases 1 and 2 more plausible. A decrease in θ2 favors Case 3.
Focusing on the second relation between asm1p02 and a
∗
2, we perform a similar analysis and focus
on the derivatives for a∗2:
∂a∗2
∂θ2
= −(α1 + θ1) ((α1 + θ1) Ω2 + γΩ1)
[(α1 + θ1) (α2 + θ2)− γ2]2
< 0 (1.50)
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We already know that asm1p02 does not change with θ2 from Equation (1.48). If we start with
a∗2 and a
sm1p0
2 close to each other, an increase in θ2 decreases a
∗
2 making Case 2 more likely.
Decreasing θ2 makes Cases 1 and 3 more likely.
Combining the results for both markets, we know that Case II and Case 2 are favored
by a steeper marginal benefit curve in the unchosen market. Likewise, Case I for Case 3
are favored by a flatter marginal benefit curve for a2. Furthermore, observe that a very low
complementarity term favors Case 3 as asm1p02 → 0 and a∗2 → a02 while there is little difference
regarding Case I and II (asm1p01 → a01 → a∗1). Overall, we can combine cases for both markets
base on the slopes of the marginal benefit curves and the complementarity term. To avoid
confusion with the uncoordinated regulators’ cases, we refer to these cases as C and D: Case
C combines cases II and 2 which are favored by a high θ2. Case D combines cases I and 3
which are favored by a low θ2 and a low complementarity. The following subsections study
each combination of cases.
Case C
Case II : ammp01 ≥ asm1p01 ≥ a∗1 ≥ a01 = ac01
Case 2 : ammp02 ≥ asm1p02 ≥ a∗2 ≥ a02 = ac02
Given these rankings, we discard double-dipping as the single market outperforms it in both
markets. Our focus is to compare quantities to prices prohibiting double-dipping (i.e. a single
market). We start with a graphical analysis to gather some intuition. This combination of
cases is depicted in Figures (1.10), (1.11) and (1.12). The first two graphs concentrate on the
chosen market, since we have not imposed any assumptions about the size of the slope of the
marginal benefit curve in the chosen market. Both figures show the single market doing better
than double-dipping (pink versus blue areas). Again, we focus on the comparison between
quantities and the single market. Figure (1.10) has a flatter marginal benefit curve, which
favors the single market over quantities (pink versus purple areas). Conversely, Figure (1.11)
shows a steeper marginal benefit curve that favors quantities. Lastly, Figure (1.12) illustrates
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the market for pollutant 2 and shows quantities outperforming the single market (yellow versus
grey areas). Hence, quantities are favored by steeper marginal benefit curves in both markets
for this case. Beyond the graphical intuition, we define the difference in deadweight losses in
each market:
Pollutant 1:
WC01 = DWL
c0
1 −DWLsm1p01 =
1
2
(α1 + θ1)
(
asm1p01 − a01
) [
(a∗1 − a01)− (asm1p01 − a∗1)
]
Pollutant 2:
WC02 = DWL
c0
2 −DWLsm1p02 =
1
2
(α2 + θ2)
(
asm1p02 − a02
) [
(a∗2 − a02)− (asm1p02 − a∗2)
]
As long as WC0i < 0 for i = 1, 2, quantities are preferred over the single market and in general
over prices. This occurs whenever quantities solutions get closer to the first best compared to
the single market solutions as illustrated by Figures (1.11) and (1.12).
Analysis and Comparative Statics
For the comparative statics analysis, recall that the term that determines WC0i ’s sign is
2a∗i − asm1p0i − a0i and moreover, the sign determines which policy is preferred. If it is positive
(negative), a single market (quantities) is preferred. Focusing on the chosen market, the sign
of the derivative of WC01 with respect to θ2 is determined by the sign of the derivative of
2a∗1− asm1p01 − a01 with respect to θ2, which is negative (See Section 1.8 for more details). Since
we know Case C is favored by high θ2 , we study the way W
C0
1 changes as θ2 becomes even
larger. We conclude that quantities tend to be favored over the single market as the slope of
the marginal benefit curve becomes steeper in the unchosen market. Turning to the market
for pollutant 2, assuming a∗2 − a02 is similar to asm1p02 − a∗2 or 2a∗2 − asm1p02 − a02 < 0, we can
conclude that
∂WC02
∂θ2
< 0. Hence, making the marginal benefit curve steeper in the unchosen
market also tends to favor quantities over the single market. To sum up, we can determine the
second best policy by looking at the sign of 2a∗i −asm1p0i −a0i in each market i = 1, 2. If the sign
is positive in both markets, the single market policy is preferred over quantities. Conversely,
when the sign is negative in both markets, quantities are preferred over the single market price
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policy. Furthermore, in this case characterized by much steeper marginal benefit curve for the
unchosen market, quantities are favored over a single market as we make the marginal benefit
curve even steeper. .
Case D
Case D is characterized by a flatter marginal benefit curve for the unchosen market and
small complementarity between pollutants. The rankings for this case:
Case I : ammp01 > a
∗
1 > a
sm1p0
1 > a
0
1 = a
c0
1
Case 3 : ammp02 > a
∗
2 > a
0
2 = a
c0
2 > a
sm1p0
2
Giving these rankings, we cannot rule out any of the policies, which makes the analysis more
challenging. For the market for pollutant 1, the quantities policy is dominated by the single
market policy. However, for pollutant 2, the single market is dominated by the quantities policy.
To gather some intuition, we refer to Figures (1.13), (1.14) and (1.15). The first provides an
example of what the curves have to look like in the chosen market in order to satisfy the ranking
for a1. We observe that the pink curve must be very close to the purple curve in order to match
the ranking for this case. This suggests that the complementarity needs to be low and that
the abatement level por pollutant 2 under the single market must be low too. The remaining
two figures focus on the unchosen market as both depict a flatter marginal benefit curve. The
difference between both curves relies on the relative size of the complementarity. For very
low complementarity (Figure 1.14), we observe little difference between quantities and double-
dipping. As we increase the complementarity, we observe that double-dipping outperforms the
other policies in Figure (1.15). In both Figures, we observe that the efficiency of the single
market is substantially affected by the flatness of the marginal benefit curve for a2 resulting
in very large welfare losses in each figure (See gray areas in Figures 1.14 and 1.15). Beyond a
graphical analysis and while we cannot discard any policy, we opt to compare the deadweight
losses between double-dipping and a single market for the chosen market and between double-
dipping quantities for the unchosen market:
WD01 = DWL
sm1p0
1 −DWLmmp01 =
1
2
(α1 + θ1)
(
ammp01 − asm1p01
) [
(a∗1 − asm1p01 )− (ammp01 − a∗1)
]
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WD02 = DWL
0
2 −DWLmmp02 =
1
2
(α2 + θ2)
(
ammp02 − a02
) [
(a∗2 − a02)− (amm1p02 − a∗2)
]
Analysis and Comparative Statics
Notice that the sign of WD0i depends on the sign of 2a
∗
i − ammp0i − asm1p0i for i = 1, 2. For
instance, if WD0i > 0 for both i = 1, 2, then double-dipping dominates the single market policy.
For Case D, we know that as for very low γ, there is little differences in the chosen market as
the abatement levels are very similar. Thus, we decide to concentrate on the unchosen market
for this analysis and we compare double-dipping to a quantities policy. We find that as long as
γ is small,
∂WD02
∂θ2
< 0. Given that this case is characterized by a small θ2, making the marginal
benefit curve even flatter in the unchosen market increases WD02 favoring double-dipping over
quantities. This is intuitive from Figures (1.14) and (1.15). To sum up, decreasing θ2 even more
going along with the characteristics of Case D makes double-dipping more likely to be preferred
over both quantities and a single market. For this case, the single market performs very poorly
resulting in large welfare losses in the unchosen market. Nonetheless, this case is based on very
low complementarity, which is not as relevant for the debate about double-dipping. In essence,
this case is more about a prices versus quantities analysis. In fact, the poor performance of
the single market is very intuitive as the firm is not allowed to get paid for reductions in one
pollutant. Hence, the firm is going to tend to reduce very little in that market, making the
deadweightloss very large under a single market policy.
1.6 Conclusions
The major contribution of this paper is to compare a price policy allowing double-dipping
to two policies: a quantities policy and a price policy prohibiting double-dipping. Hence, we
aim at understanding when each of these policy designs is more efficient. We look at the full
information scenario as a baseline for assessing these other policies. Under full information,
we show that there is no difference between quantities and prices as long as double-dipping is
allowed. Even when the regulator takes into account the structure of the single market when
setting up prices, double-dipping is still preferred over a single market under full information.
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Since full information is rarely available to a regulator(s), we study two scenarios in which
some important information is not present. A contribution of this paper is the modeling of
the set up of second best prices and quantities. The first scenario we study is the case of two
disconnected or uncoordinated policy makers lacking information about the other’s environ-
mental program. In this case, we concentrate on two possible cases that are characterized by
very different marginal benefit curves across markets. We notice that double-dipping tends to
perform better in markets that have a flatter marginal benefit curve. For instance, when the
marginal benefit curve is relatively flatter in the unchosen market, double-dipping outperforms
both quantities and the single market in that market. In fact, this flatness substantially in-
creases the deadweight loss that arises from the single market policy. Focusing on the steeper
curve, making the marginal benefit curve even steeper in the unchosen (chosen) market favors
a single market (quantities) over double-dipping. Hence, making the steeper marginal benefits
curve even steeper does not favor double-dipping.
Comparing double-dipping with a single market and not taking into account a quantities
policy, we conclude that double-dipping is likely favored over a single market when the marginal
benefit curve is relatively steeper in the chosen market and relatively flatter in the unchosen
market. Even though the steeper curve in the chosen market does not favor double-dipping, the
flatter slope in the unchosen market substantially harms the performance the single market.
Analogously, a single market is more likely to outperform double-dipping as long as the steeper
curve effect dominates the flatter curve effect. Since the unchosen market is the one with the
steeper curve, it is more likely that its effect will matter most. Taking both together, double-
dipping is more likely to be preferred over a single market when the steeper curve is in the
chosen market. Conversely, in the case when the steeper curve is in the unchosen market, a
single market is more likely to be preferred over double-dipping.
Another way the regulator can set prices or quantities in a second-best setting is when
complementarity is ignored in the policy design. Our analysis focuses on differences on the slope
of marginal benefit curve in the unchosen market. If the marginal benefit curve is relatively
steeper in the unchosen market, double-dipping is outperformed by a single market and we
compare quantities versus the single market. Making the marginal benefit curve even steeper
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favors quantities over a single market. The second case is characterized by a flatter marginal
benefit curve in the unchosen market and very low complementarity. In this case, no single
policy is outperformed in both markets. The flatter slope substantially affect the performance
of the single market resulting in a large welfare loss in the unchosen market making double-
dipping preferred over a single market. Given the poor performance of the single market, we
compare double-dipping and quantities. For the chosen market, the policies do not delivery
very different results. Focusing on the unchosen market, making the slope even flatter favors
double-dipping over quantities. Hence, for either case, changing the slope of the marginal
benefit curve in the direction that characterizes each case never favors a single market.
To summarize, this paper points to specific market characteristics that favor one policy over
the others under two second-best scenarios, which further expands our understanding about
the implications of allowing double-dipping in environmental markets. In fact, the intercon-
nection between markets due to the complementarity augments the size of the deadweight loss
associated with prices. Under both second best scenarios, incorrect prices are set above the first
best, resulting in the over abatement of each pollutant. This over abatement appears in the
other pollutants market through the vertical intercept, which is further from the true marginal
cost and increases the deadweight loss associated with prices.
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Figure 1.1 Full Information Social Planner- Pollutant 1
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Figure 1.3 Full Information Single Market - Pollutant 1
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Figure 1.4 Full Information Single Market - Pollutant 2
40
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
∂B2(𝑎2)
𝜕𝑎2
 𝑎2
𝑠𝑚2𝑝
 
𝜏2
∗ 
𝛾𝑎1
𝑠𝑚1𝑝
𝜕𝑔(𝑎1
𝑠𝑚1𝑝, 𝑎2)
𝜕𝑎2
 
τ2 
Ω2 
𝑎2 
Figure 1.5 Full Information Single Market - Pollutant 2 - Special Case
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Figure 1.6 Uncoordinated Regulators - Pollutant 1-Case A
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Figure 1.7 Uncoordinated Regulators - Pollutant 2 - Case A
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Figure 1.8 Uncoordinated Regulators - Pollutant 1- Case B
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Figure 1.9 Uncoordinated Regulators - Pollutant 2 - Case B
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Figure 1.10 Complementarity Ignored by the Regulator - Pollutant 1- Case C
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Figure 1.11 Complementarity Ignored by the Regulator - Pollutant 1- Case C
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Figure 1.12 Complementarity Ignored by the Regulator - Pollutant 2- Case C
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Figure 1.13 Complementarity Ignored by the Regulator - Pollutant 1 - Case D
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Figure 1.14 Complementarity Ignored by the Regulator - Pollutant 2 - Case D
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1.8 Appendix A - Mathematical Derivations
Uncoordinated Regulators
The firm participates in the market for pollutant 1 as long as its profit denoted by pism1pu
is larger than the profit obtained by the firm if it was participating in the market for pollutant
2, denote by pism2pu:
pism1pu = τu1 (a
sm1pu
1 )−
α1
2
(asm1pu1 )
2 − α2
2
(asm1pu2 )
2 + γasm1pu1 a
sm1pu
2
= τu1
(
α2τ
u
1
α1α2 − γ2
)
− α1
2
(
α2τ
u
1
α1α2 − γ2
)2
− α2
2
(
γτu1
α1α2 − γ2
)2
+ γ
(
α2τ
u
1
α1α2 − γ2
)(
γτu1
α1α2 − γ2
)
=
1
2 (α1α2 − γ2)2
(
2α2
(
α1α2 − γ2
)
(τu1 )
2 − α1α22 (τu1 )2 − α2γ2 (τu1 )2 + 2α2γ2 (τu1 )2
)
=
α2 (τ
u
1 )
2
2 (α1α2 − γ2)2
(
2α1α2 − 2γ2 − α1α2 − γ2 + 2γ2
)
=
α2 (τ
u
1 )
2
2 (α1α2 − γ2)2
(
α1α2 − γ2
)
=
α2 (τ
u
1 )
2
2 (α1α2 − γ2)
pism2pu = τu2 (a
sm2pu
2 )−
α2
2
(asm2pu2 )
2 − α1
2
(asm2pu1 )
2 + γasm2pu1 a
sm2pu
2
= τu2
(
α1τ
u
2
α1α2 − γ2
)
− α1
2
(
γτu2
α1α2 − γ2
)2
− α2
2
(
α1τ
u
2
α1α2 − γ2
)2
+ γ
(
γτu2
α1α2 − γ2
)(
α1τ
u
2
α1α2 − γ2
)
=
α1 (τ
u
2 )
2
2 (α1α2 − γ2)2
(
2α1α2 − 2γ2 − α1α2 − γ2 + 2γ2
)
=
α1 (τ
u
2 )
2
2 (α1α2 − γ2)
In other words, as long as α2 (τ
u
1 )
2 ≥ α1 (τu2 )2, the firm participates in the market for
pollutant 1.
Rankings
To show ammpu2 > a
∗
2, first simplify both abatement levels:
ammpu2 =
α1τ
u
2 + γτ
u
1
α1α2 − γ2
=
α1
(α1α2 − γ2)
(α1α2 − γ2)Ω2
(α1α2 − γ2 + α1θ2) +
γ
(α1α2 − γ2)
(α1α2 − γ2)Ω1
(α1α2 − γ2 + α2θ1)
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=
α1Ω2
(α1α2 − γ2 + α1θ2) +
γΩ1
(α1α2 − γ2 + α2θ1)
a∗2 =
(α1 + θ1) Ω2 + γΩ1
(α1 + θ1) (α2 + θ2)− γ2
=
(α1 + θ1) Ω2
(α1 + θ1) (α2 + θ2)− γ2 +
γΩ1
(α1 + θ1) (α2 + θ2)− γ2
We now compare both parts of ammpu2 and a
∗
2 separately. Notice that
γΩ1
(α1α2−γ2+α2θ1) >
γΩ1
(α1+θ1)(α2+θ2)−γ2 since a
∗
2’s denominator is larger. For the other part, to show
α1Ω2
(α1α2−γ2+α1θ2) >
(α1+θ1)Ω2
(α1+θ1)(α2+θ2)−γ2 ,
⇒ α1
(α1α2 − γ2 + α1θ2) >
(α1 + θ1)
(α1 + θ1) (α2 + θ2)− γ2
⇒ α1((α1 + θ1) (α2 + θ2)− γ2) > α1(α1α2 − γ2 + α1θ2) + θ1(α1α2 − γ2 + α1θ2)
⇒ α1((α1 + θ1) (α2 + θ2)− γ2 − α1α2 + γ2 − α1θ2) > θ1(α1α2 − γ2 + α1θ2)
⇒ α1(α1α2 + α1θ2 + α2θ1 + θ1θ2 − γ2 − α1α2 + γ2 − α1θ2) > θ1(α1α2 − γ2 + α1θ2)
⇒ α1(α2θ1 + θ1θ2) > θ1(α1α2 − γ2 + α1θ2)
⇒ α1α2θ1 + α1θ1θ2 > α1α2θ1 − θ1γ2 + α1θ1θ2
⇒ θ1γ2 > 0
Given the parameters of cost function, we can conclude that ammpu2 > a
∗
2 given that each
component of ammpu2 is larger than its respective component of a
∗
2.
To show ammpu1 > a
∗
1, we follow the same process as above and simplify each abatement
level first:
ammpu1 =
α2τ
u
1 + γτ
u
2
α1α2 − γ2
=
α2Ω1
(α1α2 − γ2 + α2θ1) +
γΩ2
(α1α2 − γ2 + α1θ2)
a∗1 =
(α2 + θ2) Ω1 + γΩ2
(α1 + θ1) (α2 + θ2)− γ2
=
(α2 + θ2) Ω1
(α1 + θ1) (α2 + θ2)− γ2 +
γΩ2
(α1 + θ1) (α2 + θ2)− γ2
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We now compare both parts of ammpu1 and a
∗
1 separately. Again, observe that
γΩ2
(α1α2−γ2+α1θ2)
> γΩ2
(α1+θ1)(α2+θ2)−γ2 since a
∗
1’s denominator is larger. For the other part, to show
α2Ω1
(α1α2−γ2+α2θ1) >
(α2+θ2)Ω1
(α1+θ1)(α2+θ2)−γ2 , we follow the same process as above:
⇒ α2
(α1α2 − γ2 + α2θ1) >
(α2 + θ2)
(α1 + θ1) (α2 + θ2)− γ2
⇒ θ2γ2 > 0
Given the parameters of cost function, we can conclude that ammpu1 > a
∗
1 given that each
component of ammpu1 is larger than its respective component of a
∗
1.
Thus far, we have the following rankings, ammpu1 > a
∗
1 and a
mmpu
2 > a
∗
2. We can also add
the following straightforward rankings:
ammpu1 =
α2τ
u
1 + γτ
u
2
α1α2 − γ2 >
α2τ
u
1
α1α2 − γ2 = a
sm1pu
1
ammpu2 =
α1τ
u
2 + γτ
u
1
α1α2 − γ2 >
γτu1
α1α2 − γ2 = a
sm1pu
2
Also, notice asm1tu1 = a
u
1
asm1pu1 =
α2τ
u
1
α1α2 − γ2 =
α2
(α1α2 − γ2)
(α1α2 − γ2)Ω1
(α1α2 − γ2 + α2θ1) =
α2Ω1
α1α2 − γ2 + α2θ1 = a
u
1
However,
asm1pu2 =
γτu1
α1α2 − γ2 =
γΩ1
α1α2 − γ2 + α2θ1 6=
α1Ω2
α1α2 − γ2 + α1θ2 = a
u
2
Furthermore, ammpu1 > a
u
1 and a
mmpu
2 > a
u
2 since:
ammpu1 =
α2Ω1
α1α2 − γ2 + α2θ1 +
γΩ2
α1α2 − γ2 + α1θ2 >
α2Ω1
α1α2 − γ2 + α2θ1 = a
u
1
ammpu2 =
α1Ω2
α1α2 − γ2 + α1θ2 +
γΩ1
α1α2 − γ2 + α2θ1 >
α1Ω2
α1α2 − γ2 + α1θ2 = a
u
2
To show that a∗1 > au1 ,
⇒ (α2 + θ2) Ω1 + γΩ2
(α1 + θ1) (α2 + θ2)− γ2 >
α2Ω1
α1α2 − γ2 + α2θ1
⇒ (α2 + θ2) Ω1 + γΩ2
α2 (α1 + θ1) + θ2 (α1 + θ1)− γ2 >
α2Ω1
α2 (α1 + θ1)− γ2
⇒
[
α2 (α1 + θ1)− γ2
]
γΩ2 > θ2γ
2Ω1
⇒ Ω2
Ω1
>
θ2γ
[α2 (α1 + θ1)− γ2] true since τ
∗
2 > 0
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To show a∗2 > au2 ,
⇒ (α1 + θ1) Ω2 + γΩ1
(α1 + θ1) (α2 + θ2)− γ2 >
α1Ω2
α1α2 − γ2 + α1θ2
⇒ Ω2
Ω1
<
α1α2 + α1θ2 − γ2
θ1γ
true since τ∗1 > 0
To show a∗2 > a
sm1pu
2 ,
⇒ γΩ1
α1α2 − γ2 + α2θ1 <
(α1 + θ1) Ω2 + γΩ1
(α1 + θ1) (α2 + θ2)− γ2
⇒ γΩ1
α2 (α1 + θ1)− γ2 <
(α1 + θ1) Ω2 + γΩ1
α2 (α1 + θ1) + θ2 (α1 + θ1)− γ2
⇒
(
α2 (α1 + θ1) γ + θ2 (α1 + θ1) γ − γ3
)
Ω1
< (α1 + θ1)
[
α2 (α1 + θ1)− γ2
]
Ω2 +
[
α2 (α1 + θ1) γ − γ3
]
Ω1
⇒
(
α2 (α1 + θ1) γ + θ2 (α1 + θ1) γ − γ3 − α2 (α1 + θ1) γ + γ3
)
Ω1 < (α1 + θ1)
[
α2 (α1 + θ1)− γ2
]
Ω2
⇒ θ2 (α1 + θ1) γΩ1 < (α1 + θ1)
[
α2 (α1 + θ1)− γ2
]
Ω2
⇒ θ2γ
[α2 (α1 + θ1)− γ2] <
Ω2
Ω1
true since τ∗2 > 0
Deadweight Losses
Deadweight loss for Case A:
WAu1
= DWLsm1pu1 −DWLmmpu1
=
1
2
(a∗1 − asm1pu1 )
(
∂B1(a
sm1pu
1 )
∂a1
− ∂g(a
sm1pu
1 , a
∗
2)
∂a1
)
− 1
2
(ammpu1 − a∗1)
(
∂g(ammpu1 , a
∗
2)
∂a1
− ∂B1(a
mmpu
1 )
∂a1
)
=
1
2
(a∗1 − asm1pu1 )
(
Ω1 − θ1asm1pu1 − α1asm1pu1 + γa∗2
)
− 1
2
(ammpu1 − a∗1) (α1ammpu1 − γa∗2 − Ω1 + θ1ammpu1 )
=
1
2
(a∗1 − asm1pu1 ) (Ω1 + γa∗2) +
1
2
(ammpu1 − a∗1) (Ω1 + γa∗2)
− 1
2
(α1 + θ1) (a
∗
1 − asm1pu1 )asm1pu1 −
1
2
(α1 + θ1) (a
mmpu
1 − a∗1)ammpu1
=
1
2
(Ω1 + γa
∗
2)
(
ammpu1 − asm1pu1
)
− 1
2
(α1 + θ1)
(
(ammpu1 )
2 −
(
asm1pu1
)2 − a∗1 (ammpu1 − asm1pu1 ))
=
1
2
(
ammpu1 − asm1pu1
) [
Ω1 + γa
∗
2 + (α1 + θ1)
(
ammpu1 + a
sm1pu
1 − a∗1
)]
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=
1
2
(
ammpu1 − asm1pu1
) [
Ω1 + γa
∗
2 − (α1 + θ1) a∗1 − (α1 + θ1)
(
ammpu1 + a
sm1pu
1
)]
=
1
2
(
ammpu1 − asm1pu1
) [
2 (α1 + θ1) a
∗
1 − (α1 + θ1)
(
ammpu1 + a
sm1pu
1
)]
=
1
2
(α1 + θ1)
(
ammpu1 − asm1pu1
) [
2a∗1 − ammpu1 − asm1pu1
]
Comparative Statics
Case A - Market for Pollutant 1
We focus on the slope of the marginal benefit curve for the unchosen market (i.e. θ2):
∂WAu1
∂θ2
=
1
2
(α1 + θ1)
(
∂ammpu1
∂θ2
− ∂a
sm1pu
1
∂θ2
)(
2a∗1 − ammpu1 − asm1pu1
)
+
1
2
(α1 + θ1)(a
mmpu
1 − asm1pu1 )
∂
(
2a∗1 − ammpu1 − asm1pu1
)
∂θ2
=
1
2
(α1 + θ1)
(
∂ammpu1
∂θ2
)(
2a∗1 − ammpu1 − asm1pu1
)
+
1
2
(α1 + θ1)(a
mmpu
1 − asm1pu1 )
∂
(
2a∗1 − ammpu1 − asm1pu1
)
∂θ2
Notice that:
∂asm1pu1
∂θ2
= 0. We first determine the sign of
∂(2a∗1−ammpu1 −asm1pu1 )
∂θ2
for Case A:
∂ (2a∗1 − ammpu1 )
∂θ2
=
2
(
(α1 + θ1) (α2 + θ2)− γ2
)
Ω1 − 2 (α1 + θ1) [(α2 + θ2) Ω1 + γΩ2]
((α1 + θ1) (α2 + θ2)− γ2)2
− −α1γΩ2
(α1α2 − γ2 + α1θ2)2
=
2
(
(α1 + θ1) (α2 + θ2)− γ2 − (α1 + θ1) (α2 + θ2)
)
Ω1 − 2 (α1 + θ1) γΩ2
((α1 + θ1) (α2 + θ2)− γ2)2
− −α1γΩ2
(α1α2 − γ2 + α1θ2)2
=
−2γ2Ω1 − 2 (α1 + θ1) γΩ2
((α1 + θ1) (α2 + θ2)− γ2)2
+
α1γΩ2
(α1α2 − γ2 + α1θ2)2
To show that
∂(2a∗1−ammtu1 )
∂θ2
< 0,
⇒ −2γ
2Ω1 − 2 (α1 + θ1) γΩ2
((α1 + θ1) (α2 + θ2)− γ2)2
+
α1γΩ2
(α1α2 − γ2 + α1θ2)2
< 0
⇒ α1γΩ2
(α1α2 − γ2 + α1θ2)2
< 2
γ2Ω1 + (α1 + θ1) γΩ2
((α1 + θ1) (α2 + θ2)− γ2)2
⇒ α1γΩ2
(
(α1 + θ1) (α2 + θ2)− γ2
)2
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< 2γ2Ω1
(
α1α2 − γ2 + α1θ2
)2
+ 2 (α1 + θ1) γ
(
α1α2 − γ2 + α1θ2
)2
Ω2
⇒ α1Ω2
(
α1 (α2 + θ2) + θ1 (α2 + θ2)− γ2
)2
< 2γΩ1
(
α1α2 − γ2 + α1θ2
)2
+ 2 (α1 + θ1)
(
α1(α2 + θ2)− γ2
)2
Ω2
which holds for low θ1 which matches Case A. Under Case A,
∂(2a∗1−ammpu1 )
∂θ2
< 0.
As long as a∗1 − asm1pu1 is similar to ammpu1 − a∗1 or as long as 2a∗1 − ammpu1 − asm1pu1 > 0 and
given that
∂(2a∗1−ammpu1 −asm1pu1 )
∂θ2
< 0 under Case A, then
∂WAu1
∂θ2
< 0.
Case A - Market for Pollutant 2
Concentrating on the slope of the marginal benefits curve for the unchosen market (i.e. θ2):
∂WAu2
∂θ2
=
1
2
(α2 + θ2)
(
∂ammpu2
∂θ2
− ∂a
sm1pu
2
∂θ2
)(
2a∗2 − ammpu2 − asm1pu2
)
+
1
2
(α2 + θ2)(a
mmpu
2 − asm1pu2 )
∂
(
2a∗2 − ammpu2 − asm1pu2
)
∂θ2
Note:
∂ammpu2
∂θ2
− ∂a
sm1pu
2
∂θ2
=
−α21Ω2
(α1α2 − γ2 + α1θ2)2 − 0 < 0
We first determine the sign of
∂(2a∗2−ammpu2 −asm1pu2 )
∂θ2
:
∂ (2a∗2 − ammpu2 )
∂θ2
= 2
(
− (α1 + θ1) [(α1 + θ1) Ω2 + γΩ1]
((α1 + θ1) (α2 + θ2)− γ2)2
)
− −α
2
1Ω2
(α1 (α2 + θ2)− γ2)2
− 0
= −2
(
(α1 + θ1) [(α1 + θ1) Ω2 + γΩ1]
((α1 + θ1) (α2 + θ2)− γ2)2
)
+
α21Ω2
(α1 (α2 + θ2)− γ2)2
− 0
To show
∂(2a∗2−ammpu2 )
∂θ2
< 0:
= −2
(
(α1 + θ1) [(α1 + θ1) Ω2 + γΩ1]
((α1 + θ1) (α2 + θ2)− γ2)2
)
+
α21Ω2
(α1 (α2 + θ2)− γ2)2
< 0
⇒ α21Ω2
(
(α1 + θ1) (α2 + θ2)− γ2
)2
< 2
[
(α1 + θ1)
2 Ω2 + (α1 + θ1) γΩ1
] (
α1 (α2 + θ2)− γ2
)2
⇒ Ω2
(
α1 (α1 + θ1) (α2 + θ2)− α1γ2
)2
< 2 (α1 + θ1)
2 Ω2
(
α1 (α2 + θ2)− γ2
)2
+ 2 (α1 + θ1) γΩ1
(
α1 (α2 + θ2)− γ2
)2
⇒ Ω2
(
α1 (α1 + θ1) (α2 + θ2)− α1γ2
)2
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< 2Ω2
(
α1 (α1 + θ1) (α2 + θ2)− (α1 + θ1) γ2
)2
+ 2 (α1 + θ1) γΩ1
(
α1 (α2 + θ2)− γ2
)2
⇒ Ω2
(
α1 (α1 + θ1) (α2 + θ2)− α1γ2
)2
< 2Ω2
(
α1 (α1 + θ1) (α2 + θ2)− α1γ2 − θ1γ2
)2
+ 2 (α1 + θ1) γΩ1
(
α1 (α2 + θ2)− γ2
)2
Works for low θ1 which characterizes Case A. Hence
∂(2a∗2−ammtu2 )
∂θ2
< 0
As long as a∗2 − asm1pu2 is similar to ammpu2 − a∗2 or as long as 2a∗2 − ammpu2 − asm1pu2 > 0 and
given that
∂(2a∗2−ammpu2 −asm1pu2 )
∂θ2
< 0 under Case A, then
∂WAu2
∂θ2
< 0.
Case B: Market for Pollutant 1
First, since WAu1 = W
Bu
1 and a
sm1pu
1 = a
u
1 , we use W
Au
1 as defined before. We focus on the
slope of the marginal benefit curve of the chosen market (i.e. θ1):
∂WAu1
∂θ1
=
1
2
(α1 + θ1)
(
∂ammpu1
∂θ1
− ∂a
sm1pu
1
∂θ1
)(
2a∗1 − ammpu1 − asm1pu1
)
+
1
2
(α1 + θ1)(a
mmpu
1 − asm1pu1 )
∂
(
2a∗1 − ammpu1 − asm1pu1
)
∂θ1
Note:
∂ammpu1
∂θ1
− ∂a
sm1pu
1
∂θ1
=
−α22Ω1
(α1α2 − γ2 + α2θ1)2 −
−α22Ω1
(α1α2 − γ2 + α2θ1)2 = 0
Consequently, the sign of
∂WAu1
∂θ1
is determined by the sign of
∂(2a∗1−ammpu1 −asm1pu1 )
∂θ1
:
∂
(
2a∗1 − ammpu1 − asm1pu1
)
∂θ1
= 2
(
− (α2 + θ2) [(α2 + θ2) Ω1 + γΩ2]
((α1 + θ1) (α2 + θ2)− γ2)2
)
− −α
2
2Ω1
(α2 (α1 + θ1)− γ2)2
− −α
2
2Ω1
(α2 (α1 + θ1)− γ2)2
= −2
(
(α2 + θ2) [(α2 + θ2) Ω1 + γΩ2]
((α1 + θ1) (α2 + θ2)− γ2)2
)
+
2α22Ω1
(α2 (α1 + θ1)− γ2)2
To show
∂(2a∗1−ammpu1 −asm1pu1 )
∂θ1
< 0,
⇒ −2
(
(α2 + θ2) [(α2 + θ2) Ω1 + γΩ2]
((α1 + θ1) (α2 + θ2)− γ2)2
)
+
2α22Ω1
(α2 (α1 + θ1)− γ2)2
< 0
⇒ 2α
2
2Ω1
(α2 (α1 + θ1)− γ2)2
< 2
(
(α2 + θ2) [(α2 + θ2) Ω1 + γΩ2]
((α1 + θ1) (α2 + θ2)− γ2)2
)
⇒ α
2
2Ω1
(α2 (α1 + θ1)− γ2)2
<
(α2 + θ2) [(α2 + θ2) Ω1 + γΩ2]
((α1 + θ1) (α2 + θ2)− γ2)2
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⇒ α22Ω1
(
(α1 + θ1) (α2 + θ2)− γ2
)2
< (α2 + θ2) [(α2 + θ2) Ω1 + γΩ2]
(
α2 (α1 + θ1)− γ2
)2
⇒ α22Ω1
(
(α1 + θ1) (α2 + θ2)− γ2
)2
<
[
(α2 + θ2)
2 Ω1 + (α2 + θ2) γΩ2
] (
α2 (α1 + θ1)− γ2
)2
⇒ Ω1
(
α2 (α1 + θ1) (α2 + θ2)− α2γ2
)2
< (α2 + θ2)
2 Ω1
(
α2 (α1 + θ1)− γ2
)2
+ (α2 + θ2) γΩ2
(
α2 (α1 + θ1)− γ2
)2
⇒ Ω1
(
α2 (α1 + θ1) (α2 + θ2)− α2γ2
)2
< Ω1
(
α2 (α1 + θ1) (α2 + θ2)− (α2 + θ2) γ2
)2
+ (α2 + θ2) γΩ2
(
α2 (α1 + θ1)− γ2
)2
⇒ Ω1
(
α2 (α1 + θ1) (α2 + θ2)− α2γ2
)2
< Ω1
(
α2 (α1 + θ1) (α2 + θ2)− α2γ2 − θ2γ2
)2
+ (α2 + θ2) γΩ2
(
α2 (α1 + θ1)− γ2
)2
This works for low θ2 which matches the conditions for Case B. Consequently,
∂WBu1
∂θ1
< 0.
Case B: Market for Pollutant 2
The market for pollutant 2 differs from Case A and we focus on a comparison between prices
allowing double-dipping and quantities since the latter outperforms the single market. Focusing
on θ1 again:
∂WBu2
∂θ1
=
1
2
(α2 + θ2)
(
∂ammpu2
∂θ1
− ∂a
u
2
∂θ1
)
(2a∗2 − ammpu2 − au2)
+
1
2
(α2 + θ2)(a
mmpu
2 − au2)
∂ (2a∗2 − ammpu2 − au2)
∂θ1
Note:
∂ammpu2
∂θ1
− ∂a
u
2
∂θ1
=
−α2γΩ2
(α1α2 − γ2 + α2θ1)2 − 0 < 0
Focusing on the sign of
∂(2a∗2−ammpu2 )
∂θ1
:
∂ (2a∗2 − ammpu2 )
∂θ1
= 2
Ω2
(
(α1 + θ1) (α2 + θ2)− γ2
)− (α2 + θ2) [(α1 + θ1) Ω2 + γΩ1]
((α1 + θ1) (α2 + θ2)− γ2)2
− −α2γΩ1
(α1α2 − γ2 + α2θ1)2
= −2γ γΩ2 + (α2 + θ2) Ω1
((α1 + θ1) (α2 + θ2)− γ2)2
+
α2γΩ1
(α1α2 − γ2 + α2θ1)2
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To show that
∂(2a∗2−ammpu2 )
∂θ1
< 0
⇒ α2γΩ1
(α1α2 − γ2 + α2θ1)2
< 2γ
γΩ2 + (α2 + θ2) Ω1
((α1 + θ1) (α2 + θ2)− γ2)2
⇒ α2Ω1
(α2(α1 + θ1)− γ2)2
>
2γΩ2 + 2 (α2 + θ2) Ω1
((α1 + θ1) (α2 + θ2)− γ2)2
⇒ α2Ω1
(
(α1 + θ1) (α2 + θ2)− γ2
)2
< 2γ
(
α2(α1 + θ1)− γ2
)2
Ω2 + 2 (α2 + θ2)
(
α2(α1 + θ1)− γ2
)2
Ω1
⇒ α22(α2 + θ2)Ω1
(
(α1 + θ1) (α2 + θ2)− γ2
)2
< 2α2(α2 + θ2)γ
(
α2(α1 + θ1)− γ2
)2
Ω2 + 2α2 (α2 + θ2)
2
(
α2(α1 + θ1)− γ2
)2
Ω1
⇒ (α2 + θ2)
(
α2 (α1 + θ1) (α2 + θ2)− α2γ2
)2
Ω1
< 2α2(α2 + θ2)γ
(
α2(α1 + θ1)− γ2
)2
Ω2 + 2α2
(
α2(α1 + θ1) (α2 + θ2)− α2γ2 − θ2γ2
)2
Ω1
which works for a low θ2, which matches Case B. Hence,
∂(2a∗2−ammpu2 )
∂θ1
< 0. As long as a∗2 − au2
is similar to ammpu2 −a∗2 or as long as 2a∗2−ammpu2 −au2 > 0 and given that
∂(2a∗2−ammpu2 −au2)
∂θ1
< 0
under Case B, then
∂WBu2
∂θ1
< 0.
Complementarity Ignored by the Regulator
The firm participates in the market for pollutant 1 as long as its profit denoted by pism1p0
is larger than the profit obtained by the firm if it was participating in the market for pollutant
2, denote by pism2p0:
pism1p0 = τ01 (a
sm1p0
1 )−
α1
2
(asm1p01 )
2 − α2
2
(asm1p02 )
2 + γasm1p01 a
sm1p0
2
= τ01
(
α2τ
0
1
α1α2 − γ2
)
− α1
2
(
α2τ
0
1
α1α2 − γ2
)2
− α2
2
(
γτ01
α1α2 − γ2
)2
+ γ
(
α2τ
0
1
α1α2 − γ2
)(
γτ01
α1α2 − γ2
)
=
1
2 (α1α2 − γ2)2
(
2α2
(
α1α2 − γ2
) (
τ01
)2 − α1α22 (τ01)2 − α2γ2 (τ01)2 + 2α2γ2 (τ01)2)
=
α2
(
τ01
)2
2 (α1α2 − γ2)2
(
2α1α2 − 2γ2 − α1α2 − γ2 + 2γ2
)
=
α2
(
τ01
)2
2 (α1α2 − γ2)
pism2p0 = τ02 (a
sm2p0
2 )−
α2
2
(asm2p02 )
2 − α1
2
(asm2p01 )
2 + γasm2p01 a
sm2p0
2
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=
α1
(
τ02
)2
2 (α1α2 − γ2)
Rankings
To show a∗i > a0i ,
a∗i =
(αj + θj)Ωi + γΩj
(α1 + θ1) (α2 + θ2)− γ2
=
(αj + θj)Ωi
(α1 + θ1) (α2 + θ2)− γ2 +
γΩj
(α1 + θ1) (α2 + θ2)− γ2
>
(αj + θj)Ωi
(αi + θi) (αj + θj)− γ2
>
(αj + θj)Ωi
(αi + θi) (αj + θj)
=
Ωi
(αi + θi)
= a0i
To show asm1p01 > a
0
1,
⇒ asm1p01 =
α1α2Ω1
(α1 + θ1) (α1α2 − γ2) >
Ω1
(α1 + θ1)
= a01
⇒ α1α2
(α1α2 − γ2) > 1
⇒ α1α2 ≥ α1α2 − γ2
⇒ γ2 > 0
To show ammp01 > a
sm1p0
1 ,
⇒ ammp01 =
α2τ
0
1 + γτ
0
2
α1α2 − γ2 >
α2τ
0
1
α1α2 − γ2 = a
sm1p0
1
⇒ γτ02 > 0
To show ammp02 > a
sm1p0
2 ,
⇒ ammp02 =
α1τ
0
2 + γτ
0
1
α1α2 − γ2 >
γτ01
α1α2 − γ2 = a
sm1p0
2
⇒ α1τ02 > 0
To show ammp0i > a
∗
i ,
ammp0i =
αjτ
0
i + γτ
0
j
α1α2 − γ2 >
αjτ
∗
i + γτ
∗
j
α1α2 − γ2 = a
∗
i
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we need to show that τ0i > τ
∗
i for i = 1, 2:
τ0i > τ
∗
i ⇒
αiΩi
(αi + θi)
>
αi(αj + θj)Ωi− γ2Ωi − θiγΩj
(αi + θi)(αj + θj)− γ2
We know that d ≡ αi(αj+θj)Ωi−γ2Ωi
(αi+θi)(αj+θj)−γ2 >
αi(αj+θj)Ωi−γ2Ωi−θiγΩj
(αi+θi)(αj+θj)−γ2 Hence, it suffices to show τ
0
i > d
to prove that ammp0i > a
∗
i , since τ
0
i > d and d > τ
∗
i imply that τ
∗
i . To show that τ
0
i > d,
αiΩi
(αi + θi)
>
αi(αj + θj)Ωi− γ2Ωi
(αi + θi)(αj + θj)− γ2
⇒ αi(αi + θi)(αj + θj)− αiγ2 > (αi + θi)(αi(αj + θj)− γ2)
⇒ αi(αi + θi)(αj + θj)− αiγ2 > (αi(αi + θi)(αj + θj)− (αi + θi)γ2)
⇒ θiγ2 > 0
Discarded Combinations of Cases
The following two combinations are discarded:
Case I : ammp01 > a
∗
1 > a
sm1p0
1 > a
0
1 = a
c0
1
Case 2 : ammp02 > a
sm1p0
2 > a
∗
2 > a
0
2 = a
c0
2
and
Case II : ammp01 > a
sm1p0
1 > a
∗
1 > a
0
1 = a
c0
1
Case 1 : ammp02 > a
∗
2 > a
sm1p0
2 > a
0
2 = a
c0
2
As long as a∗2 < a
sm1p0
2 , we have a
∗
1 < a
sm1p0
1 . The condition for a
∗
2 < a
sm1p0
2 is:
⇒ a∗2 =
α1τ
∗
2 + γτ
∗
1
α1α2 − γ2 <
γτ01
α1α2 − γ2 = a
sm1p0
2
⇒ α1τ∗2 + γτ∗1 < γτ01
⇒ τ∗2 <
γ
α1
(
τ01 − τ∗1
)
Similarly, to show that a∗1 < a
sm1p0
1 , we need:
⇒ a∗1 =
α2τ
∗
1 + γτ
∗
2
α1α2 − γ2 <
α2τ
0
1
α1α2 − γ2 = a
sm1p0
2
⇒ α2τ∗1 + γτ∗2 < α2τ01
⇒ τ∗2 <
α2
γ
(
τ01 − τ∗1
)
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Of these two conditions, the first suffices for the latter. In particular as long as
τ∗2 <
γ
α1
(
τ01 − τ∗1
)
⇒ τ∗2 <
α2
γ
(
τ01 − τ∗1
)
since
γ
α1
(
τ01 − τ∗1
)
<
α2
γ
(
τ01 − τ∗1
)
⇔ γ2 < α1α2
These combinations of cases are consequently ruled out.
Comparative Statics
Case C: Market for Pollutant 1
Focusing on θ2, the comparative static for the difference in deadweight losses:
∂WC01
∂θ2
=
1
2
(α1 + θ1)
(
∂asm1p01
∂θ2
− ∂a
0
1
∂θ2
)(
2a∗1 − asm1p01 − a01
)
+
1
2
(α1 + θ1)(a
sm1p0
1 − a01)
∂
(
2a∗1 − asm1p01 − a01
)
∂θ2
=
1
2
(α1 + θ1)(a
sm1p0
1 − a01)
∂
(
2a∗1 − asm1p01 − a01
)
∂θ2
Note:
∂asm1p01
∂θ2
− ∂a
0
1
∂θ2
= 0− 0 = 0
Hence, in this case the sign of
∂WC01
∂θ2
is determined by the sign of
∂(2a∗1−asm1p01 −a01)
∂θ2
:
∂
(
2a∗1 − asm1p01 − a01
)
∂θ2
= 2
Ω1
[
(α1 + θ1) (α2 + θ2)− γ2
]− (α1 + θ1) [(α2 + θ2) Ω1 + γΩ2]
[(α1 + θ1) (α2 + θ2)− γ2]2
= −2γ ((α1 + θ1) Ω2 + γΩ1)
[(α1 + θ1) (α2 + θ2)− γ2]2
< 0
Hence,
∂WC01
∂θ2
> 0.
Case C: Market for Pollutant 2
The comparative statics with respect to θ2,
∂WC02
∂θ2
=
1
2
(asm1p02 − a02)(2a∗2 − asm1p02 − a02)
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+
1
2
(α2 + θ2)
(
∂asm1p02
∂θ2
− ∂a
0
2
∂θ2
)(
2a∗2 − asm1p02 − a02
)
+
1
2
(α2 + θ2)(a
sm1p0
2 − a02)
∂
(
2a∗2 − asm1p02 − a02
)
∂θ2
Note:
∂asm1p02
∂θ2
− ∂a
0
2
∂θ2
= 0− −Ω2
(α2 + θ2)2
> 0
We first explore the sign of
∂(2a∗2−asm1p02 −a02)
∂θ2
:
∂
(
2a∗2 − asm1p02 − a02
)
∂θ2
= −2(α1 + θ1) ((α1 + θ1) Ω2 + γΩ1)
[(α1 + θ1) (α2 + θ2)− γ2]2
− −Ω2
(α2 + θ2)
2
To show that
∂(2a∗2−asm1p02 −a02)
∂θ2
< 0,
⇒ −2(α1 + θ1) ((α1 + θ1) Ω2 + γΩ1)
[(α1 + θ1) (α2 + θ2)− γ2]2
+
Ω2
(α2 + θ2)
2 < 0
⇒ Ω2
(α2 + θ2)
2 <
(
2 (α1 + θ1)
2 Ω2 + 2 (α1 + θ1) γΩ1
)
[(α1 + θ1) (α2 + θ2)− γ2]2
⇒ Ω2
[
(α1 + θ1) (α2 + θ2)− γ2
]2
< 2 (α1 + θ1)
2 (α2 + θ2)
2 Ω2 + 2 (α1 + θ1) (α2 + θ2)
2 γΩ1
which is true since γ2 > 0. Therefore, as long as a∗2 − a02 is similar to asm1p02 − a∗2 or as long as
2a∗2 − asm1p02 − a02 < 0, then ∂W
C0
2
∂θ2
< 0.
Case D: Market for Pollutant 2
We concentrate on the slope of the marginal benefit curve in the unchosen market.
∂WD02
∂θ2
=
1
2
(α2 + θ2)
(
∂ammp02
∂θ2
− ∂a
0
2
∂θ2
)(
2a∗2 − ammp02 − a02
)
+
1
2
(α1 + θ1)(a
mmp0
2 − a02)
∂
(
2a∗2 − ammp02 − a02
)
∂θ2
Note:
∂ammp02
∂θ2
− ∂a
0
2
∂θ2
=
−α2γΩ2
(α2 + θ2)
2 (α1α2 − γ2)
− −Ω2
(α2 + θ2)2
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Furthermore, notice that 2a∗2− ammp02 − a02 tends to zero as γ is very small. Hence, the first
term in the derivate tends to zero as γ is very small. We explore the sign of the second term
by looking at the sign of
∂(2a∗2−ammp02 −a02)
∂θ2
:
∂
(
2a∗2 − ammp02 − a02
)
∂θ2
= −2(α1 + θ1) ((α1 + θ1) Ω2 + γΩ1)
[(α1 + θ1) (α2 + θ2)− γ2]2
+
α2γΩ2
(α2 + θ2)2(α1α2 − γ2) +
Ω2
(α2 + θ2)2
< 0
⇒ α2γΩ2
(α2 + θ2)2(α1α2 − γ2) +
Ω2
(α2 + θ2)2
<
2 (α1 + θ1)
2 Ω2 + 2(α1 + θ1)γΩ1
[(α1 + θ1) (α2 + θ2)− γ2]2
⇒ α2γΩ2 + (α1α2 − γ
2)Ω2
(α2 + θ2)2(α1α2 − γ2) <
2 (α1 + θ1)
2 Ω2 + 2(α1 + θ1)γΩ1
[(α1 + θ1) (α2 + θ2)− γ2]2
⇒ (α2γ + α1α2 − γ2)
[
(α1 + θ1) (α2 + θ2)− γ2
]2
Ω2
< 2(α1α2 − γ2) (α1 + θ1)2 (α2 + θ2)2Ω2 + 2(α1 + θ1)γ(α2 + θ2)2(α1α2 − γ2)Ω1
which true for very small γ, which matches this case. Consequently, as long as γ is very low,
∂WD02
∂θ2
< 0.
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CHAPTER 2. COST-SHARE EFFECTIVENESS IN THE DIFFUSION
OF A NEWLY PERCEIVED POLLUTION ABATEMENT
TECHNOLOGY IN AGRICULTURE: THE CASE OF COVER CROPS IN
IOWA
Mar´ıa Jimena Gonza´lez Ramı´rez and J. Gordon Arbuckle, Jr.
2.1 Abstract
Water quality problems remain severe across much of the United States. Improvements are
particularly challenging in agricultural regions where upwards of 90 percent of the pollution
load comes from sources that fall outside regulatory control under the Clean Water Act. These
nutrient sources are responsible for a large dead zone in the Gulf of Mexico, the closure of Tole-
dos drinking water facility, and ubiquitous damage to recreational amenities. The promotion of
a newly perceived agricultural pollution abatement technology, cover crops, through cost-share
funding opportunities combined with a longitudinal data set including information on adopters
both before and after introduction of the subsidy program provides an identification strategy
to evaluate the effectiveness of funding for this promising new abatement technology. Using
propensity score matching and a Tobit estimator that takes into account non-adoption, we find
that cost-share funding significantly increases the proportion of cover crops planted and cover
crops acres among both recipients of funds and among adopters. These results have critical
implications for finding solutions to address persistent water quality problems with limited
conservation budgets.
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2.2 Introduction
Water quality problems remain severe across much of the United States. According to
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), nonpoint source (NPS) pollution is the Nation’s
largest source of water quality problems (EPA 2015). In the U.S., around 40 percent of surveyed
rivers, lakes, and estuaries are so polluted that they are not clean enough for basic uses such as
fishing or swimming (EPA 1996). Improvements in water quality are particularly challenging in
agricultural regions where upwards of 90 percent of the pollution load comes from NPS that fall
outside regulatory control under the Clean Water Act. These nutrient sources are responsible
for a large dead zone in the Gulf of Mexico, the closure of Toledos drinking water facility,
the Des Moines Water Works lawsuit against three drainage counties over water quality, and
ubiquitous damage to recreational amenities. In fact, despite the creation of the Hypoxia Task
Force in 1997 (EPA Task Force), substantial improvements in water quality are still necessary.
For example, the 2014 Gulf Hypoxia zone of oxygen-depleted bottom-water was roughly 13,000
square kilometers, an area much higher than the Hypoxia Task Force goal of 5,000 square
kilometers (EPA 2014). Nitrogen and phosphorus applications in agricultural production in the
Upper Mississippi River have contributed to the formation of the Gulf Hypoxia (Rabotyagov
et al. 2014). Current efforts to reduce agricultural runoff into water streams that are focused
on the voluntary adoption of conservation practices have not been able to achieve substantial
water quality improvements. It is now clear that to address this growing problem, it will be
necessary to substantially change the way agriculture is practiced over much of the Upper
Mississippi River Basin.
For example, Iowa developed a statewide Nutrient Reduction Strategy in 2013, which is a
science and technology-based framework to assess and reduce nutrients to Iowa water and the
Gulf of Mexico (Iowa NRS 2013). The strategy calls for a significant voluntary adoption of cover
crops, crops that are planted between harvest and the planting of cash crops, which are able
to reduce both nitrogen and phosphorus losses by approximately 30 percent (Iowa NRS 2013).
While cover crops have been widely promoted as an effective conservation practice recently,
there has been little adoption in Iowa. In 2009, Iowa had fewer than 10,000 cover crops acres.
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In 2013, the number increased to 300,000 acres planted (Soil and Water Conservation Society
2015). In both years, the number of cover crops acres is very small relative to total corn and
soybean crop land, which is around 24 million (USDA NASS 2014). These adoption statistics
illustrate that cover crops are a newly perceived conservation practice in this region and that
substantial efforts must be exerted to increase conservation acres. Carlson and Stockwell (2013)
as well as Arbuckle and Roesch-McNally (2015) emphasize the lack of research on cover crop
adoption in agriculture-intense regions and the importance of understanding it.
Several cost-share funding programs have promoted the adoption of cover crops. Based on
the Iowa Nutrient Reduction Strategy, more cost-share funding became available to implement
conservation practices in 2013, including cover crops. At the same time, state and federal
programs also provided cost-share funding for new adoption of cover crops. Together, this
cost-share funding can be viewed as an opportunity to study the come back of this practice in
this very important agricultural region. Given the availability of cost-share and the importance
of this practice for water quality, we study the effectiveness of cost-share funding in the planting
of cover crops using a unique dataset with yearly farm level data on large farm operators. While
the Iowa experience is relatively small, it provides an excellent source of information to draw
on for other programs in areas in which cover crops are perceived as a new technology. We
use matching methods combined with regression analysis to study the effectiveness of cost-
share funding using the Iowa Farm and Rural Life Poll. Focusing on Iowa provides a unique
opportunity to collect data on this new conservation practice in this region. Furthermore,
Iowa’s experience can inform the entire effort to solve the hypoxia zone problem.
Directly comparing cover crop decisions between farmers enrolled in cost-share programs
and farmers who are not enrolled could result in estimates that suffer from selection bias and in
incorrect policy advice concerning program expansion. To assess the effectiveness of cost-share
funding, we need to know what the cover crop planting decision of farmers who received cost-
share funding would have been in the absence of the funds. However, we can never observe the
counterfactual (Imbens & Wooldridge 2008). Furthermore, since the participation in cost-share
programs for cover crops is not random, we also face a selection problem that can come from
both observable and unobservable factors. For instance, a farmer who has planted cover crops in
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the past might be more likely to plant cover crops today if his experience was positive. Similarly,
a farmer who participates in a cover crop cost-share program may have invested in conservation
practices in the past compared to a farmer who does not participate, since the former might
have more experience managing conservation practices or may have lower adoption costs. We
use matching methods to pair treated and untreated (control) farmers based on observable
characteristics measured before treatment to overcome the selection problem and to have a
valid counterfactual. Our unique dataset includes variables that have not been included in
previous U.S. cost-share studies such as attitudinal and previous conservation and drainage
expenditure information.
After matching and achieving covariate balance and satisfying the overlap assumption, we
study two outcomes: the proportion of cover crops acres relative to total farm land and the
amount of cover crops acres planted. We estimate two treatment effects: the average treatment
effect on the treated and the average marginal treatment effect among adopters of cover crops.
Previous studies have focused on the former, but we contribute to the literature by estimating
the latter. Given the lack of adoption of cover crops in this region, it is important to take into
account that most farmers are not using this practice. By differentiating between adopters and
non-adopters, we are able to study the effectiveness of cost-share among farmers who are using
cover crops. Our results indicate that, on average, farmers receiving cost-share increase the
proportion of cover crop acres by about 20 percentage points relative to farmers who do not get
the funds. For acres, we find that receiving cost-share funding induces farmers to plant more
cover crops acres on average relative to non-recipients. However, the size of this effect varies
between matching specifications.
In order to estimate the average marginal treatment effect among adopters, we follow a two
step process. First, we use a Tobit regression on the matched data, since our outcome variables
include corner solutions at zero due to the lack of adoption of this conservation practice. The
Tobit estimator corrects the bias associated with these zeros (Green 2008). Secondly, we
calculate the average marginal effect of receiving cost-share among adopters. We find that,
on average, receiving cost-share increases the expected proportion of cover crops by around 18
percentage points among adopters only. For cover crops acres, we find that the average marginal
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effect of cost-share is about 104 acres among adopters. Taking all the estimation results, we
conclude that cost-share funding is effective, as it increases the proportion and acres of cover
crops among cost-share recipients and adopters.
2.3 Literature Review
Matching methods have been employed for program evaluations related to conservation.
Liu and Lynch (2011) use matching methods to study the effect of land-use policies focused
on the reduction of farmland loss. Ferraro et al. (2007) study the effectiveness of the U.S.
Endangered Species Act on species recovery rates using matching methods. Adam et al. (2008)
estimate the effectiveness of protected area networks on deforestation rates in Costa Rica.
Cooper (2005) analyzes incentive payments for adopting a bundle of best management practices.
Conservation Programs have also been studied using difference-in-difference matching. Chabe´-
Ferret & Subervie (2013) study European Union Agro-environmental schemes implementation
in France. These schemes pay farmers to adopt greener practices. They study schemes that
are meant to increase crop diversity, the planting of cover crops, the planting of buffer strips,
and the conversion to organic farming. Using propensity score matching and difference-in-
difference, they estimate the average treatment effect on the treated. They find that the Agro-
environmental scheme increases the area planted with cover crops by around 10 ha (around 24
acres) on average (Chabe´-Ferret & Subervie 2013). While we would like to use a difference-
in-difference approach in this study, the Iowa Farm and Rural Life Poll does not ask the same
questions every year. Nonetheless, we use matching techniques on pretreatment variables that
are available in our dataset.
A few papers have studied cost-share in the state of Maryland, where cover crops are an
established conservation practice. Lichtenberg and Smith-Ramirez (2003) take advantage of
the large amount of Maryland farmers receiving cost-share funding for a variety of conserva-
tion practices to assess the impact of cost-sharing on overall conservation effort. They study
three conservation measures: an aggregate indicator of cost-share funding award, the num-
ber of conservation practices adopted, and the acreage served by those conservation practices.
They take into account transaction costs, factors influencing government agencies’ cost-share
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funding allocation process, and possible economies of scale and scope. Using full information
maximum likelihood, their estimation suggests that political influence and protection of crop
productivity influence cost-sharing award decisions, while the proximity to water bodies does
not. Furthermore, they find that farmers receiving cost-share use fewer practices and achieve
no greater conservation coverage than farmers who do not receive cost-sharing (Lichtenberg &
Smith-Ramirez 2003). More recently, Lichtenberg and Smith-Ramirez (2011) study whether
cost-share induces farmers to expand cultivation on more vulnerable land for three of the most
commonly used conservation practices in Maryland: contour farming, strip cropping, and cover
crops. They find that farmers receiving cost-share funding allocate 8 percentage points more
cropland to cover crops than in the absence of the funds. Furthermore, farmers who receive
cost-share funding are roughly 36 percentage points more likely to use cover crops than farmers
without the funds.
Fleming (2015) also studies the direct effect of cost-share funding on cover crops acres in
Maryland, but he also studies the indirect effect of cost-share on conservation tillage and con-
tour/strip cropping acres. He employs a two-stage simultaneous equation approach to correct
for voluntary self-selection in the funding programs and which accounts for substitution effects
among conservation practices. He finds that cost-share funding has a positive and significant
effect on cover crops acres in Maryland (Fleming 2015). These studies in Maryland differ from
ours as they use data from a state in which there is more adoption of cover crops, and in
which indirect effects on other conservation practices are more likely as cover crops are a newly
perceived in our region. Our paper focuses on an area in which cover crops are viewed as a
new technology. Secondly, we differ in our methodologies based on the nature of the datasets
employed in each analysis. While they utilize a cross section, we use the Iowa Farm and Rural
Life Poll, which allows us to use information before cost-share funding is received by farmers.
On the other hand, we take these Maryland studies as references in the selection of explanatory
variables to control for transaction costs and the factors influencing award decision processes.
The previous research that is most relevant for this application is Mezzatesta et al. (2013),
who also estimate the average treatment effect of cost-share programs and who address ad-
ditionality concerns from conservation practices. They use matching techniques to estimate
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the average treatment effect on the treated of cost-share funding for several conservation prac-
tices, including cover crops, in Ohio using cross-sectional data. Their outcome variable is the
proportion of acres under a particular conservation practice relative to total farm acres. Fur-
thermore, they address additionality concerns by decomposing the average treatment effect on
the treated according to relative contributions of adopters and non-adopters. They find that
the average treatment effect on the treated of enrollment in cost-share programs is roughly 23
percentage points for cover crops. Our research utilizes a similar methodology, but we differ
in the dataset employed for matching. While they use cross-sectional data, we use a unique
dataset with yearly information on farmers that allows us to match treated and control units
based on pretreatment characteristics, which is fundamental to obtain a valid counterfactual.
While previous research has studied cost-share funding in the United States, it has been
focused on an area in which cover crops are more popular and in which there is substantial
adoption of the practice. We contribute to the literature by studying the planting of cover
crops in an area of the United States in which this conservation practice is newly perceived
and in which cover crops are widely promoted to attain water quality goals at a local and
regional level. Moreover, this area is extremely important as it is heavily farmed and as it
contributes to both local water quality problems and the Gulf Hypoxia. While cover crops
are recognized for their environmental benefits, limited peer-reviewed studies focused on the
adoption of cover crops exist in the literature in this area (Arbuckle & Roesch-McNally 2015).
Secondly, we contribute to the understanding of adoption decisions by using a unique dataset
that allows us to observe characteristics prior to the allocation of cost-share funding, different
than these previous U.S. studies that employ cross-sectional data. Hence, we address selection
bias through matching techniques using information prior to receiving funding. Third, we also
differ from these previous studies as we include attitudinal and past conservation and past
drainage expenditure information in our matching process. Fourth, in addition to estimating
the average treatment effect on the treated, we contribute to the literature by estimating the
average marginal treatment effect among adopters. While some studies concentrate indirect
effects (Lichtenberg & Smith-Ramirez 2011; Fleming 2015) of cover crops, we are able to focus
on planting of cover crops on its own, given that this is a new conservation practice in this
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area. In essence, we are concerned about the effectiveness of cost-share funding in the sole
planting of cover crops, given the little adoption in the area and the novelty of this practice in
the region.
2.4 Background
Whereas the Iowa Nutrient Reduction Strategy is a relatively new effort that provides
guidelines to improve water quality in Iowa and in the Gulf of Mexico, water quality has been
promoted by both state and federal conservation programs in the past. These programs of-
ten provide cost-share incentives, in which matching funds or incentive payments are given to
farmers to cover a proportion of the conservation costs. In Iowa, several cost-share program are
available through USDA’s Natural Resource Conservation Service (NRSC), including the Con-
servation Reserve Program (CRP), the Environmental Quality Incentives Programs (EQIP),
the Conservation Reserve Enhancement Program (CREP), the Conservation Stewardship Pro-
gram (CSP), among others. Some of these programs are focused on particular conservation
practices such as land retirement in the case of CRP and wetlands in the case of CREP. Other
programs promote a variety of conservation practices, including cover crops, such as EQIP or
CSP. For instance, EQIP offers cost-share to first cover crop producers. Basic payment rates
varied from roughly $24 to $35 per cover crop acre depending on the type of cover crop seed
employed by the farmer (USDA NRCS 2013).
In August of 2013, $2.8 million became available statewide to implement conservation prac-
tices based on the Iowa Nutrient Reduction Strategy through the Water Quality Initiative
(Iowa NRS 2014). The funds were allocated for practices that could be implemented in a short
time, with the goal of providing water quality benefits in 2013 and spring of 2014 (Iowa NRS
2014). One of practices that was promoted through this cost-share program was cover crops
with a payment rate of $25 per acre (Swoboda 2013). According to the Iowa NRS 2013-2014
Annual Progress Report, roughly 95,000 acres of cover crops were established through this
state cost-share program. This number is very small relative to the total amount of corn and
soybean crop land, which is around 24 million acres in Iowa (USDA NASS 2014). Overall,
roughly 230,000 acres of cover crops were planted through both Federal and State cost-share
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program in 2013, capturing around 75 percent of total cover crop acres for that year. Given the
availability of cost-share funding in 2013, we use a unique data set to assess the effectiveness
of cost-share funding in the planting of cover crops.
2.5 Farmer’s Model
A profit maximizer farmer chooses the amount of cover crops to be planted based on the
following optimization:
max
a
pi(a) = max
a
τa− g(a) (2.1)
where a is acres of cover crops, τ is the cost-share funding payment per acre, and g(a) is the
cost function associated with planting cover crops.
Due to winter conditions and the lack of markets, cover crops do not have enough time to
grow and are typically killed before planting the cash crop in the spring. Hence, the farmer
does not receive any direct revenue associated with harvesting the cover crop. However, cover
crops reduce soil erosion and nutrient loss and increase soil health (Arbuckle & Roesch-McNally
2015). These benefits can increase the cash crop yield. However, yield changes associated with
cover crops are still a topic of debate, as more research is needed to understand the relation
between cover crops and yields. For this reason, we include yield changes as part of the cost
function. If cover crops decrease yield, the forgone revenue associated with the yield loss
becomes a cost. Otherwise, the additional revenue becomes a negative cost1. The cost function
also includes seed, labor, and any other costs associated with planting, managing, and killing
the cover crop. A farmer plants cover crops (i.e. a∗ > 0) as long as:
τ =
∂g(a)
a
(2.2)
Essentially, a farmer plants cover crops as long as he or she receives cost-share funding per acre
at the level where it equals the marginal cost. The above equation determines the amount of
1Since cover crops are newly perceived in this region, having data on the returns to cover crops is very hard.
As limited adoption has taken place, information on yield changes is limited and researchers rely on experimental
plots or integrated assessment models to understand these changes.
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acres planted by the farmer. On the other hand, if the farmer is not offered enough cost-share
funding compensation (i.e. if τ < ∂g(a)a ), he or she will not plant cover crops, resulting in a
corner solution at zero (i.e. a∗ = 0). This simple model illustrates the behavior of a profit
maximizer farmer. Beyond a farmer’s cover crop planting decision, our paper is focused on
the effectiveness of having cost-share funding (i.e. τ) on cover crop acres planted and the
proportion of cover crops relative to total farm land.
2.6 Methodology
For the estimation of treatment effects, we would like to know the way the treatment
participant would behave in the absence of the treatment as first formalized by Rubin (1974).
The treatment effect for individual i is the comparison of i’s outcome with treatment, denoted
by Y1,i, and i’s outcome without treatment, denoted by Y0,i. The fundamental problem when
estimating treatment effects is that we only observe one of these potential outcomes for each
individual (Holland, 1986). Basically, when estimating causal effects, we face a missing data
problem, so we need to predict the unobserved potential outcomes (Rubin, 1976). In order
to estimate treatment effects, E(Y1 − Y0|X), we compare treated and control individuals that
are very similar. Following Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) and Heckman et al. (1998), two
assumptions are made to estimate treatment effects: (1) strong ignorability assumption, in
which the treatment assignment, denoted by T , is independent of potential outcomes (Y0, Y1)
given the covariates X (i.e. T ⊥ (Y0, Y1)|X); and (2) overlap assumption, in which there is a
positive probability, denoted by P (T = 1) of receiving each treatment for all values of X (i.e.
0 < P (T = 1|X) < 1 for all X). A weaker version of (1), in which E(Y0|X,T ) = E(Y0|X)
and E(Y1|X,T ) = E(Y1|X), suffices for estimating the average treatment effect on the treated,
defined as ATT = E(Y1 − Y0|X,T = 1). For our research question, we focus two outcome
variables: Y 1 which is the proportion of cover crops planted relative to total farm acreage and
Y 2 which is the amount of acres of cover crops planted. The treatment indicator, T , is defined
as follows:
T =

1 if farmer is enrolled in cost-share program
0 if farmer is not enrolled in cost-share program
(2.3)
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In order to estimate treatment effects, the literature suggests a two-step process. To start,
researchers use pretreatment information to select comparable treated and control units to
analyze the treatment effect without using the outcome variable. Secondly, using the matched
sample, researchers estimate treatment effects (Stuart & Rubin 2008). For the first step,
matching techniques are employed to balance the distribution of covariates in the treated and
control groups (Stuart 2010). In essence, by controlling for pretreatment differences between
treatment and control, researchers are able to reduce bias by using a valid counterfactual. For
the second step, researchers estimate treatment effects. We are interested in estimating two
effects: the average treatment effect on the treated and the average marginal treatment effect
among adopters. For the first, we estimate the ATT directly using a propensity score estimator:
ÂTT =
1
N1
 ∑
i∈I1∩Sp
[
Y1,i − ˆY0,i
] (2.4)
with
ˆY0,i =
∑
j∈I0
Wˆ (i, j)Y0,j (2.5)
where Y is either Y 1 or Y 2, I1 denotes the set of treatment observations, I0 denotes the set
of control observations, N1 is the number of treated observations, Sp denotes the region of
common support, and Wˆ (i, j) are the weights that depend upon the distance between the
propensity scores for i and j and the number of matches per treatment observation. To assess
the estimation results, researchers use Abadie and Imbens robust standard errors, which take
into account that the propensity score is estimated.
To estimate the average marginal treatment effect among adopters, we use the matched
data and regress the outcome variable on the treatment status and other relevant covariates.
Matching methods and regression adjustment models can complement each other (Rubin &
Thomas 2000, Glazerman, Levy & Myers 2003, Abadie & Imbens 2006). Intuitively, by selecting
matched samples, the bias due to covariate differences is reduced and regression analysis for
remaining small covariate differences increases the efficiency of treatment estimates (Stuart &
Rubin 2008) and makes results less sensitive to model specifications (Ho et. al. 2007).
For the first step, propensity score matching is typically employed in non-experimental
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studies to attain balance and overcome the selection problem (Rosenbaum & Rubin 1983).
First, a propensity score is calculated, which is each individual’s probability of being included
in the treatment, and it is calculated using observed covariates, X (Wooldridge 2010). Smith
and Todd (2005) recommend the inclusion of covariates that influence both treatment status
and outcome when estimating the propensity score. As emphasized by Ho et. al. (2007),
the selection of covariates to be included in regressions can be based on previous research (i.e.
Chabe´-Ferret & Subervie 2013, Mezzatesta et al 2013, and Lichtenberg & Smith-Ramı´rez 2003,
2011) and scientific understanding. Furthermore, using covariates measured prior to treatment
assignment is fundamental to avoid including variables that may have been affected by the
treatment (Stuart & Rubin 2008).
Choosing appropriate covariates, nearest neighbor propensity score matching, and genetic
matching are employed to obtain valid counterfactuals. Under nearest neighbor propensity score
matching, best controls are found by minimizing a distance measure, the propensity score, for
each treated unit one at a time (Ho et al. 2011). Genetic matching is a multivariate matching
method that maximizes the balance of covariates across treatment and control (Diamond and
Sekhon 2012). In essence, the method minimizes the discrepancy between distribution of po-
tential cofounders in the treated and control groups, which allows for a maximized covariate
balance (Sekhon 2011)2.
We use teffects psmatch and GenMatch (Sekhon 2012) to estimate the ATT directly using
nearest neighbor propensity score matching and genetic matching respectively and to estimate
Abadie and Imbens (2012) robust standard errors. The latter take into account the usage of es-
timated treatment probabilities in the matching process. For nearest neighbor propensity score
matching, we utilize several matching specifications, including both probit and logit propensity
scores, caliper levels, and number of neighbors to be matched per treated observation. For
genetic matching, we also try several specifications including number of neighbors, boots, and
population size. To assess covariate balance, we compute standardized mean differences and
variance ratios between treatment and control. To verify the overlap assumption, we plot kernel
density plots of the propensity scores for both matched and raw datasets.
2We use teffects psmatch in Stata and GenMatch (Sekhon 2012) in R to match treatment and controls
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After data is matched and covariate balance and overlap are attained, we employ a Tobit
regression since our outcomes include a corner solution at zero for a substantial fraction of the
observations (Wooldridge 2010). For corner solution responses, using conventional regression
methods such as OLS yield biased results (Greene 2008). Under the standard Tobit model
(Tobin 1985), the dependent variable is left censored3 at zero.
Y ∗i = β0 + βTTi +X
′
iβ + εi (2.6)
Yi = max (0, Y
∗
i ) (2.7)
where i indicates the observation, Y ∗i is the latent variable, X
′
i is a vector of explanatory
variables, Ti is the treatment, β is a vector of unknown parameters, and εi is the error term.
Both Y 1 and Y 2 have corner solutions at zero, since many farmers report zero cover crops acres.
Likewise, no farms report planting cover cover crops on a 100 percent of their acreage, making
Y 1 < 1 for all farmers. When estimating the treatment effect through these Tobit models, we
apply the same set of covariates utilized in the matching process, X, to control for remaining
covariate differences. To conclude the analysis, we focus on the average marginal effect of the
treatment indicator among adopters of cover crops:
∂E[Y |Y > 0]
∂T
= βT
[
1− λ(α)
(
Xiβ
σ
+ λ(α)
)]
(2.8)
where λ(α) =
φ
Xiβ
σ
Φ
Xiβ
σ
is the Inverse Mills Ratio, σ is the Tobit scale, Φ() is the standard normal
cdf and φ() is the standard normal pdf. This marginal effect indicates the treatment effect on
on observations where Y > 0. However, since we are interested in the marginal effect of the
treatment indicator, we compute the average discrete first-difference between treatment and
control for the expected positive outcome using Stata’s margins, which takes into account the
matching weights and uses the Delta-method to calculate standard errors.
3Wooldridge (2010) prefers to avoid the word ”censored” as it might suggest some data censoring. In this
case, we work with a corner solution model, where the corner is at zero. This is similar to the charitable
contribution example that is typically used to exemplified corner solution responses when the only corner is at
zero (Wooldridge 2010).
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2.7 Data
We use data from the Iowa Farm and Rural Life Poll (IFRLP) to estimate the effect of
cost-share programs in the planting of cover crops in Iowa, which provides us with a unique
opportunity to learn about this emerging conservation practice. The IFRLP is an annual
longitudinal survey of Iowa farmers that started in 1982, which has a sample of roughly 2000
large operators that are repeatedly sampled. This survey is the longest-running survey of
its kind in the United States (Arbuckle, Jr. et al. 2013). Iowa State University Extension in
partnership with Iowa Agricultural Statistics and the Iowa Department of Agriculture and Land
Stewardship are in charge of the survey. They mail the survey to the same group of farmers
every spring. Nonetheless, as a response to attrition due to retirement and other factors, new
samples are randomly drawn from the Census of Agriculture master list to refill the panel
sample. As these new samples are drawn, smaller-scale farmers often decide not to participate.
Arbuckle (2013) compares IFRLP (2008) and the Census of Agricultural statistics (2007) for
Iowa and finds that the IFRLP sample has large-scale farmers. As in Arbuckle’s (2013) study,
this concentration of large farm operators is beneficial for our research purposes as large-scale
farms operate a substantial amount of acreage relative to small-scale farms. Furthermore, we
want to make sure our study captures large farmers, who ultimately have a larger impact on
the environment.
The IFRLP focuses primarily on conservation-related policy, decision making, behavior, and
attitudes among farmers. Questions from the annual survey are often developed in consultation
with public agency stakeholders such as the Iowa Department of Natural Resources, the Iowa
Department of Agriculture and Land Stewardship, and the USDA NRCS and are focused on
a few particular subjects each year. The surveys are meant to facilitate the development and
improvement of research and extension programs and to help local, state, and national leaders
in their decision-making process (Arbuckle et al. 2011). For our analysis, we use data from
the 2010 and 2011 polls, which provide pretreatment covariates.4 In addition, the 2014 poll
is used since it contains information for our outcome variables and identifies which farmers
4Each poll contains questions about the previous year
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received cost-share funding to plant cover crops, which determines our treatment variable. We
construct the proportion of cover crops using information on cover crops acres and the aggregate
of responses on the amount of farmland acres devoted to several farming categories. Lastly,
the 2014 poll also contains some pretreatment variables that do not change after harvest, when
cover crop decisions are made and when cost-share is received. Using this data, we study the
effect of cost-share funding on our two outcome variables.
Based on the 2014 poll alone with over one thousand observations, roughly 14 percent of
surveyed farmers stated that they planted cover crops in 2013. The mean among cover crops
adopters was 98 acres (IFRLP 2014). The majority use cover crops on less than 100 acres
of their land. After merging the polls from 2010, 2011 and 2014, we have 588 observations.
While we lose observations by merging the responses from the three years, we proceed with the
merging because we want to match based on pretreatment variables from the older surveys.
Once we exclude observations with missing variables or inconsistent responses, our final sample
is 530 observations. Table 2.1 summarizes adoption among these observations. With this subset
of the polls, we observe that roughly 17 percent of respondents adopted cover crops in 2013.
There are almost twice as many adopters without cost-share as with this funding.
Focusing on our outcome variables, Table 2.2 contains summary statistics among those who
adopted cover crops from the merged surveys. For the proportion outcome, the mean is around
20 percent, and the median is roughly 12 percent for the whole dataset, showing that most
farmers fall below the average proportion. Among cost-share recipients, the mean proportion
is around 24 percent, which is about 5 percentage points higher than the mean among non-
recipients. The range of the proportion is between 0.2 percent and 80 percent among all farmers,
which is larger than the range among cost-share recipients. For acres, Table 2.2 shows that
adopters planted around 109 acres in 2013. Among cost-share recipients only, an average of 119
acres were planted in 2013, which is about 15 acres higher than the mean among non-recipients.
The range goes from 1 to 1700 acres among all farmers and among non-recipients. It is worth
noting the large difference between maximum acres among recipients and non-recipients. First,
we observe that the maximum of the whole dataset comes from a non-recipient of cost-share.
Secondly, we observe that the maximum was 1700 and 500 among non-recipients and recipients
80
respectively, illustrating a large difference between both groups. While non-recipients have a
larger maximum, the average is higher among recipients. It is plausible that some of these
summary statistics for non-recipients are substantially influenced by this maximum. In fact,
half of the farmers without cost-share planted fewer than 35 acres. In contrast, the median
among cost-share recipients was 75 acres. Despite having a much larger maximum acres among
non-recipients, the remaining summary statistics are higher among cost-share recipients. From
these tables, we observe that while there are more non-recipient adopters, their amount of acres
planted are substantially lower relative to the acres planted among cost-share recipients.
To match treatment observations to valid counterfactuals, we use a list of covariates that
affects both treatment and outcome variables. Following the literature, we use similar covariates
as previous studies (Chabe´-Ferret & Subservie 2013; Mezzatesta et al. 2013; and Lichtenberg
& Smith-Ramı´rez 2003 & 2011) as well as additional variables available in the IFRLP. For
instance, we include whether a farmer believes that Iowa farmers should do more to reduce
nutrient and/or sediment runoff into waterways. We also include variables capturing whether
the farmer had incurred in any costs associated with conservation practices and whether the
farmer had any expenditure associated with agricultural drainage over the last 10 years in 2010.
Our covariates occurred prior to receiving cost-share funding and prior to planting cover crops
in 2013.
Table 2.3 describes each covariate used in the matching process and subsequent Tobit mod-
els, displaying a combination of demographic and farm characteristics as well as some con-
servation information that might affect the enrollment into the cost-share program and the
subsequent cover crops planting decision. Pretreatment outcome variables are ideal explana-
tory variables to include in both matching and regression models. However, we do not have
information about previous cover crops acres planted. As a proxy, we use an indicator variable
that captures the farmers who adopted cover crops in the last five years prior to 2010. Farm and
farming characteristics such as soil erosion problems, the presence of water running through
or along the farm, farm size, proportion of farm acreage rented, the management of livestock,
gross farm sales, and the proportion of farm acreage devoted to grain crops are included to help
predict program enrollment as well as outcome variables. We emphasize the importance of soil
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erosion problems, as this indicator variable is influenced by soil erodibility, slope gradient and
length, vegetation, conservation measures, and rainfall intensity and runoff. In particular, the
higher the slope, the greater the amount of soil erosion by water. Moreover, cover crops help
decrease soil erosion. We also include location information to capture some of the differences
among geographic locations based on weather, soil characteristics, and other factors that are
different among agricultural districts. Demographic and labor information such as age, experi-
ence, farm income, education level, and the number of days worked off farm are also included.
Lastly, we include farmers’ attitudes towards reducing nutrient or sediment runoff into water-
ways and previous conservation costs and drainage expenditures. The latter is included since
land with little slope is more likely to require drainage systems.
Table 2.4 summarizes the explanatory variables prior to any matching process, showing
some statistical significant difference in means between treated and control groups prior to
matching. For instance, the sample mean of the dummy variable indicating water running
on or along the farm is 0.90 for farmers receiving cost-share funding and 0.72 for farmers not
receiving cost-share funding, a difference that is significantly different at a 1 percent level. The
difference on the natural log of farm land is significantly different among treatment and control
groups at the 5 percent level. Lastly, differences in age, age squared, and the indicator variable
for prior use of cover crops are significantly different at a 10 percent level. This table illustrates
the importance of matching before any treatment analysis, since the treatment and control
groups exhibit explanatory variables that are significantly different.
2.8 Matching Results
For the first step of our analysis, we try different specifications of two matching algorithms:
nearest neighbor propensity score matching and genetic matching. We use different caliper
levels, discarding options, distance measures (i.e. Logit and Probit), and different number of
control units to match to treated observations. As emphasized by Stuart (2010), we choose the
best matched data set without using the outcome variable. For this section, we report results
from the best matching method for our data. Robustness checks based on other matching
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methods are reported under the Robustness Checks Section.5 We choose the best method
based on the lowest standardized mean differences among all covariates and the verification of
the overlap assumption. We obtain the best matching result using nearest neighbor propensity
score matching with a probit propensity score, five nearest neighbors, no caliper, and allowing
for replacement of controls.
We first report the probit propensity score results in Table 2.5. The probit estimation
shows that having planted cover crops in the five years prior to 2010 has a positive effect in
receiving treatment and its coefficient is statistically significant at a 1 percent level. Farm
size and having water going through or along the farm also have a positive effect and their
coefficients are statistically significance at a 5 percent level. The sign and significance of these
coefficients are intuitive. In particular, farm size is a piece of information that is included in
cost-share application processes and that is used by administrative bodies making cost-share
award decisions. As explained by Lichtenberg and Smith-Ramı´rez (2003), we expect farm
size to increase the likelihood of receiving cost-share, since larger farm operators are probably
more knowledgeable about farm programs, more experienced dealing with government officials
and application processes, and more influential politically. As far as the presence of water
bodies, they explain that proximity to water bodies should be a decision criteria for awarding
cost-share funds. They hypothesize that the coefficient on this water indicator should be
positive and statistically significant, which is observed in our regression results. Looking at
other explanatory variables, age affects treatment selection negatively, meaning that younger
farmers are more likely to enroll in a cost-share program for cover crops. This negative relation
has been observed in previous studies (Lichtenberg & Smith-Ramı´rez 2003 and Mezzatesta
et al 2013), and it is explained by shorter time horizons and possibly resistance to change
among older farmers. In contrast, farm experience increases the likelihood to enroll in the
cost-share program. This positive relation is also observed by Lichtenberg and Smith-Ramı´rez
(2003). More experienced farmers are likely to be more knowledgeable about conservation
funding opportunities and application processes, decreasing their application transaction costs
and increasing their likelihood of applying and subsequently receiving funding.
5Results from other matching methods are available upon request.
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After matching using the specified method, we have 29 treated units matched to 117 control
units for a total of 146 observations. Table 2.6 summarizes the standardized mean differences
and variance ratios between treatment and control for all covariates. The former is the difference
in sample means between treatment and control groups divided by the standard deviation of the
average sample variance of both groups. The highest absolute standardized mean difference is
0.12. Only three covariates have absolute standardized mean differences above 0.10. Following
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985), absolute standardized mean differences below 0.20 are desirable.
Moreover, according to Rubin (2001), each variance ratio should be between 0.5 and 2, since a
ratio for a perfectly balance covariate is 1. Table 2.6 also summarizes the variance ratios of the
matched sample showing that every ratio falls within the desired range. Figure 2.12 provides a
graphical illustration of the improved balance of the variance ratios. After matching, we observe
that variance ratios lie within the desired range of 0.5 and 2. Based on both standardized mean
differences and variance ratios of covariates, we conclude that we attain a good balance.
To assess the common support of the matched sample, we use Figure 2.12, which depicts
the overlap of the propensity scores between treatment and control groups before and after
matching. Figure 2.12 displays the estimated propensity scores of treated, depicted in red, and
control units, depicted in blue, for both raw and matched datasets, which illustrates the overall
distribution of propensity scores in treated and control groups. From this figure, we observe
that matched treated and control units have overlapping propensity scores, which is illustrated
on the right panel. We also illustrate that the overlapping assumption is satisfied through two
box plots of the estimated propensity scores before and after matching. Figure 2.12 shows the
box plot of the estimated propensity scores from the raw treated and control groups on the left
and the matched sample on the right. We can see that matched treated and control groups
look very similar after matching.
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2.9 Results
2.9.1 Estimation Results for the Proportion of Cover Crops Planted Relative to
Total Farm Acreage
After finding the matching method that attains the best balance among treatment and
control groups, we estimate two treatment effects. First, we directly estimate the average
treatment effect on the treated. Secondly, we use a Tobit regression to estimate the average
marginal treatment effect among adopters of cover crops. For the first method, we estimate
the average treatment effect on the treated directly using equation (1), as explained in the
methodology section. We take into account matching weights and compute Abadie and Im-
bens robust standard errors, which take into account that the propensity score is estimated.
Estimation results are summarized in Table 2.7. We find that for cost-share funding recipients,
getting the funding increases the proportion of cover crops planted by 20 percentage points on
average relative to farmers who do not obtain any funds. This estimation result is statistically
significant at the 1 percent level.
Since the proportion of cover crops planted has a corner solution at zero due to common
non-adoption of cover crops, we utilize a Tobit model to secondly estimate the average marginal
treatment effect of cost-share funding on the proportion of cover crops acres relative to total
farm acreage (Y 1) among adopters, as explained in the methodology section. For the Tobit
regression, we use the weights from the matching procedure and employ the same set of covari-
ates used in the matching process (X) in addition to the treatment indicator (T ). Table 2.9
summarizes the results from the Tobit regression on the proportion of cover crops acres. We
observe that the treatment indicator (i.e. T = cost.share.I) affects the proportion positively,
and its coefficient is statistically significant at a 1 percent level, confirming the effectiveness of
cost-share funding in the planting of cover crops. Other covariates are statistically significant,
correcting for residual covariate imbalance between the groups (Ho et. al. 2007).
In order to assess the magnitude of the effectiveness of cost-share funding among adopters,
we compute the average marginal treatment effect on the expected proportion of cover crops
acres planted. While estimating the marginal effect, we focus on adopters (i.e. farmers with
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positive outcome) and we take into account the weights from the matching procedure and
the discrete nature of the treatment indicator. Table 2.10 summarizes the average marginal
treatment effect and its standard error, which is calculated using the Delta-Method. The
average marginal effect of receiving cost-share funding on the expected proportion of cover crops
acres planted is around 18 percentage points among adopters, which is statistically significant
at the 1 percent level. In other words, on average, we expect that farmers receiving cost-share
increase the proportion of cover crops planted by 18 percentage points of their acreage relative
to cover crop adopters who do not receive cost-share funding. Comparing both treatment
estimations, we find that both are positive, statistically significant and similarly sized. We
conclude that having cost-share funding increases the proportion of farm land devoted to cover
crops among cost-share funding recipients and among adopters.
2.9.2 Estimation Results for Cover Crop Acres Planted
As with the proportion of cover crops, we follow the same estimation methods for assessing
the effectiveness of cost-share funding in the amount of cover crops acres (Y 2), our second
outcome variable. We first estimate the average treatment effect on the treated directly and
find that receiving cost-share funding increases cover crops acres by roughly 81 acres. In other
words, cost-share funding induces farmers to plant an additional 81 cover crop acres compared
to non-recipient farmers on average. Using Abadie and Imbens robust standard errors, we
find that this coefficient is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. Results from this
estimation are summarized in Table 2.12.
Secondly, we use a Tobit regression to estimate the average marginal treatment effect on
expected cover crops acres among adopters. Again, we use the weights from the matching
procedure and regress the outcome variable on the same set of covariates using the matching
process (X) as well as the treatment indicator (T ). Table 2.14 summarizes the results from
the Tobit regression and shows that the coefficient on the treatment indicator is positive and
statistically significant at the 1 percent level, confirming cost-share effectiveness in the planting
of cover crops. Lastly, to assess the magnitude of the effectiveness of cost-share funding among
adopters, we find that the estimated average marginal treatment effect is around 104 acres,
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which is summarized in Table 2.15. On average, we expect that farmers receiving cost-share
increase the planting of cover crops by 104 acres relative to cover crop adopters who do not
receive cost-share funding. We use the Delta-Method to calculate standard errors and take
into account the discrete nature of the treatment indicator. We find that the average marginal
effect is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Comparing the estimated ATT and the
estimated average marginal treatment effect among adopters, we find that both are positive and
statistically significant, but that they differ in size. We also find that the confidence interval for
the estimated ATT is larger than the one for the estimated average marginal treatment effect.
We conclude that having cost-share funding increases cover crops acres among adopters and
cost-share funding recipients, but the magnitude of each effect is different among both subsets,
with the effect among adopters having a smaller confidence interval.
2.10 Robustness Checks
As robustness checks, we repeat each estimation using different matched datasets from
other matching specifications that attain a good balance during the first step of our research
analysis. Nearest neighbor propensity score matching with a probit propensity score, four
nearest neighbors, a 0.20 caliper, and allowing for replacement of controls also provides a decent
balance. The lowest absolute standardized mean difference is 0.13.6 Furthermore, nearest
neighbor propensity score matching with a logit propensity score, five nearest neighbors, a 0.20
caliper, and allowing for replacements offers a decent match. The lowest standardized mean
difference under this matching model is 0.19, which is higher than the other two matching
models 7. Lastly, we also include results from a genetic matching (Sekhon 2011) model with
five neighbors and allowing for replacement.8. This matching method did not attain the best
balance, with the highest absolute standardized mean difference being .33. However, we decide
to include the best matching outcome under the genetic algorithm method. Tobit regressions
are run for each outcome variable using each matched data set. For the six regressions, the
coefficient on the treatment indicator is positive, and it is statistically significant at the 1
6Complete matching results are available upon request
7Complete matching results are available upon request
8Complete matching results are available upon request
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percent level. Hence, we conclude that the sign and statistically significance of the treatment
indicator does not vary across matching specifications.
For the proportion outcome variable, Table 2.8 summarizes estimated ATT coefficients
under the three methods. We find that the second best matching method, displayed on the
first row of the table, has the same estimated ATT coefficient, 0.20, as our main results in Table
2.7. With the other two matching methods, the estimated ATT is 2 percentage points higher
than the estimated coefficient from the best matching model. Overall, all the coefficients are
statistically significant at the 1 percent level and they are similar in size. We therefore conclude
that receiving cost-share funding increases the proportion of cover crops acres by around 20
percentage points among funding recipients relative to not receiving the funds. Focusing on
adopters only, Table 2.11 shows the estimated average marginal treatment effect on the expected
outcome under each matching specification. We observe that the three estimated effects are
very similar in size and are slightly higher than the marginal treatment effect estimated under
the chosen matching model displayed in Table 2.10. It is worth noting that these marginal
effects are similar to the estimated ATT under each method. We conclude that cost-share
funding increases the proportion of cover crops planted by roughly 20 and 18 percentage points
among funding recipients and adopters respectively relative to not receiving the funds.
For acres of cover crops planted, Table 2.13 summarizes estimated ATT coefficients under
each matching specification. We observe that using the second best matched dataset, the
estimated ATT is around 74 acres, which is statistically significant at the 1 percent level,
and it is around 7 acres lower than the estimated ATT using the best matched dataset (See
Table 2.12). For the other two matching specifications, the ATT coefficients are similar in size,
but they are around 20 acres higher than the estimated ATT from Table 2.12. We conclude
that having cost-share funding increases the amount of acres planted among recipients, but
the magnitude of its effect differs between matching specifications. These differences might be
explained by the large 95 percent confidence interval for the estimated ATT from Table 2.12.
Focusing on adopters only, Table 2.16 summarizes the estimated average marginal treatment
effect results from the three matching specifications. We observe that the estimated effects are
similar in size and statistically significant at the 1 percent level. They are also very similar
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to the main results from Table 2.15, showing less variation compared to estimated ATTs. We
also note that the 95 percent confidence interval is smaller in Table 2.15 compared to Table
2.12. We conclude that receiving cost-share funding increases the expected amount of acres
planted by around 104 acres among adopters of cover crops relative to those who do not obtain
cost-share funding.
2.11 Conclusions
Cover crops have been promoted to address agricultural water pollution at local and regional
levels through Federal and State conservation programs. Based on the Iowa Nutrient Reduction
Strategy, in August of 2013, additional cost-share funding became available to establish cover
crops, among other conservation practices, with the goal of providing water quality benefits
in 2013 and spring 2014 (Iowa NRS 2014). The availability of cost-share funding provides a
unique opportunity to study its effectiveness in promoting this newly perceived technology in
this agriculture-intense region. Specifically, we use matching methods combined with regression
analysis to study the effectiveness of cost-share funding on the proportion of cover crops acres
planted relative to total farm acreage and the amount of cover crops acres planted using a
unique dataset that contains yearly information on large farm operators.
Following a two-step process, we first match treated and control units based on pretreatment
information using a variety of matching specifications and two matching algorithms: nearest
neighbor propensity score matching and genetic matching (Sekhon 2012). We choose the best
matched data set based on standardized mean difference, variance ratios, and the overlap of
propensity scores between treatment and control groups. For the second step, we estimate two
treatment effects for both outcomes (i.e. proportion and acres): the average treatment effect
on the treated and the average marginal treatment effect among adopters. For the former, we
estimate the ATT directly and use Abadie and Imbens robust standard errors. For the latter
and given that our outcomes include a corner solution at zero, we use a Tobit model in which
we regress each outcome variable on the treatment indicator and other relevant covariates. We
then estimate the average marginal treatment effect among adopters of cover crops.
We find that receiving cost-share funding has a positive effect on both cover crops acres
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and on the proportion of cover crops. In particular, receiving cost-share funding increases the
proportion of cover crops acres by around 20 percentage points among recipients of the funds
on average. The program also increases acres among recipients of the funds, but the estimated
size effect varies by matching method. Focusing on adopters only, we use Tobit regressions and
find that the treatment coefficients are statistically significant at the 1 percent level for each
expected outcome variable, implying that receiving cost-share acres has a positive effect on
expected cover crop acres and on the expected proportion of cover crops even when controlling
for high non-adoption of cover crops. For the average marginal treatment effects, we find that,
on average, we expect that farmers receiving cost-share increase the proportion of cover crops by
around 18 percentage points relative to cover crop adopters who do not receive funds. For acres,
the results show that, on average, we expect farmers receiving cost-share to plant an additional
104 cover crops acres relative to cover crop adopters without funding. In the end, cost-share
funding is effective in increasing cover crops acres and the proportion of cover crops planted
among both recipients of the funds and adopters of cover crops. Since cost-share is effective
in increasing the planting of cover crops, policy makers concerned about water pollution from
agriculture in this region, where cover crops are newly perceived, could allocate more cost-share
funds to this practice. These results could assist policy makers in finding effective solutions to
address persistent water quality problems with limited conservation budgets.
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2.12 Tables and Figures
Table 2.1 Cover Crops Adoption
Number of
Non-adopters
Number of
Adopters with Cost-Share
Number of
Adopters without Cost-Share
Number of
Observations
442 29 59 530
Table 2.2 Summary Statistics for Cover Crops Outcome Variables among Adopters
Outcome Variable Subset Min Median Mean Max
Y 1: Proportion All 0.002 0.1237 0.196 0.80
Y 1: Proportion Cost-Share=1 0.017 0.186 0.244 0.80
Y 1: Proportion Cost-Share=0 0.002 0.068 0.172 0.80
Y 2: Acres All 1 45 109.20 1700
Y 2: Acres Cost-Share=1 8 75 119.17 500
Y 2: Acres Cost-Share=0 1 35 104.27 1700
Note: This table focuses on the behavior of adopters only (i.e Y 1 > 0 and Y 2 > 0)
91
Figure 2.1 Balance Plot of Propensity Score
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Table 2.3 Explanatory Variables Description
Covariate Definition
cover.crops.2010.I =1 if farmer planted cover crops in the last five years prior to 2010
water.on.or.along.farm =1 if farmer indicated that creeks, streams, or rivers run through
or along the farm
soil.erosion =1 if farmer indicated to have had significant soil erosion
on any of his or her land in the last five years in 2011
attitude.reduction =1 if farmer believes that Iowa farmers should do more to reduce
nutrient or sediment runoff into waterways
conservation.costs.I =1 if farmer had incurred in any costs associated with conservation
practices (excluding tile or similar drainage systems) over
the past 10 years in 2010
drainage.expenditure.I =1 if farmer had any expenditure associated with agricultural
drainage systems over the past 10 years in 2010
log.ag.land natural log of total farm acreage operated in 2013
rented proportion of farm acreage rented in 2013
labor.off.farm number of days worked off the farm in 2009
gross.farm.sales.I =1 if farmer had gross farm sales above $250,000 in 2009
farm.income.I =1 if percent of total net household income from the farm was
above 51% in 2009
age age of farmer
age.sq age squared
college =1 if the highest level of education completed was at least a
Bachelor’s degree in 2011
Central =1 if farm is located in Central Agricultural District
East.Central =1 if farm is located in East Central Agricultural District
West.Central =1 if farm is located in West Central Agricultural District
North.Central =1 if farm is located in North Central Agricultural District
North.East =1 if farm is located in North East Agricultural District
North.West =1 if farm is located in North West Agricultural District
South.Central =1 if farm is located in South Central Agricultural District
South.West =1 if farm is located in South West Agricultural District
livestock.I =1 if farmer managed livestock in 2013
exp number of years farming in the USA
exp.sq experience squared
grains proportion of farm acreage devoted to grain crops in 2013
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Table 2.4 Summary Statistics of Explanatory Variables
Treatment Control Difference in Means
cover.crops.2010.I 0.24 0.09 0.15 *
water.on.or.along.farm 0.90 0.72 0.18 ***
soil.erosion 0.31 0.28 0.03
attitude.reduction 0.83 0.83 0.00
conservation.costs.I 0.59 0.51 0.08
drainage.expenditure.I 0.59 0.54 0.05
log.ag.land 6.14 5.63 0.51 **
rented 0.37 0.32 0.05
labor.off.farm 90.48 78.94 11.54
gross.farm.sales.I 0.38 0.28 0.10
farm.income.I 0.52 0.51 0.01
age 62.66 66.18 -3.52 *
age.sq 4025.28 4463.62 -438.34 *
college 0.38 0.34 0.04
Central 0.17 0.14 0.03
East.Central 0.07 0.14 -0.07
West.Central 0.10 0.12 -0.02
North.Central 0.10 0.13 -0.03
North.East 0.17 0.12 0.05
North.West 0.14 0.14 0.00
South.Central 0.14 0.06 0.08
South.West 0.07 0.07 0.00
livestock.I 0.28 0.24 0.04
exp 39.79 41.40 -1.61
exp.sq 1671.17 1852.33 -181.16
grains 0.83 0.78 0.05
*** Significant at 1% level, ** Significant at 5% level, * Significant at the 10% level.
Statistical significance is based on Welch Two Sample t-tests.
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Figure 2.2 Box Plot of Propensity Score
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Figure 2.3 Variance Ratio of Residuals
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Table 2.5 Probit Propensity Score Model
Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept) 0.5179 3.5331 0.15 0.8835
cover.crops.2010.I 0.7391 0.2732 2.71 0.0068 ***
water.on.or.along.farm 0.5947 0.3012 1.97 0.0483 **
soil.erosion -0.0268 0.2306 -0.12 0.9073
attitude.reduction -0.1646 0.2676 -0.62 0.5385
conservation.costs.I -0.1535 0.2381 -0.64 0.5190
drainage.expenditure.I -0.1136 0.2343 -0.48 0.6278
log.ag.land 0.3062 0.1530 2.00 0.0453 **
rented -0.1975 0.3536 -0.56 0.5765
labor.off.farm 0.0006 0.0011 0.53 0.5946
gross.farm.sales.I -0.1487 0.2857 -0.52 0.6028
farm.income.I -0.1656 0.2605 -0.64 0.5249
age -0.2086 0.1217 -1.71 0.0864 *
age.sq 0.0014 0.0010 1.51 0.1323
college -0.0072 0.2252 -0.03 0.9745
Central 0.6780 0.5641 1.20 0.2294
East.Central 0.3855 0.6004 0.64 0.5209
West.Central 0.4840 0.5941 0.81 0.4153
North.Central 0.3949 0.5900 0.67 0.5033
North.East 0.7596 0.5711 1.33 0.1835
North.West 0.6671 0.5871 1.14 0.2559
South.Central 1.1256 0.6072 1.85 0.0638 *
South.West 0.5587 0.6335 0.88 0.3778
livestock.I -0.0161 0.2489 -0.06 0.9484
exp 0.1300 0.0719 1.81 0.0706 *
exp.sq -0.0015 0.0009 -1.71 0.0869 *
grains 0.1054 0.4948 0.21 0.8313
*** Significant at 1% level, ** Significant at 5% level, * Significant at the 10% level
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Table 2.6 Matching Results
Stand. Mean Difference Variance Ratio
cover.crops.2010.I 0.06 1.09
water.on.or.along.farm 0.02 0.94
soil.erosion 0.01 1.01
attitude.reduction -0.11 1.25
conservation.costs.I -0.11 1.05
drainage.expenditure.I 0.01 1.00
log.ag.land 0.01 1.16
rented 0.08 0.84
labor.off.farm 0.09 1.19
gross.farm.sales.I 0.01 1.01
farm.income.I 0.05 1.00
age 0.04 1.14
age.sq 0.05 1.03
college -0.08 0.97
Central 0.07 1.15
East.Central -0.12 0.69
West.Central 0.00 1.00
North.Central 0.05 1.14
North.East -0.04 0.94
North.West -0.04 0.92
South.Central 0.04 1.09
South.West -0.03 0.92
livestock.I 0.09 1.11
exp -0.04 1.43
exp.sq -0.01 0.97
grains 0.06 0.94
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Table 2.7 Average Treatment Effect on the Treated for the Proportion of Crops Acres Relative
to Total Farm Acreage (Y 1)
Coefficient AI Robust Std. Error z P> |z| [95% Conf. Interval]
ATT 0.20 0.04 4.73 0.000 *** 0.12 0.29
*** Significant at 1% level, ** Significant at 5% level, * Significant at the 10% level
Table 2.8 Average Treatment Effect on the Treated for the Proportion of Cover Crops (Y 1)
using Other Matching Specifications
Method ATT Coefficient AI Robust Std. Error P value
Nearest2 0.20 0.04 0.000 ***
Nearest3 0.22 0.04 0.000 ***
Genetic4 0.22 0.04 0.000 ***
*** Significant at 1% level, ** Significant at 5% level, * Significant at the 10% level
2 : probit propensity score matching with 4 neighbors and 0.20 caliper
3 : logit propensity score matching with 5 neighbors and 0.25 caliper
4: genetic matching with 5 neighbors, replacement, 500 boots and 100 population size
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Table 2.9 Tobit Model for Proportion of Cover Crops Planted Relative to Total Farm Acreage
(Y 1)
Estimate Robust Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept) 1.47 0.82 1.79 0.077
cost.share.I 0.40 0.05 8.65 0.000 ***
cover.crops.2010.I 0.13 0.06 2.09 0.039 **
water.on.or.along.farm -0.03 0.06 -0.44 0.662
attitude.reduction -0.01 0.09 -0.09 0.927
soil.erosion -0.09 0.06 -1.49 0.140
conservation.costs.I 0.04 0.05 0.83 0.408
drainage.expenditure.I 0.03 0.06 0.59 0.558
log.ag.land -0.10 0.04 -2.74 0.007 ***
rented 0.05 0.08 0.60 0.552
labor.off.farm -0.00 0.00 -0.30 0.763
gross.farm.sales.I 0.11 0.06 1.88 0.062 *
farm.income.I 0.04 0.06 0.60 0.552
age -0.03 0.03 -1.06 0.292
age.sq 0.00 0.00 0.99 0.324
college -0.00 0.06 -0.07 0.948
Central 0.18 0.15 1.19 0.238
East.Central 0.12 0.15 0.76 0.446
West.Central -0.00 0.13 -0.02 0.985
North.Central -0.07 0.13 -0.55 0.586
North.East 0.08 0.15 0.51 0.611
North.West 0.10 0.16 0.61 0.541
South.Central 0.18 0.16 1.15 0.251
South.West 0.12 0.17 0.69 0.493
livestock.I -0.04 0.06 -0.73 0.464
exp -0.02 0.02 -0.73 0.466
exp.sq 0.00 0.00 1.02 0.310
grains -0.02 0.12 -0.18 0.858
*** Significant at 1% level, ** Significant at 5% level, * Significant at the 10% level
Number of observations = 146
Number of corner solution outcomes at zero (i.e. non-adopters) = 97
Number of adopters of cover crops = 49
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Table 2.10 Average Marginal Treatment Effect on the Expected Proportion of Cover Crops
Acres Relative to Total Farm Acreage (Y 1) among Adopters
Marginal Effect Delta-Method Std. Error z P> |z| [95% Conf. Interval]
cost.share.I 0.18 0.02 8.65 0.000 *** 0.14 0.22
*** Significant at 1% level, ** Significant at 5% level, * Significant at the 10% level
Table 2.11 Average Marginal Treatment Effect on the Expected Proportion of Cover Crops
Acres Relative to Total Farm Acreage (Y 1) among Adopters using Other Matching
Specifications
Method Marg. Effect Delta-Method Std. Error z P> |x| [95% Conf. Interval]
Nearest2 0.20 0.04 4.51 0.000 *** 0.11 0.28
Nearest3 0.22 0.04 5.37 0.000 *** 0.14 0.30
Genetic4 0.21 0.02 8.82 0.000 *** 0.16 0.25
*** Significant at 1% level, ** Significant at 5% level, * Significant at the 10% level
2 : probit propensity score matching with 4 neighbors and 0.20 caliper
3 : logit propensity score matching with 5 neighbors and 0.25 caliper
4: genetic matching with 5 neighbors, replacement, 500 boots and 100 population size
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Table 2.12 Average Treatment Effect on the Treated for Cover Crops Acres (Y 2)
Coefficient AI Robust Std. Error z P> |z| [95% Conf. Interval]
ATT 81.37 32.37 2.51 0.012 ** 17.92 144.82
*** Significant at 1% level, ** Significant at 5% level, * Significant at the 10% level
Table 2.13 Average Treatment Effect on the Treated for Cover Crops Acres (Y 2) using Other
Matching Specifications
Method ATT Coefficient AI Robust Std. Error P value
Nearest2 73.90 27.82 0.008 ***
Nearest3 102.70 9.39 0.000 ***
Genetic4 104 24.2 0.000 ***
*** Significant at 1% level, ** Significant at 5% level, * Significant at the 10% level
2 : probit propensity score matching with 4 neighbors and 0.20 caliper
3 : logit propensity score matching with 5 neighbors and 0.25 caliper
4: genetic matching with 5 neighbors, replacement, 500 boots and 100 population size
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Table 2.14 Tobit Model for Proportion of Cover Crops Acres Planted (Y 2)
Estimate Robust Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept) 614.10 544.93 1.13 0.262
cost.share.I 280.85 59.75 4.70 0.000 ***
cover.crops.2010.I 136.81 85.35 1.60 0.112
water.on.or.along.farm 30.82 49.84 0.62 0.538
attitude.reduction 102.57 75.42 1.36 0.176
soil.erosion -22.25 44.04 -0.51 0.614
conservation.costs.I 14.99 41.23 0.36 0.717
drainage.expenditure.I 124.18 66.13 1.88 0.063
log.ag.land -6.24 32.73 -0.19 0.849
rented 51.50 79.29 0.65 0.517
labor.off.farm -0.22 0.22 -1.00 0.321
gross.farm.sales.I 147.00 69.79 2.11 0.037 *
farm.income.I 2.40 45.20 0.05 0.958
age -14.47 22.17 -0.65 0.515
age.sq 0.13 0.18 0.75 0.454
college -35.51 44.58 -0.80 0.427
Central 328.88 177.49 1.85 0.066 .
East.Central 230.67 180.71 1.28 0.204
West.Central 201.40 159.85 1.26 0.210
North.Central 132.29 143.43 0.92 0.358
North.East 260.87 196.72 1.33 0.187
North.West 240.47 179.41 1.34 0.183
South.Central 221.84 172.12 1.29 0.200
South.West 186.70 167.15 1.12 0.266
livestock.I -26.34 49.76 -0.53 0.598
exp -49.44 27.01 -1.83 0.070 .
exp.sq 0.74 0.37 2.00 0.048 *
grains -148.65 95.84 -1.55 0.124
*** Significant at 1% level, ** Significant at 5% level, * Significant at the 10% level
Number of observations = 146
Number of corner solution outcomes at zero (i.e. non-adopters) = 97
Number of adopters of cover crops = 49
103
Table 2.15 Average Marginal Treatment Effect on the Expected Cover Crops Acres Planted
(Y 2) among Adopters
Marginal Effect Delta-Method Std. Error z P> |z| [95% Conf. Interval]
cost.share.I 103.78 17.66 5.88 0.000 *** 69.16 138.34
*** Significant at 1% level, ** Significant at 5% level, * Significant at the 10% level
Table 2.16 Average Marginal Treatment Effect on the Expected Cover Crops Acres Planted
(Y 2) among Adopters using Other Matching Specifications
Method Marg. Effect Delta-Method Std. Error z P> |z| [95% Conf. Interval]
Nearest2 104.92 19.40 5.41 0.000 *** 66.90 142.93
Nearest3 103.65 14.12 7.34 0.000 *** 75.98 131.32
Genetic4 106.17 20.35 5.22 0.000 *** 66.29 146.05
*** Significant at 1% level, ** Significant at 5% level, * Significant at the 10% level
2 : probit propensity score matching with 4 neighbors and 0.20 caliper
3 : logit propensity score matching with 5 neighbors and 0.25 caliper
4: genetic matching with 5 neighbors, replacement, 500 boots and 100 population size
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CHAPTER 3. GENDER SPECIFIC RISK PREFERENCES,
INTRA-HOUSEHOLD BARGAINING, AND INVESTMENT
DECISIONS: EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE FROM RURAL
CAMEROON
Mar´ıa Jimena Gonza´lez Ramı´rez and Niccolo Meriggi
3.1 Abstract
Motivated by the importance of intra-household dynamics both for the success of devel-
opment policies and for the effectiveness of interventions intended to enhance social welfare,
we study spouses’ differences in risk preferences, the relative influence of spouses on household
decisions under risk, and their implications on household educational and medical expenditure
decisions in rural Cameroon. Our study is based on the results from a lab-in-the-field risk ex-
periment in which husband and wife individually participated in isolation and then participated
together as a couple. Using the experimental results, we focus on risk preference differences
between spouses, spouses’ individual influence over the couple’s joint decision, and the relation
between this relative influence and different expenditure decisions. Chapter 3 answers the fol-
lowing research questions: (i) Are there differences in risk preference between husbands and
wives within households?; (ii) are there differences in the relative influence of each spouse over
joint decisions involving risk?; and (iii) how does this relative influence affect educational and
medical expenditure decisions within a household?
Our results provide evidence of risk aversion among husbands, wives, and couples (i.e.
husband and wife together) on average, in which husbands are more risk averse than wives
and couples. We identify some factors influencing the heterogeneity in risk preferences between
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spouses including whether the wife chose her husband for marriage and whether the wife worked
during the past year. For the relative influence of spouses over couple’s decisions under risk,
we find variables that increase the likelihood that one spouse is closer to the couple. Moreover,
using a proxy for female bargaining power based on the difference in choices between each spouse
and the couple, we find that monogamous wives are more likely to be more empowered than
polygamous wives. At the same time, monogamous wives married to Muslim husbands are more
likely to be less empowered than monogamous wives married to non-Muslim husbands. Lastly,
we find that the proxy for female bargaining power is positively correlated with educational
and medical expenditures. Our results provide a deeper insight into intra-household dynamics
in the studied area, but more research is required to continue informing policy and supporting
the generation of more effective development strategies in the region.
3.2 Introduction
Risk is intrinsic to everyone’s daily life and many decisions revolve around risk considera-
tions. Economic decisions made by households are no exception; yet, neo-classical economics
has failed to adequately capture dynamics among household members (de Palma et al. 2011,
Drichoutis & Koundouri 2012, Carlsson et al. 2013). Expected Utility models treat households
as homogenous units with analogous preferences, allocating (scarce) resources to maximize
joint welfare (Becker 1974, Chiappori and Meghir 2015). Under the unitary household model,
consumption choices are modeled as a constrained utility maximization by a single decision-
maker subject to a pooled resource constraint (Becker 1974). This assumption of a unitary
household ignores the relative influence each household member has on the decision process
and any differences in risk preferences among them. As a result, this unitary household model
may not provide an accurate representation of household decisions ignoring, amongst other
things, individual spouses’ preferences and their relative influence on joint decisions (Carls-
son et al. 2012, Sheremenko & Magnan 2015). Given the important influence of household
heads and their spouse(s) over the allocation of households’ resources, a lack of understanding
of between-spouses/intra-household decision making processes may hinder the effectiveness of
development policies targeting households’ decisions.
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In recent years, economists have acknowledged the complexity of intra-household dynam-
ics, developed models taking into account the heterogeneity in preferences of different (key)
household members, and therefore moved closer to an accurate representation and understand-
ing of real world dynamics (Alderman et al. 1995; Bateman and Munro 2003, 2005, 2009; de
Palma et al. 2011; Carlsson et al. 2012, 2013; de Brauw and Eozenou 2014; Butle et al. 2015;
Castilla 2015; Sheremenko and Magnan 2015). While some of these models study heterogeneity
in preferences within households, only some compare individual and joint decisions of spouses
(Bateman and Munro 2005, 2009; de Palma et al. 2011; Carlsson et al. 2012, 2013; Butle
et al. 2015). In reality, intra-household choices are affected by the bargaining power of each
spouse (Sheremenko & Magnan 2015). Understanding female bargaining power is important
as studies have observed stronger preferences for child schooling and health outcomes among
females (Hoddinott and Haddad 1995, Duflo 2003). Also, women are less likely to allocate
resources towards alcohol or tobacco (Hoddinott and Haddad 1995). Understanding these dif-
ferences in preferences can facilitate the accumulation of human capital and ultimately result
in better household outcomes. Taking into account spouses’ influence on household decisions
can therefore help researchers and policy makers design better development programs.
New advances in the literature have penetrated the policy sphere, and they are increasingly
raising policy makers’ awareness of the importance of intra-households dynamics and gender is-
sues for development effectiveness (Doss 2013). This awareness has motivated increasing efforts
to understand: i) the heterogeneity in risk preferences across spouses, which has been found
to be gender specific in different contexts, ii) the relative influence of respective preferences on
household joint decisions (i.e. bargaining power), and iii) their repercussions on the allocation
of resources within a household. Motivated by the importance of intra-household dynamics
both for the success of development policies and for the effectiveness of interventions intended
to enhance social welfare, we study intra-household differences in risk preferences, the relative
influence of spouses on household decisions, and their implications on household expenditure
decisions in rural Cameroon. Our study is based on the results from a lab-in-the-field risk ex-
periment in which husband and wife individually participated in isolation and then participated
together as a couple. Using the experimental results, we focus on specific differences between
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spouses, spouses’ individual influence over the couple’s joint decision, and the relation between
this relative influence and different household expenditure decisions. We answer the follow-
ing questions: (i) Are there differences in risk preference between husbands and wives within
households?; (ii) are there differences in the relative influence of each spouse over joint decisions
involving risk?; and (iii) how does this relative influence affect household educational and med-
ical expenditure decisions? By investigating these questions, we enhance the understanding of
the dynamics underlying households’ investment decisions in less developed countries.
Our results provide evidence of risk aversion among husbands, wives, and couples (i.e.
husband and wife together) on average, in which husbands are more risk averse than wives
and couples. We identify some factors influencing the heterogeneity in risk preferences between
spouses including whether the wife chose her husband for marriage and whether the wife worked
during the past year. For the relative influence of spouses over couple’s decisions under risk,
we find variables that increase the likelihood that one spouse is closer to the couple. Moreover,
using a proxy for female bargaining power based on the difference in choices between each
spouse and the couple, we find that monogamous wives are more likely to be more empowered
than polygamous wives. Moreover, monogamous wives married to Muslim husbands are more
likely to be less empowered than monogamous wives married to non-Muslim husbands. Lastly,
we find that the proxy for female bargaining power is positively correlated with educational and
medical expenditures. Our results provide a deeper insight into intra-household dynamics in the
studied area, and can inform policy and support the generation of more effective development
strategies in the region.
3.3 Literature Review
To better understand household’s decisions, experiments have been employed to study intra-
household dynamics and gender differences in preferences. While differences in risk preferences
is a major component of our paper, it is worth mentioning studies that document other intra-
household and gender-specific differences in preferences. For instance, Bateman and Munro
(2009) use a choice experiment given to cohabiting couples to study differences between house-
hold and individual valuations of dietary health risks. They find significant differences between
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the values calculated from joint versus individual responses as well as between men and women.
Carlsson et al. (2012) study differences in intertemporal choices among households. They ana-
lyze the relative influence of husband’s and wife’s own choices on their joint decisions and find
that in the majority of the households, husbands have stronger influence over joint decisions
relative to wives. Castilla (2015), using a trust game among married couples, finds that men
return significantly more money than women. However, prior non-cooperation behavior among
husbands is associated with less sharing by their wives. Lastly, de Brauw (2015) studies the
way women’s empowerment affect crop productivity and finds that the ability to make decisions
in positively correlated with additional control over family income. These papers illustrate the
expansion in the understanding of the heterogeneity in preferences within households that goes
beyond differences in risk preferences.
Our study on intra-household dynamics and spouses’ differences in risk preferences builds
upon existing literature. Bateman and Munro (2005) is one of the first studies that looks
at joint decisions among couples. Using experimental data from couples in Norwich, United
Kingdom, they conclude that couples’ joint choices are typically more risk averse than those
made by individuals. Moreover, when studying whether couples’ behavior follows the axioms
from Expected Utility theory, they find that couples also exhibit the same anomalies observed
among individuals. De Palma et al. (2011) use a series of binary choices with a sure amount
as the safer choice to estimate both the spouses’ and the couple’s degrees of risk aversion in
Germany. They focus on the dynamics of the decision-making process among couples and
conclude that the balance of power is changeable. In most cases, the male partner has more
decision-making power at the beginning. However, female partners gain more power over the
course of the experiment. They find that the average couple tends to be less risk averse than
its average members (de Palma et al. 2011).
Among the different experimental designs, two lab-in-the-field experiments appear to be the
most popular methods to elicit risk preferences. Holt and Laury’s (2002) multiple price lotteries
experiment, in which the payoffs are fixed and the probabilities change in each choice task, has
been widely employed to derive risk preferences in the literature (Drichoutis & Koundouri
2012, Carlsson et al. 2013, de Brauw & Eozenou 2014). On the other hand, Tanaka et al.
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(2010) elicitation method is also commonly used (Tanaka et al. 2010, Sheremenko & Magnan
2015). Their method is different from Holt and Laury’s (2002) as they employ three series of
paired lotteries with a total of thirty-five choices that are used to derive three parameters from
Prospect Theory (Kahneman & Tversky 1979). Besides the concavity of the utility function
that has been used to characterize risk preferences, their method also derives parameters for
nonlinear probability weighting and loss aversion. Differently from Holt and Laury (2002), they
enforce monotonic switching, preventing subjects from switching more than once and enforcing
the direction of the switch. Enforcing consistent choices (i.e. a single switching point) could bias
the results, as individuals who would behave inconsistently are kept in the sample (Charness
et al. 2013). In essence, if inconsistent choice data is treated as noise and is dropped from the
analysis, researchers can be confident that the subjects in the remaining sample understood
the instructions and are revealing their true preferences (Charness et al. 2013).
Tanaka et al. (2010) study risk preferences in Vietnamese villages and find that village
mean income is correlated with risk and time preferences. However, they do not study intra-
household dynamics or spouses’ differences in preferences. Sheremenko and Magnan (2015)
follow Tanaka et al.’s (2010) elicitation method and study the way experimentally derived risk
parameters of individual spouses in farming households affect fertilizer use in Kenya. They
also analyze the relation between female bargaining power, risk preferences, and household’s
agricultural choices and find that more empowered women who are more risk and loss averse
apply less fertilizer than disempowered females in collective households.
Our paper utilizes data from a lab-in-the-field experiment that follows Holt and Laury’s
(2002) elicitation method. The study that is most related to ours is Carlsson et al. (2013),
as they study the relation between couple’s joint and individual spouses’ choices using Holt
and Laury’s (2002) risk experiment in rural China. They observe that the joint decision is
typically closer to the husband’s decision and the couple is typically less risk averse than the
husband. Moreover, they study factors that favor a stronger influence of the wife over the joint
decision. For instance, female preferences tend to be better reflected in the joint decision in
wealthier households. De Brauw and Eozenou (2014) also follow Holt and Laury (2002) and
design a hypothetical experiment to elicit risk preferences focused on sweet potato production
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in Mozambique. They use their lab-in-the-field experiment to test different models of risk
preferences, and they observe that rank dependent utility dominates expected utility theory.
Furthermore, they reject the Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) hypothesis.
We contribute to the literature by expanding the understanding of intra-household dynamics
using a unique dataset that contains information on 1689 households from rural Cameroon. The
size of our sample is very large relative to other studies1, and it includes results from a lab-in-
the-field experiment for the head of the household, his wife, and the couple together. Using this
large dataset, we study spouses’ heterogeneity in risk preferences and the relative influence each
spouse has on the decision process. We compare our results to previous studies. In addition,
we construct a new proxy measurement of female bargaining power using individual spouses’
and couple’s experimental results. We contribute to the literature by analyzing factors that
affect female empowerment and the relation between wife’s bargaining power and household
educational and medical expenditures.
3.4 The Experiment
3.4.1 Data Collection and Sample
Our study was conducted in 200 rural villages in the Adamawa region of Cameroon (See
Figure 3.7 for map). The data collection was funded partly by the Dutch National Science
Foundation2 and carried out with the support of the Netherlands Development Organisation
(SNV) and the Cameroonian Institute of Statistics (INS). These villages were randomly selected
from a homogeneous sub-population (stratum) of all villages in the region (contained in 2005
census). Between May and July of 2013, 3600 households heads residing in the selected villages
were administered a questionnaire capturing the living conditions of people in the region. The
1Bateman and Munro’s (2005) sample has 76 couples; de Palma et al. (2011) have information on 22 couples
who answered 3828 lotteries; Carlsson et al. (2012) has information on 101 couples; Carlsson et al. (2013) uses a
sample of 117 households; de Brauw and Eozenou (2014) have information on 682 farmers from 439 households;
Castilla (2015) has information on 188 married couples; and Sheremenko and Magnan (2015) has information
on 304 individuals from 172 households.
2Nederlandse Organisatie voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek (NWO) grant number 453-10-001. The funding
came through the “Biogas Research and Innovation Project.” This project is linked to the Cameroonian National
Biogas Programme, which was implemented in collaboration with the Cameroonian ministry of Water and Energy
and the Cameroonian National Institute of Statistics.
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same group of households were visited again between October and December of 2013 to take
part of a sequence of lab-in-the-field experiments measuring individuals’ risk preferences and
social preferences (i.e. altruism, trust, trustworthiness and distributional preferences). The
Cameroonian National Institute of Statistics (INS) helped with the data collection. The coor-
dination and supervision of the project were led in collaboration with five senior INS members,
two3 Ph.D. and two MSc students from Wageningen University. The project hired and trained4
150 enumerators for the data collection, who were either current or formers students from the
University of Ngaoundere or former INS workers who were very proficient. Having local enu-
merators was extremely important to overcome language and cultural barriers. Every four to
six enumerators were assigned to a team that was coordinated by a team leader. At the same
time, team leaders were supervised by the five senior INS members and the PhD and MSc
students.
From the 3600 households in the initial sample, 3195 participated in the lab-in-the-field ex-
periments. Given our research questions, we focus on households in which we observe responses
for the lab-in-the-field risk preference experiment for the male head of the household, his wife
or female partner, and the joint decision. In polygamous households, the wife was selected by
the husband. Given this criteria, our sample includes married couples as well as couples living
under common law, and it excludes single individuals, widows, widowers, and divorcees. This
subset of couples has 1689 households.
Table 3.1 includes the average of several demographic characteristics. We observe that
husbands5 are over 10 years older than wives6 on average. Most of our sample contains husbands
and wives who are Muslim, and their religions are highly correlated. Around half of our sample
3Including Niccolo Meriggi, who provided the sampling, design, questionnaires, and training manual, and
who also administered all the training.
4For each round of data collection, manuals and survey instruments were tested with a group of 10 enumerators
first. Each pre-test lasted for about 12 days, and it consisted of lectures and simulations for the first week. The
training continued by testing all instruments for 2 to 3 days at pre-test villages, five villages that were not part
of the study sample. Improvements derived from this pre-test and training session were incorporated in the main
training session for 170 enumerators. This main training lasted between 14 and 18 days, and it followed a similar
format as the pre-test training. After the 10th day, enumerators were divided into smaller groups and went
through some simulations supervised by previously trained enumerators. Enumerators were assessed throughout
the training, and only the best performing enumerators were retained for the experiment.
5For now on, husbands refer to male heads of households, which include married men and men from common
law partnerships.
6Wives refer to the female partner of the head of the household, and it includes both married women and
women living under common law unions.
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lives in a monogamous household. Amongst polygamous households, the first wife is more likely
to be chosen as “game partner” by the male household head. The average number of children
is around 5, but there is a higher number of sons than daughters on average. The majority
of couples belong to the same ethnic group, and the majority of husbands paid a dowry for
their wives. Only a third of wives were able to choose their husbands when they got married,
as opposed to having a family member choosing for them. Around 70 percent of wives and 96
percent of husbands worked during the past year. Based on the question about their level of
welfare relative to other households in the village, the average response is below the same level
category.7 In other words, the average household reports a slightly lower welfare level than
other households in the village. A larger percentage of husbands have attended school relative
to wives, but we observe that the majority has not attended any school. Adamawa is one of the
least educated regions in Cameroon. Educational participation is low as there is a perceived
association of formal schooling with Christianity or Westernization (Usman 2006).
3.4.2 Experimental Design and Procedure
Risk preferences were measured for the head of the household and (one of)8 their spouses
individually in each household, following the procedure described in Holt and Laury (2002).
The experiment was administered by two enumerators, one male and one female. The male
and female enumerators individually interviewed the husband and the wife respectively. At
first, respondents (husband and wife) were presented with a sequence of ten paired lotteries
individually in isolated locations within their household and were asked to decide their favored
option in each lottery over hypothetical gains (see Table 3.2). Then, participants were brought
to the same location and worked through the same lottery choices together. Both male and
female enumerators were present, but only one9 enumerator administered the questions. All
7Based on the following question: In your opinion, how is your household level of welfare relative to others
in the village? =1 if much worse, =2 if worse/lower, =3 if the same, =4 if better, and = 5 if much better.
8For polygamous households, the husband chose a wife to participate in the experiment. Among polygamous
households that participated in the lab-in-the-field experiment, we compare wives who were selected by their
husband to participate in the risk game with wives who were not selected. The only major difference we
find is age. It appears as if husbands selected older wives on average. However, for the other demographic
characteristics, we find no statistically significant differences.
9The male enumerator more often administered the questions for the joint couple’s portion of the experiment.
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choices were made with the understanding that one of the choices would be randomly selected
as a payoff at the end of the experiment.
From the lottery decisions in Table 3.2, Option A is considered safer than Option B, as the
difference in payoffs for each probability is smaller. For both options, payoffs are constant, and
probabilities change for each decision. Looking at the expected payoff from each option, a risk
neutral individual switches from Option A to Option B after the fourth decision. Individuals
who switch to Option B after the fifth decision are considered risk averse and individuals who
choose Option B before the fourth decision are considered risk lovers. The later the individual
switches to Option B, the more risk averse he or she is. Moreover, for the tenth decision, Option
B should be selected, as it clearly has a higher payoff with certainty. Individuals who choose
Option A at the tenth decision may not have understood the experiment.
3.4.3 Inconsistent Responses
Before we study intra-household and gender differences in risk preferences, we analyze
the quality of the responses from the lab-in-the-field experiment by computing the number of
inconsistent responses and by looking at a measurement of the understanding of the experiment.
For the former, we compute the number of households with inconsistent responses that arise
from two reasons: either the subject chose Option A at the tenth lottery or the subject had
multiple switching points. Table 3.3 summarizes the number of inconsistent responses per
group based on both criteria.
More husbands choose Option A at the tenth decision relative to wives. Once husband and
wife make decisions jointly, we find that the percentage of inconsistent responses is the lowest.
For multiple switching points, there are now more inconsistent wives relative to husbands.
Again, couples have the least number of inconsistent choices. Considering both inconsistencies
together, we observe a very similar percentage of inconsistent responses for husbands and
wives, and a lower percentage for couples. This persistent decrease in inconsistent responses
for couples suggests that each spouse is learning from the other.
The percentage of inconsistent responses at the tenth decision for each individual group is
comparable to results found in other experiments that range from 6 to 23 percent (de Brauw
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& Eozenou 2014, Carlsson et al. 2013, de Palma et al. 2011, Bateman & Munro 2005, Holt &
Laury 2002). However, once we also remove inconsistent responses based on multiple switching
points, we find that the percentage of inconsistent responses is higher relative to other studies.
Nonetheless, as we remove households with inconsistent responses for either husband, wife,
or couple, we expect to have a higher percentage removed. In fact, Carlsson et al. (2013)
observe around 10 percent of inconsistent responses for husbands, wives, and couples separately.
However, once they remove inconsistent households, the percentage of inconsistent responses
almost doubles to 19 percent. We also observe that once we remove inconsistent responses
at the household level, the percentage removed goes from around 30 percent for individual
spouses and 21 percent for couples to 54 percent at the household level. Besides looking at the
number of inconsistent responses, we also explore participants’ understanding by looking at an
assessment by the enumerators. After the last decision, each enumerator was asked to assess
the understanding of each subject. The evaluation ranged from 1 to 10, with 10 being perfect
understanding. For husbands, wives, and couples, the average evaluations are 9.36, 9.27, and
9.43 respectively. These high scores support the usage of the entire sample without removing
inconsistent households.
3.5 Methodology and Results
Using the experiment and the survey, we study the difference in risk preferences between
husbands and wives, the relative influence of each spouse on joint decisions, and the way this rel-
ative influence affects educational and medical household expenditures. Our research strategy
consists of studying differences in risk choices at the aggregate level and at the household level.
At the aggregate level, we study the proportion of individuals choosing the safe choice and the
similarity in responses among different comparison groups at each decision. At the household
level, we study factors that affect the similarity of the couple’s joint decisions to each spouse’s
decision separately. We also study characteristics that affect the likelihood that a couple’s
decision is closer to the husband’s decision, the wife’s decision, or equally distant from both.
Using a proxy for measuring wife’s empowerment based on individual and joint experimental
results, we further study factors that may increase or decrease the wife’s relative influence over
115
the joint decision. We conclude our study by analyzing whether this measurement of female
bargaining power is correlated with educational and medical household expenditure decisions.
3.5.1 Intra-household Differences in Risk Preferences using Aggregate Data
Since a risk neutral individual is expected to choose four safe choices, the number of safe
choices indicates the degree of risk aversion for each subject, where having more (fewer) than
four safe choices implies risk aversion (loving). To study intra-household differences in risk
preferences, we illustrate the experimental results with two graphs based on the raw data.
Figure 3.7 depicts the number of safe choices per decision for three groups: husbands, wives,
and couples. Husbands, wives, and couples do not respond as risk neutral decision-makers. As
reference, the black dashed line represents the expected behavior of a risk neutral individual,
who is expected to choose the safe choice (Option A) for the first four decisions, and then
switch to the risky choice (Option B) from the fifth to the tenth decision. Around 10 percent
of husbands, wives, and couples behaved a risk neutral decision makers. We observe some risk
loving individuals to the left of the fourth decision choosing the riskier option.10 At the first
decision, we observe around 73, 75, and 78 percent of husbands, wives, and couples choosing the
safe choice. At the fourth choice, we observe around 64, 65, and 67 percent of husbands, wives,
and couples choosing the safe choice. Compared to Holt and Laury (2002) and de Brauw
and Eozenou (2014), the decreasing proportion of safe choices per decision is also observed.
However, these studies do not focus on gender and intra-household differences.
Concentrating on the different groups, we observe that couples (purple line with diamonds)
tend to be closer to risk neutral relative to husbands (blue line with dots) and wives (red line
with triangles). In particular, we observe a higher proportion of safe choices among couples
during the first four decision and a lower proportion of safe choices after the sixth decision.
For the fifth decision, we observe a higher proportion for couples, but the three groups are
very close to each other. Moreover, we observe that the three groups tend to be closer to each
other between the fourth and sixth decision. We notice a larger proportion of highly risk loving
10While other studies have also found risk loving individuals, Holt and Laury (2002) and de Brauw and
Eozenou (2014) find a higher proportion of safe choices at decisions 1 through 4 ranging from 80 to 90 percent.
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husbands at the first decision and highly risk averse husbands at the ninth and tenth decisions.
The line for the proportion of safe choices among wives is between the couples’ and husbands’
lines.11
For the second visual illustration, we compare the percentage of identical choices among
three comparison groups: i) husbands and wives ii) husbands and couples, iii) wives and couples,
and iv) husbands, wives, and couples in Figure 3.7. As de Brauw and Eozenou (2014) explain,
similar responses are expected around the tails of the experiment. We observe more similar
choices at the end tail of the experiment relative to the beginning of the experiment.12 As
in their experiment, we observe more divergence in choices at the sixth decision for most
comparison groups. In particular, we observe around 54, 60, and 70 percent of same responses
among husband and wife13, wife and couple, and husband and couple respectively. Furthermore,
we observe around 42 percent of households with same responses for the husband, wife, and
couple at the sixth choice. There are more response matches between husband and couple than
for the other comparison groups at each decision. Focusing on the sixth choice, we observe
that the husband and couple’s choices within a household match 70 percent of the time relative
to 60 percent between wife and couple’s choices. This difference in percentages suggests that
the husband’s choice tends to be closer to the couple’s choice within a household. There are
more matches for the comparison groups between the couple and each spouse than for the
husband and his wife (green and blue line are above purple line). Moreover, choices diverge
the most when we compare the three subjects (i.e the husband, wife, and couple) within each
household.14
Besides the visual representation of the experimental results, we also analyze the average
number of safe choices per group summarized in Table 3.4. For inconsistent husbands, wives,
or couples, we assign the median15 between the first and last switch points from Option A
11We generated a similar figure using the subset of the data that excludes households with inconsistent re-
sponses (N=784). We observe a similar pattern in which each group does not follow risk neutral expectation,
and in which we observe more highly risk loving husbands relative to wives and couples.
12De Brauw & Eozenou (2014) do not see major difference across tails.
13De Brauw & Eozenou (2014) find that husband and wife’s choices only match 57 percent of the time at the
sixth decision.
14We generated a similar figure using a subset of the data that excludes households with inconsistent responses
(N=784). In general, we observe a similar pattern among the four comparison group lines.
15In cases where the median is not a whole number, we round up.
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to Option B as the switching point for inconsistent subjects, as suggested by Carlsson et al.
(2013). The number of safe choices is calculated as the assigned switch point minus one for
subjects with inconsistent responses. The average number of safe choices is higher for husbands
(5.02) relative to wives (4.84) and to couples (4.90), as was observed by Carlsson et al. (2013).16
The average number of safe choices for the joint decision lies between the husbands’ and wives’
averages, which is also observed by Carlsson et al. (2013).17 However, the difference in means
seems smaller relative to their study.18 These averages illustrate the existence of risk aversion in
the aggregate data. Kolmogorov-Smirnov two-sided test finds statistically significant difference
between the distribution of safe choices between husbands and wives with a p-value below
0.001.
Since the number of safe choices can be used as a proxy for risk aversion, we also analyze
the proportion of subjects with a particular number of safe choices. From Table 3.5, we observe
a large proportion of highly risk loving husbands, wives, and couples, who never chose the safe
choice in any of the decisions.19 Overall, a large proportion of husbands, wives, and couples
have between four and six safe choices, which has also been observed in previous studies (Holt
& Laury 2002, and Carlsson et al. 2013). Lastly, we also observe highly risk averse individuals
who chose the safe choice nine to ten times.20
From this section, we start exploring our first and second research questions using aggregate
data. Results from the lab-in-the-field experiment provide evidence of risk aversion among
husbands, wives, and couples on average. While the majority of subjects do not behave as risk-
neutral individuals, we find intra-household differences in risk preferences, in which there are
16Differently, Bateman and Munro (2005) find that couple’s joint choices are typically more risk averse than
those made by individuals based on their study in Norwich, United Kingdom.
17Differently, de Palma et al. (2011) find that the average couple tends to be less risk averse than its average
members.
18Carlsson et al. (2013) study’s average number of safe choices are 5.82, 5.39, and 5.65 for Chinese husbands,
wives, and couples respectively among consistent choices only. We find that Chinese husbands, wives, and
couples appear to be more risk averse relative to our study’s results in Cameroon.
19Other studies find lower proportions of highly risk loving individuals: Holt and Laury (2002) find between
1 and 3 percent of individuals who chose zero to one safe choices. Carlsson et al. (2013) find 2, 9 and 6 percent
of husbands, wives, and couples who chose zero to one safe choices. Lastly, de Brauw and Eozenou (2014) find
3 percent of individuals who chose zero safe choices.
20Carlsson et al. (2013) observe 25, 17 and 14 percent of husbands, wives, and couples respectively with 9 safe
choices. Differently, Holt and Laury (2002) observe between 1 and 6 percent of individuals choosing between
9 and 10 safe choices depending on the payoff. Lastly, de Brauw and Eozenou (2014) observe 10 percent of
individuals with 10 safe choices.
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more risk averse husbands relative to wives and couples. For the second question, we observe
more matches between husband’s and couple’s choices at each decision than between wife’s and
couple’s choices, which suggests that husbands tend to be closer to the couple’s choice within a
household. While this aggregate data analysis offers a first glance at intra-household differences
in risk preferences, we continue with a household level analysis that provides more insight in
the remaining of the paper.
3.5.2 Differences in Risk Preferences among Spouses within a Household
Focusing on household level data, we continue addressing our first research question and
studying whether there are differences in risk preferences among spouses within a household
employing two strategies. Following Carlsson et al. (2013), we study the similarity of spouses’
individual decisions using a negative binomial model and focusing on the absolute difference
in risk preferences (i.e. safe choices). Secondly, we estimate the likelihood that a wife is more,
equally, or less risk averse than her husband using an ordered probit model, incorporating the
sign of the difference in safe choices.
For the first strategy, we estimate a negative binomial model with the absolute difference
in safe choices by husband and wife as the dependent variable. For every model, we employ
the assigned number of safe choices, calculated based on the median between first and last
switch points, for inconsistent subjects. Table 3.6 summarizes the marginal effects, calculated
as the average partial effect among all observations, of different factors that might influence
the similarity, in absolute value, in risk choices between spouses. Couples with older wives are
more likely to have a larger absolute difference in safe choices than couples with younger wives
on average. However, the size of this marginal effect is very small. Wives who reported that
they chose their husbands for marriage, as opposed to having any family member choosing for
them, are more likely to have similar choices to their husbands. The absolute difference in safe
choices decreases by about half a point for wives who chose their husbands on average. The
decision power in the marriage process could favor the match of more similar spouses, which
could explain the sign and significance of this marginal effect.
For the second strategy, we assign each couple to three categories based on their difference
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in risk preferences21: (1) wife is less risk averse than her husband22, (2) wife is equally risk
averse as her husband23, and (3) wife is more risk averse than her husband24. Each category
is assigned based on the difference in number of safe choices, where having a higher number
of safe choices implies more risk aversion. We observe 753, 241, and 685 in each category
respectively, showing again that we have more risk averse husbands relative to wives. We
estimate an ordered probit model with the constructed categories as the dependent variable.
We find that the predicted probability of a wife being less, equally, and more risk averse than
her husband are around 45, 14, and 41 percent respectively. Hence, we observe heterogeneity
in risk preferences among husbands and wives, as the majority of wives are predicted to be
either more or less, but not equally risk averse to their husbands.
Table 3.7 reports the marginal effects for the ordered probit regression25. For dummy
variables, the marginal effect is computed as the discrete change of the variable from 0 to
1. There are three variables that influence the likelihood of having heterogeneous preferences
among spouses (i.e. of being in the first and last category). Whether the wife worked during
the last year increases the heterogeneity in risk preferences among spouses in a statistically
significant way. If a wife has worked in the past year, the probability of the wife being more
risk averse than her husband decreases by around 7 percent and goes from 41 to 34 percent.
Analogously, a wife who worked in the past year is more likely to have a more risk averse
husband than a wife who did not participate. Labor force participation for the wife appears to
contribute to some heterogeneity in risk preferences between spouses. Work might increase a
wife’s exposure to different experiences and perspectives, which could influence her and might
increase the heterogeneity of preferences within a household. Taking into account that the
majority of our sample of husbands and wives did not receive any formal schooling, whether the
husband attended school also appears to contribute to differences in risk preferences between
spouses. A husband with any schooling is more likely to be with a wife with different risk
preferences. For example, an educated husband appears more likely to be with a less risk
21Without loss of generality, we employ comparisons with the wife as a reference.
22Wife has fewer number of safe choices than husband.
23Wife and husband have the same number of safe choices.
24Wife has more number of safe choices than husband.
25An ordered logit model yields similar results
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averse wife. Nonetheless, once we additionally control for the husband’s religion, we find that
a Muslim husband with schooling seems less likely to be with a less risk averse wife than a
non-Muslim husband with schooling.
From the two strategies in this section, we finish addressing our first research question and
find different factors correlated with heterogeneity in risk preferences among spouses. From
the first model, we find that whether a wife was able to choose her husband increases similarity
of risk preferences among spouses in absolute value. For the second model, wife’s labor force
participation and husband’s education status affect whether one spouse is more or less risk
averse than the other, incorporating a direction in the difference in risk preferences compared
to the first model. For our first research question, we find heterogeneity in risk preferences
among spouses and a few factors that are correlated with this heterogeneity. Our results
provide more evidence that supports the need for a better representation of individual spouses’
preferences within household models. More research is required to understand heterogeneity in
risk preferences among spouses, which can subsequently be incorporated in the design of more
effective development policies targeting household outcomes.
3.5.3 Similarity of Individual and Joint Risk Preference Decisions
Given our unique dataset containing individual and joint responses, we study the similarity
of each spouse’s individual decisions to the joint couple’s decision and continue addressing our
second research question. We start by comparing the number of safe choices, as a proxy for
the degree of risk preferences, chosen by the couple to the number of safe choices chosen by the
husband and by the wife in two ways. First, we compute the absolute difference in safe choices
among the following comparison groups: husband versus couple and wife versus couple. If this
difference is very small between husband (wife) and couple, we interpret it as the husband
(wife) having more similar risk preferences as the couple. We study these absolute differences,
summarized in Table 3.8, to analyze possible characteristics that might make the husband’s
(wife’s) and the couple’s decisions more similar. From Table 3.8, the average absolute difference
in safe choices is smaller between husband and couple than between wife and couple or between
husband and wife. While we concentrate on the first two comparisons, we report the average
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absolute difference in safe choices between husband and wife to contrast the heterogeneity in
risk preferences between spouses to the heterogeneity between individual and joint choices.
Table 3.8 provides more evidence suggesting that the husband tends to have more influence
over the couple on average relative to his wife.
Following Carlsson et al. (2013)26, we estimate a negative binomial model with the absolute
difference in safe choices as a dependent variable. Tables 3.9 and 3.10 report marginal effects
from the negative binomial regression that are calculated as the average partial effects for all
observations. For dummy variables, the marginal effect is computed as the discrete change of
the variable from 0 to 1. From Table 3.9, among polygamous households, the order of marriage
seems to influence the similarity in safe choices between husband and couple. The survey asked
polygamous wives whether they are the first, second, third, or so on wife. Husbands who
participated in the experiment with their first wives tend to have a lower absolute difference
in safe choices with the couple. In other words, husbands tend to have more influence over
the joint decision when playing with their first wives than with their second, third, fourth,
or fifth wives. At the same time, husbands with more wives tend be more similar to the
couple, suggesting more influence over the couple’s choice. Being from the same ethnic group
also increases the similarity in safe choices between husband and couple. While monogamous
status does not have a marginal effect that is statistically significant, a monogamous Muslim
husband tends to have more similar responses to the couple than a monogamous non-Muslim
husband. From Table 3.10, we find no statistically significant marginal effects that make the
wife’s choice closer to the couple’s choice. With these negative binomial regressions, we identify
variables that make a husband’s risk preferences closer to the couple’s preferences, suggesting
more influence by the husband over the couple. We continue addressing our second research
question in the next subsection, in which we study the relative influence of each spouse on the
couple’s choices.
26Carlsson et al. (2013) use a negative binomial regressions on the absolute difference in safe choices between
husbands and wives as they study heterogeneity in preferences between husband and wife. For this section, we
focus on the similarity of decisions between each spouse and the couple.
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3.5.4 The Relative Influence of Each Spouse on the Couple’s Joint Decision
Besides analyzing the similarity between the husband’s (wife’s) and the couple’s decisions,
we now study the way each spouse influences the joint decision in an attempt to understand
which spouse’s risk preferences are better captured in the couple’s joint decision. Following
Carlsson et al. (2013), we categorize each household based on the similarity in the number of
safe choices: (1) couple is closer to husband, (2) couple is equally distant from husband and
wife, and (3) couple is closer to wife. We estimate an ordered probit model to study factors
that influence the likelihood to fall into one of these three categories. Table 3.11 summarizes
the predicted probabilities for each category. We observe that a couple’s joint decision is more
likely to be influenced by the husband (43 percent) than by the wife (36 percent). Furthermore,
having equal influence on the joint decision is even less likely (20 percent).
The marginal effects of the ordered probit27 regression are presented in Table 3.12. Two
variables influence the likelihood that the couple is closer to the husband. On one hand,
monogamous husbands are less likely to be closer to the couple relative to polygamous husbands,
in which the predicted probability of being in this category decreases from 43 to about 30
percent. However, once we consider some interactions, we find that Muslim monogamous
husbands are 13 percent more likely to be closer to the couple than non-Muslim monogamous
husbands. Moreover, these same factors influence the likelihood that the couple’s joint decision
is closer to the wife’s, but in the opposite direction. For instance, monogamous wives are around
12 percent more likely to be closer to the couple than polygamous wives. However, monogamous
wives married to Muslim husbands are 12 percent less likely to be closer to the couple relative
to monogamous wives married to non-Muslim husbands. This first model finds two variables,
monogamous status and its interaction with Muslim husband, which influence the likelihood
that one spouse has more influence over the joint decision. Policy makers designing household
development strategies in regions in which polygamy is still prevalent should consider the way
monogamous or polygamous statuses affect intra-household dynamics and the effectiveness of
their strategies.
While these three categories from the first model inform us on who has more influence, we
27An ordered logit regression was also estimated obtaining very similar results.
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expand the understanding of the relative influence of each spouse on the joint couple’s decision
by using a new proxy for bargaining power. We construct this proxy using the following formula:
female barg =
( |Shusband − Scouple|
10
− |Swife − Scouple|
10
)
(3.1)
where S equals number of safe choices by husband, wife, or couple. We look at the absolute
difference in safe choices for each comparison group, and we divide by the maximum number of
safe choices possible. Notice that female barg takes the value of 1 if the husband is as different
from the couple and there is no difference in safe choices between wife and couple (i.e. wife
has the most influence over the couple relative to her husband). Furthermore, female barg is
0 when both spouses have the same influence over the couple’s decision and their differences
in safe choices are equal. Lastly, female barg takes the value of -1 if the husband has identical
choices as the couple, and the wife is as different to the couple as possible (i.e. wife has the
least influence over the couple relative to her husband). With this definition, a positive female
barg implies that the wife has more influence over the couple’s choice, and a negative female
barg implies that the husband is more influential. We then normalize this measurement such
that if falls between 0 and 1. After this normalization, we observe that the average female barg
is 0.49 and the median is 0.5, the point where both have equal influence over the joint profile.
With this female bargaining power measure constructed, we assign ordered categories de-
pending on the wife’s empowerment level or relative influence over the joint couple’s decision
as summarized in Table 3.13. There are more households below the equal influence category,
in which 728 households have wives with less influence than their husbands. We observe 117
fewer households that have wives with more influence than their husbands, with a total of 611
households. Lastly, we find 340 households in which both husband and wife have same influ-
ence over joint decisions. We estimate an ordered probit with these categories as the dependent
variable. The predicted probabilities are summarized in Table 3.13, which suggest that it is
more likely for wives to have less influence over the joint decision than to have more influence.
Table 3.14 summarizes the marginal effects from the model. Monogamous status influences
the likelihood of falling into each category. Wives from monogamous households are more likely
to be more empowered than wives from polygamous households. The probability of falling into
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the categories with less influence (i.e. categories 1, 2, and 3) decreases for monogamous wives.
At the same time, the probability of falling into the categories with more influence (i.e.5,
6, and 7) increases for monogamous wives, which is consistent with the findings from Table
3.12. However, the marginal effects vary in size per category, with larger effects, around 10
percentage points, for categories three and five. These two categories fall next to the category
of equal influence from both spouses, which has a very small, but positive marginal effect.
In particular, monogamous wives are more likely to have the same influence over the couple’s
decision relative to polygamous wives, and the predicted probability of falling within this equally
influence category increases from 20 to around 21 percent. Once we consider monogamous
status and religion together, we find that that wives are more likely to be less empowered
within monogamous households with Muslim husbands relative to wives within monogamous
households with non-Muslim husbands. Again, we observe larger marginal effects around the
equally influence category, which has a small marginal effect that is not statistically significant.
Seeing the different sizes of the marginal effects for each category confirms the importance of
using these different categories. With this model, we confirm that monogamous status and its
interaction with Muslim husband increase the likely that one spouse has more influence over
joint decisions under risk. Moreover, we are able capture different marginal effects sizes for
each wife’s empowerment category that go beyond simply identifying which spouse is closer to
the couple’s joint decision.
From these two models in this subsection, we expand our understanding of intra-household
dynamics and finish addressing our second research question. Our results suggest that husbands
are predicted to have more influence over couples’ joint decisions relative to their wives. Having
husband and wife with equal influence over the couple is the least predicted category. Based
on the first model, monogamous status and its interaction with Muslim husband increase the
likelihood that one spouse is going to have more influence over the couple. For instance,
monogamous wives are more likely to be closer to the couple than polygamous wives. At
the same time, monogamous wives married to Muslim husbands are less likely to have more
influence over the couple relative to monogamous wives married to non-Muslim husbands. For
the second model, we construct a proxy for female bargaining power and assign each wife
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into seven empowerment level categories. Monogamous status and its interaction with Muslim
husband also increase the likelihood that a wife falls within a particular empowerment level. In
particular, monogamous wives are more likely to be more empowered than polygamous wives.
At the same time, monogamous wives married to Muslim husbands are more likely to be
less empowered than polygamous wives married to non-Muslim husbands. Lastly, we capture
different marginal effect sizes with our second model, finding larger effects around the equal
influence category. Our results support the need for more research and a better understanding
of intra-household dynamics for the design of more effective development strategies targeting
household outcomes.
3.5.5 The Relation between Female Bargaining Power and Household Expendi-
ture Decisions
Our last research question is focused on understanding the way female bargaining power
or wife’s empowerment level, measured as the wife’s relative influence over the joint decision,
affects annual expenditures on education and on medical related goods. For polygamous house-
holds, we take the chosen wife’s bargaining power as representative of other wives’ empower-
ment levels. Focusing on educational expenditure, the survey includes questions about annual
expenditures on tuition, school registration, books, newspapers, notebooks, or other expenses
related to education. We use answers to these questions and construct an annual education
expenditure variable. The average annual educational expenditure is 25870 XAF. We estimate
a linear regression with the latter as the dependent variable, and we include female barg as an
explanatory variable, among others.
Table 3.15 summarizes results from the regression. The proxy for wife’s empowerment is
positively correlated with educational expenditure, suggesting that households with more em-
powered wives tend to spend more on education on average. For instance, a 0.01 increase in
female bargaining power, which ranges from 0 to 1, is associated with a 270 XAF increase
in educational expenditure. This result confirms the importance of understanding the rel-
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ative influence each wife has on the intra-household decision-making process. Development
strategies that promote female empowerment could also potentially attain a higher educational
investment.
We control for key household members risk preferences by including both husbands and
wifes number of safe choices as proxies for their risk preferences. Households with older hus-
bands appear to invest more on education on average, but the size of the coefficient is small. We
control for the size of the household by including number of wives, sons, daughters, grandmoth-
ers, grandfathers, other male relatives, and other female relatives who live in the household.
While the number of wives is negatively correlated with annual educational expenditure, the
number of sons and daughters are positively correlated. The signs of these correlations are in-
tuitive as having more wives could result in more expenditure on them, decreasing educational
expenditure. Households with more sons and with more daughters tend to invest more on
education than households with fewer sons and fewer daughters respectively on average. The
size of the coefficient for number of sons is more than double the coefficient for the number of
daughters, suggesting that households tend to allocate more money towards their sons’ educa-
tion. The number of other male relatives who live in the household is also positively correlated
with educational expenditure. Having more male household members could result in additional
household income, which can be allocated towards education.
With regards to adult education, households with educated28 spouses tend to spend more
on education relative to household with uneducated spouses. Households in which only one
spouse is educated or in which both are educated tend to spend more on education relative
to households with uneducated parents. We observe a larger coefficient for households in
which only the husband received formal schooling. The coefficient for households in which
only the wife attended school and in which both spouses attended school are similar in size.
Lastly, we control for other variables such as wife’s age, spouses’ work information, religion,
monogamous status, and average health29, but their coefficients are not statistically significant.
28In this context, an educated person is one who attended school. Given the low level of education in the
region, the majority do not obtain any formal schooling.
29To control for health status within the household, we utilize a question from the survey that asks respondents
to assess their current health status by selecting one of the following: good, relatively good, fair, or bad. Each
of these responses was assigned 3, 2, 1 and 0 respectively. The average health variable is computed as the
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While we control for several variables, we understand that our data could be missing important
information. Hence, we know we are finding correlations that call for more research to confirm
any causation. Nonetheless, our findings suggests a positive relation between female bargaining
power and educational expenditure that could be very useful for the effectiveness of development
strategies.
For annual medical expenditures, the field survey includes questions about semi-annual ex-
penditures on medicines, drugs, hygiene articles, and body-care products and about annual
expenditures on examination, care, and hospital fees. We construct an annual medical ex-
penditure variable with the answers to the former questions. The average annual educational
expenditure is 69760 XAF, more than twice the average annual educational expenditure. We
estimate a linear regression model that is summarized in Table 3.16. As with education, our
proxy for wife’s empowerment is positively correlated with annual medical expenditures. For
example, a 0.01 increase in female bargaining power is associated with a 512 XAF increase
in medical expenditure on average. The more influence a wife has on the couple’s decision,
the more medical expenditure her household has on average after controlling for other factors
such as number of households members and average health. Finding this positive relation be-
tween female bargaining power and medical expenditure is important for development policies
that are designed to attain better health outcomes. Nonetheless, more research is required to
identify any causation.
Both number or sons and daughters are also positively correlated with medical expenditure,
and the estimated coefficient are very similar. The more children within a household, the more
medical expenditures are incurred. As with education, the number of other male relatives is
also positively correlated with medical expenditure, which can also be explained by having
more males who can work and contribute their income. Households in which only the husband
received any formal schooling tend to spend more on medical expenditure relative to household
with uneducated spouses.
We control for current health status of household members and recent diseases in a couple of
average of this numeric health assessment for every household member (i.e. head of household, wives, children,
grandparents, and other relatives who live in the household).
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ways. First, we construct an average health variable based on the subjective assessment of the
health status of each household member. The coefficient for this average is negative, meaning
that households with a higher average subjective health status (i.e. healthier households)
tend to spend less on medical related products. However, this coefficient is not statistically
significant. The survey also asked responded to state whether they had suffered four specific
diseases in the last two weeks. The survey focused on malaria, diarrhea, respiratory diseases,
and eye infections. We construct four variables that count the number of household members
who had each disease in the last two weeks. Among the four diseases, the only statistically
significant coefficient is for the number of households with respiratory diseases. Having more
members with respiratory diseases in the last two weeks increases medical expenditures on
average.
From this subsection, we conclude that female bargaining power has a positive and statisti-
cally significant relation with educational and medical expenditures after controlling for several
variables. From both models, increasing wife’s empowerment is associated with increases in
educational and expenditure expenditures. While our analysis finds a positive relation, more
research is needed to fully comprehend the way intra-household dynamics and female bargain-
ing power influence household’s decisions and to better design development strategies focused
on education and health outcomes.
3.6 Conclusions
Given the importance of intra-household dynamics for the success of development poli-
cies, we study heterogeneity in risk preferences between husband and wife within a household,
the relative influence of each spouse on joint decisions involving risk, and the way this rela-
tive influence affects annual educational and medical expenditures within a household using a
lab-in-the-field risk experiment. Focusing on the aggregate data, we observe risk aversion in
husbands, wives, and couples, in which husbands are observed to be more risk averse than wives
and couples on average. Focusing on the percentage of same choices at each decision in the
experiment, we find more matches between husband and couple than between wife and couple,
suggesting more influence of husbands over couples’ decisions. At the household level, we find
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heterogeneity in risk preferences between husband and wife. A wife who chose her husband
for marriage tends to have more similar risk preferences, in absolute terms and on average, as
her husband relative to a wife who did not chose. Moreover, we find characteristics that affect
whether one spouse is more, equally, or less risk averse than the other, incorporating a direction
in the difference in risk preferences. A working wife is less likely to be more risk averse than
her husband relative to a non-working wife on average.
To study the relative influence of each spouse on joint decisions involving risk, we use
individual and joint decisions from the lab-in-the-field to find which spouse is closer to the
couple. We find that monogamous husbands are less likely to be closer to the couple relative to
polygamous husbands, and that monogamous wives are more likely to be closer to the couple
than polygamous wives on average. Besides considering which spouse is closer to the couple,
we also study the relative influence of each spouse on joint decisions using a proxy for female
bargaining power based on the difference in individual and joint decisions. Using this measure,
we find that wives from monogamous households are more likely be more empowered relative
to polygamous wives. At the same time, monogamous wives married to Muslim husbands are
more likely to be less empowered than monogamous wives married to non-Muslim husbands.
Lastly, we explore the way this proxy for female bargaining power affects annual educational
and medical expenditures. We find that households with more empowered wives tend to invest
more on education than households with less empowered wives. At the same time, the more
influence a wife has on the couple’s decision, the more medical expenditure her household has
on average, controlling for number of household members and subjective average health status.
Our findings reaffirm the importance of understanding spouses’ heterogeneity of risk preferences
and the relative influence of each spouse on joint decisions. Considering spouses’ differences in
preferences and intra-household dynamics can result in more effective development strategies
that target household outcomes. Furthermore, our results find that female bargaining power
is positively correlated with educational and medical expenditures, which are often associated
with development goals. We conclude by emphasizing the need and importance of more research
in this area that can assist policy makers in designing more effective development strategies.
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3.7 Tables and Figures
Figure 3.1 Cameroon Map
http://static.cameroonweb.com/GHP/img/pics.org/Regional-Map.jpg
Accessed on: 6/10/2016
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Table 3.1 Summary Statistics
Variable Mean
Wife’s age 32.62
Husband’s age 45.89
Older wife (=1) 0.01
Wife is Muslim (=1) 0.83
Husband is Muslim (=1) 0.84
Monogamous household (=1) 0.52
1st wife in polygamous household (=1) 0.33
Number of wives 1.69
Number of children 5.19
Number of sons 2.72
Number of daughters 2.47
Same ethnicity among spouses (=1) 0.87
Dowry was paid by husband (=1) 0.97
Wife chose husband (=1) 0.32
Wife worked during the year (=1) 0.68
Husband worked during the year (=1) 0.96
Relative welfare1 2.85
Wife went to school (=1) 0.28
Husband went to school (=1) 0.40
Husband’s expenditure on wife(s) 16.04
Number of observations 1689
1Based on the following question: In your opinion, how is your household level of welfare
relative to others in the village? =1 if much worse, =2 if worse/lower, =3 if the same, =4 if
better, and = 5 if much better
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Table 3.2 Risk Experiment Lotteries
Decision Option A Option B Expected
Payoff
(A-B)
1 110 of 2000 XAF ,
9
10 of 1600 XAF
1
10 of 3850 XAF ,
9
10 of 100 XFA 1165 XFA
2 210 of 2000 XAF ,
8
10 of 1600 XAF
2
10 of 3850 XAF ,
8
10 of 100 XFA 830 XFA
3 310 of 2000 XAF ,
7
10 of 1600 XAF
3
10 of 3850 XAF ,
7
10 of 100 XFA 495 XFA
4 410 of 2000 XAF ,
6
10 of 1600 XAF
4
10 of 3850 XAF ,
6
10 of 100 XFA 160 XFA
5 510 of 2000 XAF ,
5
10 of 1600 XAF
5
10 of 3850 XAF ,
5
10 of 100 XFA -175 XFA
6 610 of 2000 XAF ,
4
10 of 1600 XAF
6
10 of 3850 XAF ,
4
10 of 100 XFA -510 XFA
7 710 of 2000 XAF ,
3
10 of 1600 XAF
7
10 of 3850 XAF ,
3
10 of 100 XFA -845 XFA
8 810 of 2000 XAF ,
2
10 of 1600 XAF
8
10 of 3850 XAF ,
2
10 of 100 XFA -1180 XFA
9 910 of 2000 XAF ,
1
10 of 1600 XAF
9
10 of 3850 XAF ,
1
10 of 100 XFA -1515 XFA
10 1010 of 2000 XAF ,
0
10 of 1600 XAF
10
10 of 3850 XAF ,
0
10 of 100 XFA -1850 XFA
Holt & Laury’s (2002) payoffs were converted to the local currency in Cameroon.
XAF stands for CFA franc, the currency used in Cameroon.
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Table 3.3 Summary of Inconsistent Responses
Group Number
choosing
Option A on
10th lottery
% Number with
multiple
switching on
points
% Number
with both
inconsistencies
%
Husbands 248 15.68% 295 17.47% 513 30.37%
Wives 147 8.7% 419 24.81% 526 31.14%
Couples 134 7.93% 242 14.33% 362 21.43%
Households* 385 22.79% 685 40.56% 905 53.58%
*either husband, wife, or couple has inconsistent responses
Figure 3.2 Percentage of Safe Choices in Each Decision
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Figure 3.3 Percentage of Same Responses in Each Decision
Table 3.4 Average Number of Safe Choices by Group
Group Average Number of Safe Choices
Husbands 5.02
Wives 4.84
Couples 4.90
Number of Households 1679
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Table 3.5 Risk Aversion Classification Based on Lottery Choices
Number of
Safe Choices
Proportion
of Husbands
Proportion
of Wives
Proportion
of Couples
0 0.21 0.16 0.16
1 0.03 0.04 0.02
2 0.04 0.05 0.05
3 0.06 0.07 0.07
4 0.10 0.12 0.13
5 0.11 0.16 0.14
6 0.07 0.10 0.11
7 0.05 0.08 0.09
8 0.06 0.06 0.06
9 0.13 0.11 0.10
10 0.13 0.06 0.07
N=1679
Table 3.6 Marginal Effects of Negative Binomial Model for Absolute Difference in Safe Choices
between Husband and Wife
Variable Marginal
Effect
Robust
Std. Error
P-value
Wife’s age 0.015 0.009 0.0995*
Husband’s age -0.003 0.008 0.7198
Older wife (=1) -0.310 0.640 0.6279
Husband is Muslim (=1) 0.596 0.516 0.2481
Monogamous household (=1) 0.386 0.469 0.4113
1st wife in polygamous household (=1) -0.243 0.220 0.2686
Number of wives -0.142 0.156 0.3626
Number of children -0.005 0.021 0.7983
Same ethnicity among spouses (=1) -0.151 0.212 0.4749
Wife chose husband (=1) -0.443 0.150 0.0032***
Wife worked during the year (=1) -0.057 0.153 0.7081
Relative welfare -0.016 0.084 0.8469
Husband’s expenditure on wife1 0.001 0.001 0.7166
Wife went to school (=1) 0.060 0.194 0.7587
Husband went to school (=1) 0.511 0.509 0.3155
Muslim Husband * Husband with any schooling -0.699 0.462 0.1301
Muslim Husband * Monogamous -0.595 0.424 0.1600
1 For polygamous households, this expenditure is calculated as the average per wife
** Significant at 1% level, ** Significant at 5% level, * Significant at the 10% level
Robust standard errors are estimated.
Number of Observations = 1679
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Table 3.7 Marginal Effects of Ordered Probit Regression on Spouses’ Risk Preference Differ-
ences
Marginal Effects
Variable Wife less
risk averse
than
husband
Wife
equally
risk averse
as husband
Wife more
risk averse
than
husband
Wife’s age -0.0006 0.0000 0.0006
Husband’s age -0.0008 0.0000 0.0008
Older wife (=1) -0.0188 0.0002 0.0187
Husband is Muslim (=1) 0.1395 0.0036 -0.1431
Monogamous household (=1) 0.0429 -0.0008 -0.0422
Number of wives 0.0257 -0.0005 -0.0252
Number of children -0.0040 0.0001 0.0040
Same ethnicity among spouses (=1) -0.0297 0.0009 0.0289
Wife chose husband (=1) -0.0064 0.0001 0.0063
Wife worked during the year (=1) 0.0723*** -0.0005 -0.0718***
Husband worked during the year (=1) -0.0083 0.0002 0.0081
Relative welfare 0.0035 -0.0001 -0.0035
Wife went to school (=1) -0.0129 0.0002 0.0127
Husband went to school (=1) 0.1770** -0.0060 -0.1711**
Husband’s expenditure on wife 0.0001 0.0000 -0.0001
Muslim Husband * Husband with any schooling -0.1670** -0.0030 0.1700**
Muslim Husband * Monogamous -0.0195 0.0003 0.0192
*** Significant at 1% level, ** Significant at 5% level, * Significant at the 10% level
Number of Observations = 1679
Table 3.8 Absolute Difference in Safe Choices
Absolute Difference
in Safe Choices Between:
Min Mean Max Standard
Deviation
Husband and Couple 0 2.37 10 2.51
Wife and Couple 0 2.64 10 2.44
Husband and Wife 0 3.49 10 2.83
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Table 3.9 Marginal Effects of Negative Binomial Model for Absolute Difference in Safe Choices
between Husband and Couple
Variable Marginal
Effect
Robust
Std. Error
P-value
Wife’s age 0.012 0.008 0.1559
Husband’s age -0.004 0.007 0.5801
Older wife (=1) 0.850 0.663 0.1994
Husband is Muslim (=1) 0.574 0.403 0.1540
Monogamous household (=1) 0.120 0.441 0.7853
1st wife in polygamous household (=1) -0.535 0.180 0.0029***
Number of wives -0.308 0.141 0.0288**
Number of children 0.015 0.018 0.4043
Same ethnicity among spouses (=1) -0.343 0.204 0.0918*
Wife chose husband (=1) -0.161 0.134 0.2299
Wife worked during the year (=1) 0.056 0.135 0.6805
Relative welfare -0.074 0.073 0.3065
Husband’s expenditure on wife 0.000 0.001 0.9872
Wife went to school (=1) 0.048 0.162 0.7671
Husband went to school (=1) -0.110 0.381 0.7724
Muslim Husband * Husband with any schooling -0.165 0.388 0.6713
Muslim Husband * Monogamous -0.748 0.409 0.0675*
*** Significant at 1% level, ** Significant at 5% level, * Significant at the 10% level
Robust standard errors are estimated.
Number of Observations = 1679
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Table 3.10 Marginal Effects of Negative Binomial Model for Absolute Difference in Safe
Choices between Wife and Couple
Variable Marginal
Effect
Robust
Std. Error
P-value
Wife’s age 0.008 0.008 0.3272
Husband’s age 0.001 0.007 0.9160
Older wife (=1) -0.200 0.568 0.7240
Husband is Muslim (=1) 0.117 0.452 0.7965
Monogamous household (=1) -0.624 0.421 0.1384
1st wife in polygamous household (=1) 0.098 0.192 0.6106
Number of wives -0.153 0.131 0.2405
Number of children -0.022 0.017 0.2044
Same ethnicity among spouses (=1) -0.046 0.191 0.8091
Wife chose husband (=1) 0.002 0.130 0.9903
Wife worked during the year (=1) 0.097 0.129 0.4536
Relative welfare 0.066 0.073 0.3625
Husband’s expenditure on wife 0.001 0.001 0.2583
Wife went to school (=1) 0.019 0.170 0.9099
Husband went to school (=1) 0.366 0.426 0.3897
Muslim Husband * Husband with any schooling -0.591 0.387 0.1262
Muslim Husband * Monogamous 0.640 0.419 0.1268
*** Significant at 1% level, ** Significant at 5% level, * Significant at the 10% level
Robust standard errors are estimated.
Number of Observations = 1679
Table 3.11 Predicted Probabilities of Joint Influence
Category Average
Predicted
Probability
Couple closer to husband 0.43
Equal Distance 0.20
Couple closer to wife 0.36
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Table 3.12 Marginal Effects of Ordered Probit Regression on Spouses’ Influence on Joint
Decision
Marginal Effects
Variable Couple
closer to
husband
Equal
distance
Couple
closer to
wife
Wife’s age 0.000 0.000 0.000
Husband’s age 0.000 0.000 0.000
Older wife (=1) -0.040 0.001 0.039
Husband is Muslim (=1) -0.040 0.003 0.038
Monogamous household (=1) -0.129* 0.006 0.123*
Number of wives -0.004 0.000 0.004
Number of children -0.003 0.000 0.003
Same ethnicity among spouses (=1) 0.023 -0.001 -0.022
Wife chose husband (=1) 0.035 -0.002 -0.033
Wife worked during the year (=1) 0.016 -0.001 -0.015
Relative welfare 0.018 -0.001 -0.018
Wife went to school (=1) 0.032 -0.002 -0.030
Husband went to school (=1) -0.024 0.001 0.023
Husband’s expenditure on wife 0.000 0.000 0.000
Muslim Husband * Husband with any schooling -0.012 0.001 0.011
Muslim Husband * Monogamous 0.126* -0.008 -0.118*
*** Significant at 1% level, ** Significant at 5% level, * Significant at the 10% level
Number of Observations = 1679
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Table 3.13 Female Bargaining Power Levels
Category female
barg ’s
range
Wife’s
empowerment
level
Observations Predicted
probability
1 =0 least influence over
couple’s decision
21 0.01
2 (0,0.25] less influence
than husband
147 0.09
3 (0.25,0.50) less influence
than husband
560 0.33
4 0.50 same influence
as husband
340 0.20
5 (0.50,0.75] more influence
than husband
535 0.32
6 (0.75,1) more influence
than husband
66 0.04
7 =1 most influence over
couple’s decision
10 0.01
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Table 3.15 Annual Educational Expenditure Regression
Variable Coefficient Robust
Std. Error
P-value
Intercept -21674 27434 0.4300
female barg 27033 15976 0.0920*
Husband’s Number of Safe Choices -258 848 0.7610
Wife’s Number of Safe Choices 670 518 0.1970
Wife’s age 69 154 0.6560
Husband’s age 371 216 0.0870*
Husband is Muslim (=1) -25045 15524 0.1080
Monogamous household (=1) -7972 11265 0.4800
Number of wives -6318 3485 0.0710*
Number of sons 5468 1458 0.0000***
Number of daughters 2495 1139 0.0300**
Number of grandfathers -5324 10301 0.6060
Number of grandmothers -10028 6253 0.1100
Number of other male household members 9295 5351 0.0840*
Number of other female household members 5996 3767 0.1130
Wife worked during the year (=1) -2133 3979 0.5920
Husband worked during the year (=1) -986 6812 0.8850
Only husband went to school (=1) 30485 11971 0.0120**
Only wife went to school (=1) 17727 6156 0.0040***
Both spouses went to school (=1) 19432 7097 0.0070***
Average health of household members 5939 4574 0.1960
*** Significant at 1% level, ** Significant at 5% level, * Significant at the 10% level
Number of Observations = 1678
Clustered standard errors at village level
R-squared=0.06
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Table 3.16 Annual Medical Expenditure Regression
Variable Coefficient Robust
Std. Error
P-value
Intercept 17408 47313 0.7130
female barg 51216 25313 0.0440**
Husband’s Number of Safe Choices 642 1230 0.6030
Wife’s Number of Safe Choices -624 1170 0.5950
Wife’s age -573 457 0.2110
Husband’s age 246 412 0.5510
Husband is Muslim (=1) 7768 17042 0.6490
Monogamous household (=1) -7395 18932 0.6970
Number of wives 3114 11105 0.7790
Number of sons 5593 2410 0.0210**
Number of daughters 5650 3041 0.0650*
Number of grandfathers -14633 26969 0.5880
Number of grandmothers 11266 22394 0.6150
Number of other male household members 11984 6631 0.0720*
Number of other female household members -7068 4495 0.1180
Wife worked during the year (=1) 9943 9280 0.2850
Husband worked during the year (=1) 1669 18425 0.9280
Only husband went to school (=1) 30902 17379 0.0770*
Only wife went to school (=1) 2369 16162 0.8840
Both spouses went to school (=1) 1283 11911 0.9140
Average health of household members -8895 8446 0.2940
Number with malaria in the last 2 weeks 2285 4060 0.5740
Number with diarrhea in the last 2 weeks -7776 11165 0.4870
Number with respiratory diseases in the last 2 weeks 21948 10940 0.0460**
Number with eye infections in the last 2 weeks 20341 22230 0.3610
*** Significant at 1% level, ** Significant at 5% level, * Significant at the 10% level
Number of Observations = 1678
Clustered standard errors at village level
R-squared=0.04
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